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FOREWORD
I am pleased to submit to the legislature the Committee's review of the
regulation of hazardous waste generation and transportation. According to the
Environmental Protection Agency, Massachusetts has serious problems in this
regard. Nearly one-third of all the wells tested in our state show some degree
of contamination, and overall, Massachusetts is one of the ten worst states in
terms of health risk. This is despite the fact that we are not among the ten
largest generators of hazardous waste.
In recognition of these problems, the Committee chose to examine the
capabilities of the Department of Environmental Quality Engineering to
inspect hazardous waste generators and to enforce safe disposal practices.
Following the year-long research that has resulted in this report, the
Committee is even more convinced that a highly visible and focused
enforcement effort is needed to deter any illegal disposal of hazardous waste.
As the Department's response to the draft of this report acknowledges,
the Committee has sought to be constructive in making its observations and
findings. Consequently, I am especially pleased to learn that since the end of
the audit period many of the key issues raised in the report either have been or
are being addressed by the Department.
Nevertheless, because of the importance of the hazardous waste issue,
the Committee intends to follow up with a spot review of the progress claimed
by the DEQE. The Committee will be particularly interested in determining
how the Department has addressed the non-notifier problem, has made
effective use of the manifest system, and has remedied the serious lack of
manpower found in the Northeast regional office. The importance of this last
deficiency is underscored by the fact that that office is responsible for more
than half of the state's hazardous waste problem but is allocated less than 30%
of the total inspectional and compliance resources of the Department.
While the progress made by the Department over the last five years is
gratifying, the state still does not have complete data on the types and
quantities of waste produced in Massachusetts. As a result, the agency is
unable to reasonably estimate the extent of illegal disposal of hazardous waste
now occurring. Despite this problem, the Department has persistently failed
to make effective use of alternative resources, such as volunteer community
outreach programs and personnel available in other state agencies.
With the siting of a Massachusetts hazardous waste facility still many
years in the future, the current transport and management of hazardous waste
must be among the highest priorities of the Commonwealth. Over 80% of the
hazardous wastes generated in Massachusetts still must be transported out of
state, which increases the health risks to the public. While we recognize that
the Division of Hazardous Waste is a relatively young agency with enormous
public health and safety responsibilities and has achieved considerable progress
in its short history, we do believe that improvements can be made, particularly
in the areas of enforcement, compliance, and prevention. The Department of
Environmental Quality Engineering shows promise of becoming a model for
other environmental agencies. This Committee in its oversight role hopes to
help it to accomplish that goal. For as we all are well aware, preventing the
illegal disposal of hazardous waste is infinitely more palliative and
cost-effective than the current clean-up efforts caused by past inappropriate
disposal of such waste.
LOUIS P. BERTONAZZI, CHAIRMAN / Q
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report examines the hazardous waste problem in Massachusetts and
the implementation of the Hazardous Waste Management Act, Chapter 21 C of
the General Laws. Enacted in November 1979, the Act authorized the
Massachusetts Department of Environmental Quality Engineering (DEQE) to
establish a Division of Hazardous Waste and directed the department to
develop rules and regulations which, where practicable, were to be consistent
with those promulgated under the federal Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976.
Massachusetts' hazardous waste problem is distinct from that of many
other states. First, Massachusetts, has no licensed disposal facilities and must
transport over 80% of the hazardous waste it produces out-of-state. This
complicates the tracking of these wastes and increases the number of
communities that are exposed to their potential threat. As such, although
Massachusetts is not among the ten largest hazardous waste producing states,
its waste may pose greater risk and more complex management problems than
other states by virtue of transport safety.
Second, the profile of small quantity generators and their contribution to
the hazardous waste stream in Massachusetts differ considerably from the
national picture. In response to this, Massachusetts has implemented
regulations more stringent than required by federal statutes. The value and
difficulties of this action are of interest not only to the Commonwealth but to
the federal government as it increases the stringency of its own regulations.
Third, Massachusetts has committed itself to develop of a "state of the
art" computerized manifest system that exceeds federal requirements in its
ability to track hazardous waste load-by-load from the point of generation to
the point of disposal.
In 1980, DEQE created a Division of Hazardous Waste (DHW) to develop
and implement regulations governing the treatment of hazardous waste. This
report is the result of the Committee's examination of the Division's
effectiveness in accomplishing this task. Of the triad of hazardous waste
programs—the day-to-day management of generated waste, the siting of new
disposal and treatment facilities, and the cleanup of abandoned waste
sites—the Committee chose to focus its attention on issues involving the
day-to-day management of hazardous wastes.
In its preliminary research, the Committee identified eight areas for
closer examination:
organization and management of DHW,
hazardous waste generation rates,
the small generator issue,
the manifest system,
inspection and enforcement activities,
generator and transporter attitudes,
educational/outreach efforts, and
the use of the administrative fine.
Each chapter details the findings for these areas. The final section of
this report presents conclusions and recommendations.
A, Summary of Major Findings
The Committee applauds DHW's development of complex and exhaustive
regulations. DHW has attracted talented, highly motivated individuals to
senior and middle management positions. What was found lacking, however,
was an overall organizational cohesiveness and a well defined, long-range
policy which explicitly sets priorities necessitated by limited resources. In
many cases, management decisions affecting the allocation of resources
appeared to be based upon assumptions which, although having a certain
obvious logic, were not necessarily substantiated by data and were in fact
contrary to many of the Committee's findings. Contributing to the lack of
cohesiveness among different parts of the agency were:
1. a rapidly growing agency dependent on a cumbersome staffing
system,
2. general understaffing, including extended vacancies in key
positions,
3. a senior staff with so many disparate individual responsibilities
that no one directly involved in day-to-day activities could
oversee the entire operation, and
4. an agency with responsibility for a wide variety of programs that
continues to increase (Right-to-Know is the latest addition).
These factors have caused the agency to operate in a reactive mode,
constantly changing directions to deal with real or perceived emergencies.
The decentralized regional system, which requires an even stronger
organizational structure, only exacerbates these problems. A sound
management information system does not exist. At the same time, external
factors such as the shifting priorities at the federal Environmental Protection
Agency have adversely impacted on attempts to plan and organize the state's
own program.
The Division of Hazardous Waste has not established a sound estimate of
the volume of hazardous waste generated. Instead it has relied on figures
from the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Management produced
in the Generic Environmental Impact Report, figures that interchange wastes
reported as transported off the site of generation for overall generation
amounts. Acceptance of this interchange appears consistent with the way
DHW has selectively focused resources on certain segments (large quantity
generators) while giving little attention to other sectors (small quantity
generators and non-notifiers). The Committee's investigation has shown that
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these small generators, although producing less waste, may pose a higher risk
to the community. However, this can only be determined and resources can
only be appropriately allocated when total generation volumes and their fate
are established and all policy decisions and resource allocations are
promulgated from this basis.
Similarly, we have only rough estimates of the number of generators of
hazardous waste. Of the conservatively estimated 3,000 to 6,000 small
quantity generators of hazardous waste, 1,900 have notified DEQE that they
are generating hazardous waste. This means that 30% to 60% of small
quantity generators may not have notified DEQE , compared to 5% or less of
large quantity generators. The DEQE budget narrative estimates that there
may be as many as 10,000 small quantity generators. Therefore, the portion
not notifying may be much larger. Since small quantity generators may
contribute as much as 20% to 22% to the hazardous waste stream, a
substantial portion of the approximately 40,000 tons of small generator waste
produced per year may be unaccounted for.
Having recognized in the regulations the potential risk posed by the small
quantity generator of hazardous waste, the Department in implementing its
compliance and inspection program has not paid appropriate attention to this
group. Small quantity generators were found to be the least likely to know
about or understand regulations. Many suffer significant financial barriers in
the transport of their small quantities of waste. Despite the potential risk
posed by them, DHW inspects few small quantity generators, has no
alternative approach such as a random inspection plan, and has developed no
clearly stated plans to confront this problem .
The computerized manifest system was instituted by DEQE to
continuously track hazardous waste, provide data on types and amounts of
waste, and serve as a critical enforcement tool. DEQE has succeeded in
expanding its capacity to process tens of thousands of manifests annually and
to improve the rate by which those forms are in complete compliance with
regulations. However, due to the large number of total manifests processed,
the 9% non-compliance rate means that 5,000 manifests annually or 100 each
week must be corrected. This is often a lengthy, resource-intensive process
that compromises the timeliness of the computerized system, its very purpose.
Moreover, the Committee's investigation found that the manifest system
has not initiated any enforcement cases, detected any instances of illegal
disposal, or been utilized by the regions to trigger investigations. It has only
functioned reactively, acting as backup documentation for cases developed in
other ways. Similarly, the manifest system has not been able to provide
continuous tracking of each load of hazardous waste. Discrepancies flagged
for follow-up often require months rather than days or weeks to resolve.
Additionally, there is no readily accessible database on the outcome of cases
caught by the computer system for review.
Although operational for several of years, the manifest computer program
still is not entirely workable. Specific types of data cannot be easily retrieved
or separated out from other data. This has resulted in long delays and missed
deadlines in providing data to other agencies and Massachusetts communities,
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as required by 21C. The computer system also has not been developed in a
way that would allow it to track and analyze the generation rates and
reporting practices of either individual generators or segments of the
regulated community. For instance, it cannot track amounts of wastes
manifested by a particular company over time in order to note sudden major
changes in that company's reporting. It cannot compare companies or
industries to standard profiles so as to note major deviations, nor reconcile
companies' manifest data to other reporting sources, such as the annual
report. Also comparisons with data bases from other programs (air or water
quality for instance) cannot be made. These are major shortcomings.
DHWs inspection and enforcement program has increased the number of
inspections and improved compliance rates in recent years and has conducted a
number of major enforcement cases. However, the handling of inspection
cases and the interpretation of regulations take place in four regional offices
and one central office, and these have not been consistent among these five
offices. In some instances, activities are funneled through the central office;
at other times they are not. The issuance of notices of violation and the
timing of escalation to more serious actions follows no consistent pattern.
Given the large number of notices of violations, relatively few are escalated
to more serious enforcement actions, even in cases of repeat violators.
Because of the amount of resources required for formal enforcement
procedures, the Department has frequently favored negotiations with violators
rather than court actions. Although this approach has its place, there appears
to be an overreliance on it, particularly in more serious second tier cases.
This inability to prosecute in court a sufficient number of publicized
enforcement matters has diminished the climate of general deterrence sought
by the legislature when the Hazardous Waste Management Act was enacted
and has added to the general perception among the regulated community that
DHW is a "toothless tiger."
As the number of compliance inspections has increased, the percentage of
businesses found not in compliance has fallen. But among those out of
compliance, the percentage of serious (Class I and II) violations has escalated.
This trend and the Department's failure to verify, as corrected, the majority
of the noted violations, indicates that a much more credible presence must be
established among the regulated community. This is particularly true given
the delaying tactics employed by many repeat violators. To do this the
Department must have an enforcement tool which will allow it to deal
effectively and quickly with violations which are serious but not major in
scope.
The ability to assess an administrative fine will serve the purpose of
eliminating the view that the agency lacks effective sanctioning power and is
not to be taken seriously. The Committee has been impressed with the
rule-making and licensing expertise of the Department's professional staff and
believes that the agency could be entrusted to fairly execute a law giving it
the power to assess monetary penalties for serious violations of the law.
As there is no centralized or automated tracking of cases or a data base
of outcomes, the central office cannot pinpoint major problem areas in the
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regulated community or assess the effectiveness of its own program. DHW has
chosen an inspection procedure that may require 10 to 15 years to cover all
large quantity generators, a timetable that seems to negate the deterrence
value of inspections. DHW has also targeted its inspection resources to the
large generators to the almost total exclusion of small generators, even though
the larger ones are in compliance 80% of the time and small generators may
be at highest risk due either to their higher level of non-notification or to the
frequent lack of understanding of regulations among those who are in the
system.
Another way in which the Department has failed to effectively utilize its
limited compliance resources has been its deployment of personnel to the
regional offices which is not proportionate to the regulatory burden in the
regions. For example, the western region with 19% of the generators has
three RCRA inspectors, while the northeastern region with over 50% of the
generators has only four RCRA inspectors. Future budget plans indicate that
this imbalance will not be corrected.
One major problem is that there is no clear cut line of authority and
communication between the central office and regional offices. As a result,
activities, policies, and training differ from one region to another. For
example, one region prefers unannounced or surprise inspections, and another
region operates on a carefully pre-arranged basis. The central office has made
no effort to evaluate the results of these different approaches to determine
whether one is more effective than another.
The state's lack of an organized systematic surveillance effort has
created a situation where a number of different agencies attempt to detect
illegal dumping without regard or knowledge of the efforts of others. A pilot
program started in June 1982 to increase surveillance by using resources
available in other agencies failed mainly because DEQE did not have enough
resources to properly organize or supervise it. DEQE should not let its role of
lead agency in this program slip away through default. Instead, it should seek
sufficient resources to allow it to assume the leadership role granted to it in
1979 by the legislature.
Interviews with numerous officials from DEQE and other agencies have
convinced the Committee that outreach and education programs are critical to
the success of the hazardous waste management program. DEQE budget
narratives and five-year plans continually stress the need for such an effort;
yet, the only major outreach program tried so far, the Community Hazardous
Waste Coordinator Program, has deteriorated into inactivity due to the
priorities of other programs and an absence of adequate funding. A major
cause of non-compliance is lack of knowledge about or understanding of
regulations, particularly among small generators. Since most non-notifying
companies are smaller generators often best identified by local communities,
the absence of such a community outreach program represents a critical loss
to DHW in controlling if not the largest quantities of waste perhaps that at
highest risk. This is regretable because the low cost of an educational
program makes its cost benefits quite favorable.
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B. Summary of Recommendations
1. The Department must establish a cohesive, centralized
management structure that is capable of instituting priorities in
a manner which most effectively utilizes limited resources and
specifically targets the highest risk sectors of the hazardous
waste stream. Basic to this goal is the development of a
formalized management information system and standardized
employee evaluations.
2. The Department, either alone or in conjunction with associated
regulated agencies, should develop a standard of total hazardous
waste generation, so as to provide a means of estimating the
amount of waste that may not be accounted for through the
agency's reporting mechanism. This would have particular
importance for focusing attention on sectors that may not be
reporting all waste or not in the system, such as small quantity
generators. In conjunction with this effort DEQE needs to more
carefully assess the problems of small generators, in knowing
about, understanding and complying with regulations. It should
consider novel ways of handling such problems which the present
regulatory mechanism, oriented to the larger generators, is not
geared to handle. Limited transport of certain wastes is an
example of this.
3. The Department must carefully assess the value of its present
use of the computerized manifest system in which every one of
the tens of thousands of manifests is processed and examined, at
a great cost in labor and other resources. Given that no
enforcement cases have been initiated nor have major
discrepancies been discovered through this system, the
Committee thinks a more efficient use of resources might be to
randomly audit manifests, in a highly publicized way, as does the
Department of Revenue. Violators would be heavily fined.
Computer capability could be used to develop detailed profiles of
different segments of the hazardous waste community by size or
type of industry. This capability could then be directed to high
risk sectors or those deviating from expected levels of activity
for closer scrutiny.
4. The Department needs to develop protocols governing the
inspection process and all types of enforcement response so as to
ensure effective and consistent regulation throughout the state.
Procedures should be instituted so that activities are funneled
through the central office for review and monitoring. To
translate these plans into results the Department must establish
a credible, visible presence among the regulated community,
ensuring a climate of general deterrence. This should likely
include the highly publicized prosecution of more cases. It would
also include utilization of other statewide enforcement groups
such as the State Police or Natural Resource Officers who have
great familiarity with and contacts in local areas.
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5. The Department must reconsider the impact of its inspection
program which as presently structured will require 10-15 years
to inspect all large quantity generators, with little of such
resources available for small quantity generators. A less
thorough but more rapid inspection process which can locate
major violators more quickly may create more of an atmosphere
of deterrence and yield better results.
6. The Committee feels that the Outreach Programs, specifically
the Community Hazardous Waste Coordinator Program and the
Industry Assistance Program, should receive as much active
support as they have received attention in the Agency's
descriptions of its program. These programs can be very cost
effective and are well suited for an agency operating with
limited resources and for a regulatory problem that extends into
every community in the state.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This report examines the hazardous waste problem in Massachusetts and
evaluates the effectiveness of the implementation of regulations in handling
this growing problem. Hazardous waste management is an all encompassing
term that can be broken down into three distinct components:
1. the day-to-day management of the hazardous waste stream,
including the off-site transport of wastes;
2. the siting of new facilities to handle the treatment and disposal
of hazardous waste; and
3. the cleanup of hazardous waste that has been previously dumped
in an environmentally inappropriate manner—either intentionally
or unintentionally—and threatens human health.
All of these components are vital to the environmental and economic
health of the state; all three are worthy of the Committee's time and attention
for a variety of reasons. The failure, thus far, to establish new facilities for
the treatment and disposal of locally produced hazardous waste in
Massachusetts is quite disturbing. Without secure disposal sites in this state,
the strong resurgence of the Massachusetts economy could be seriously
blunted, and future attempts to manage the toxic waste stream will be
impaired.
A review of the state's efforts to clean up hazardous waste that has been
previously dumped improperly is warranted because of the magnitude of the
local problem. The Environmental Protection Agency has considered
Massachusetts to be among the ten worst states in terms of adverse health
effects due to improper disposal practices, even though Massachusetts is not
included among the top ten hazardous waste-producing states. With that
assessment it is not surprising to find that Massachusetts has three sites on the
list of the twenty most serious Superfund sites nationally.
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As it was not possible for the Committee to examine all three components
adequately, it chose to focus on the day-to-day management of hazardous
waste for three reasons:
1. The day-to-day hazardous waste management component
consists of a variety of programs so that it poses much more
complex management challenges than do the other two
components, which basically consist of single programs. The
first component may derive the most value from an independent
assessment.
2. The development of a successful siting progam and the data
necessary for that development are based, at least in part, on an
effectively functioning day-to-day management program.
3. The need to clean up improperly disposed of hazardous wastes
reflects a failure in the hazardous waste management system. It
also results in a cost that is 50-100 times greater than the initial
proper management of the same waste. The Committee felt it
timely and cost effective, therefore, to ensure the proper
functioning of the program which can prevent future threats to
health and the environment. The Love Canal provides a good
example of the value of this approach. A report by the
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment states it would
have cost $2 million to properly manage the wastes found in Love
Canal, versus $36 million spent through 1980 on remedial
cleanup, with a final bill expected to exceed $100 million. There
are also $2 billion in lawsuits and untold personal tragedy due to
loss of homes and health. Similar upheavals in peoples lives have
been evidenced in areas such as Woburn.
Futhermore, the existence of old and potentially dangerous waste disposal
sites can create strong social pressure for immediate remediation. Similarly,
efforts to locate new environmentally sound disposal sites can generate a
firestorm of protest, guaranteeing intense public review. In these
circumstances there is a constant danger that management resources allocated
to the regulation of present hazardous waste generation will be redirected to
the more visible problem of cleaning up old dumps and preparing new sites.
The Committee points out that a program to effectively deal with current
hazardous waste management may be substantially unrelated to the response
system designed to deal with cases involving sites, legal or otherwise. It is
concerned that the failure to recognize that the management strategies and
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skills needed for the several components of the system are not
interchangeable. Thus, the Committee hopes its decision to focus on the
day-to-day management of toxic wastes will serve to assist program managers
as they seek to assure that this vital component is not sacrificed to competing
but more glamorous efforts.
A. Public Attempts to Protect the Environment
While the Committee in this report focuses on current efforts to control
the movement of hazardous wastes in Massachusetts, it is very much aware of
the fact that hazardous waste is but a part of a broader and more complex
puzzle requiring solution at local, national, and international levels. Our
present review provides only a snapshot of one statute, one agency, and one
aspect of a problem that over the last twenty years has burned itself into the
public consciousness. Chemical contamination of the environment is now
recognized as a threat to the very nature of life. With that recognition has
come a demand from the public that government act to preserve and protect
our environment from harm by toxic chemicals.
Government has responded, but progress has not been achieved without
struggle and heated dispute. Just over twenty years ago, ideas expressed in
the following paragraphs were sufficient in the minds of some to call into
question the patriotism of their author:
"As the tide of chemicals born of the Industrial Age has arisen to
engulf our environment, a drastic change has come about in the
nature of the most serious public health problems. Only yesterday
mankind lived in fear of the scourges of smallpox, cholera, and
plague that once swept nations before them. Now our major
concern is no longer with the disease organisms that once were
omnipresent; sanitation, better living conditions, and new drugs have
given us a high degree of control over infectious disease. Today we
are concerned with a different kind of hazard that lurks in our
environment—a hazard we ourselves have introduced into our world
as our modern way of life has evolved."
"The new environmental health problems are multiple—created by
radiation in all its forms, born of the never-ending stream of
chemicals of which pesticides are a part, chemicals now pervading
the world in which we live, acting upon us directly and indirectly,
separately and collectively. Their presence casts a shadow that is
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no less ominous becasue it is formless and obscure, no less
frightening because it is simply impossible to predict the effects of
lifetime exposure to chemical and physicial agents that are not part
of the biological experience of man."
Nevertheless, Rachel Carson's 1962 Silent Spring and other publications
like it became the catalysts for intense investigation of the dangers posed by
the indiscriminate application of chemical pesticides, and also stimulated a
wide ranging debate over the entire subject of toxic chemical use and
disposal. During the 1960's and early 1970's, public opinion coalesced on the
need to do something. Reacting to public pressure, Congress was galvanized
into action in 1969 with the enactment of the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA). In that act Congress declared it to be the continuing policy of
the federal government, in cooperation with state and local governments and
other concerned public and private organizations to:
"use all practicable means and measures..., in a manner calculated
to poster and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain
conditions under which man and nature can exist in harmony, and
fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and
future generations of Americans."
Federal agencies were directed to carry out their statutory missions in a
manner that would enhance and protect the environment. With the enactment
of NEPA, the federal government firmly bound itself and its client agencies or
beneficiaries to take no actions unless the effects on the natural environment
were measured.
Once Congress acknowledged its own obligation to protect the
environment, it turned its attention to identifying and controlling a number of
specific categories of toxic threats. While not exhaustive, the list of
Congressional initiatives included at least:
The Clean Water Act
The Clean Air Act
Toxic Substances Control Act
Safe Drinking Water Act
Ocean Dumping Act
-11 -
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
Hazardous Materials Transportation Act
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act
Although these laws have some relevance to the handling of hazardous
waste, the federal authority to regulate hazardous waste comes primarily from
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976. This Act, codified by
42 U.S.C. s. 6901 etseq. and known as RCRA, has been amended by the Quiet
Communities Act of 1978, the Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1980,
the Used Oil Recycling Act of 1980, the comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, and was substantially
revised when it was reauthorized on November 9, 1984. This act with its
amendments is the basic legislative authority under which the federal
government regulates hazardous waste activities. Subtitle C of RCRA
authorizes the administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) to promulgate regulations to establish a management system to identify
and account for all regulated hazardous wastes.
A major component of this statutory scheme was accomplished when the
EPA completed the development of the very complex hazardous waste
regulations authorized in Subtitle C. These lengthy and technical rules are
found in Volume 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations: Part 124 and Parts
260-271. Because of their complexity and detail, the regulations were to be
issued in two major phases in order to make the process more orderly. In spite
of this effort, implementation has been slower than anticipated. [Even already
published standards can be troublesome as they are frequently amended and
refined, an evolutionary process that sometimes complicates state attempts to
conform to federal initiatives.]
Conforming their efforts to federal directives is particularly important to
states because RCRA allows and encourages the EPA to delegate to states the
authority to implement a regulatory program, so long as the state's program is
as stringent or more stringent than the federal requirements. Once the state
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receives authorization from the EPA, the day-to-day management of
hazardous waste regulation is the state's responsibility. State law and
regulations become the substantive law governing the subject. However, the
EPA has the authority to enforce the state program and retains the lead role
in criminal enforcement matters. Additionally, the EPA has extensive
authority to gather information and has retained RCRA injunctive authority.
Any description of the legislative history of the hazardous waste
management acts would be incomplete if it did not emphasize that the primary
subject of such legislation is the management of wastes currently generated,
treated, or moved for disposal. The remediation of old or abandoned problem
hazardous waste sites and accidential spills presents issues which are distinct
from the problems associated with current waste management practices. Past
disposal practices and accidental spills are the subject of the clean-up
statutes, usually called the "Superfund" laws, which include at the federal
level, CERCLA and in this Commonwealth, C. 21 E, the Massachusetts Oil and
Hazardous Materials Release Prevention and Response Act. It is important to
note that these laws, unlike the Hazardous Waste Act, are not enforcement
statutes. When enforcement powers have been included in them, the language
has been inserted primarily to assist in achieving the goal of clean-up, not the
prevention of future violations.
B. Scope of the Hazardous Waste Problem
The Environmental Protection Agency's present inventory of hazardous
waste sites numbers 19,668 (December 31, 1984) and is growing daily.
Although not designed for such purpose, the sites were so designated because
they contain hazardous waste, and, therefore, pose a threat to human health
and the environment. The EPA "Superfund" priority list, which includes those
sites considered most serious and requiring immediate attention, originally
consisted of 115 sites, was increased to 546 sites, and has now been recently
updated to 786 sites (December 31, 1984, awaiting final approval). The trend
is clear; it is estimated that eventually the list will grow to between 1,200 to
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2,000 sites. Sixteen of the 115 sites on the original list were in
Massachusetts. Of the twenty most serious Superfund sites, three (15% of the
list) were in Massachusetts—Woburn (Industriplex), Ashland (Nyanza Chemical)
and Holbrook (Baird and McGuire). Other towns in Massachusetts that have
had serious problems are Lowell, Bedford, Acton, Lunenburg, Norwood, and
Tyngsboro. More than 100 sites have already received some type of federal or
state remedial action or have been pinpointed as problems or potential
problems. Other estimates suggest the total number of uncontrolled hazardous
waste dump sites in the Commonwealth is between 600-1,000.
Although there are many ways in which environmental contamination is
translated into human exposure (see Appendix A) a major route is through
groundwater. Groundwater supplies 50% of the American public with their
drinking and washing needs, and meets 40% of agriculture demand.
Consumption of groundwater is growing at the rate of 25% per decade. In
Massachusetts 1.5 million people depend on it to meet their water needs.
Almost 100% of the rural population—where most improper/illegal dumping
occurs—is dependent on groundwater. Because this water source is hidden
from view and is difficult to clean once contaminated, there is great concern
that toxic wastes will leak unknowingly into this finite and irreplaceable
natural resource.
The problem is not only one of potential contamination of this resource
but also the economic and social upheaval that results when a water supply is
protectively closed down. This has already occurred in this state. In Acton,
two active wells, supplying 40% of the town water supply, had to be closed
down in December of 1978 when organic chemicals were found. Water had to
be purchased from neighboring Concord to meet demand. Two wells were
closed down in Woburn in May of 1979. In May 1978, Bedford lost 80% of its
well water source when dioxane and trichloroethylene contamination were
found in four wells. In all, 30% of the wells tested in Massachusetts show
some degree of chemical contamination, a situation described as epidemic and
expected to grow worse.
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Establishing a link between uncontrolled hazardous waste dump sites and
specific health problems is an extremely difficult task. But it is important to
distinguish difficulties due to methodological problems from those due to the
lack of a real connection. The subtlety of effects—changes in genetic
material leading to birth defects or cancers, or permanent damage to
organs—of which an understanding is so important, makes such understanding
difficult due to that very subtlety. In contrast, it is much easier to
demonstrate the cause of acute effects such as fainting from inhalation of
volatile materials or being burnt by corrosive materials.
There are many reasons that make it difficult to establish a link between
cause and effect: the exposed population may not be large enough to
demonstrate a significant change in the incidence of a cancer which does not
normally occur very frequently; determining who was exposed to what for how
long is also quite difficult due to the mobility of the population and the
multiplicity of different chemicals in a dump site; the latency of many
diseases—often 10, 20, or 30 years—makes it difficult to correlate cause and
effect, especially among a highly mobile population; and because most studies
are retrospective, it becomes difficult to know what the exposure levels were
to whom, many years before. There might also be problems of
objectivity—among both the studied population and the interviewers. Both
may be selective in what they report, knowing the purposes of the study.
Despite these difficulties in determining the negative health effects of
hazardous wastes, certain trends have emerged. A study of the Silresim site in
Lowell—a Superfund site—showed an increase in acute health effects:
respiratory problems including wheezing and chest tightness, shortness of
breath, chest pains, persistent colds, irregular heartbeat, headaches, nausea,
and other effects. A question did exist as to whether the degree of exposure
would have produced these effects. In Woburn, another Superfund site, there
have been significantly elevated levels of leukemia even though the cause and
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effect has not been clearly established. A 1979 EPA study considered
Massachusetts among the ten worst states in terms of adverse health effects
due to improper disposal practices, even though Massachusetts is not ranked
among the top ten hazardous waste producing states. The improper disposal
sites were referred to as "ticking time bombs."
Although these studies are far from conclusive proof of a link between
dump sites and human health problems, they do strongly support the
judiciousness of an approach which recognizes that hazardous wastes are by
definition potentially injurous to human health and that they should be
properly managed to avoid a potential problem. In other words, given that
these materials are toxic, the evidence for potentially serious effects is strong
enough to argue against a "wait and see" approach, which would in essence be
a large scale longitudinal study whose results 10, 20 or 30 years from now
could be disastrous.
Due to the complexity of the issues and their rapid rise to prominence,
recognition of the problem has not necessarily been accompanied by a clear
understanding of it, so that recognition alone does not ensure proper control of
hazardous wastes. As an example, the strong citizen concern in Massachusetts
about hazardous wastes has prevented the siting of a single facility in this
state. This failure to develop local treatment sites has had the unfortunate
result of increasing the distances all hazardous wastes must be transported,
and has increased the likelihood that wastes may be disposed improperly or
illegally. As a consequence dangers from hazardous wastes have been
heightened rather than lessened.
C. Hazardous Waste Risk
Hazardous wastes in uncontrolled dump sites obviously pose a much
greater risk to human health than do hazardous wastes that have been properly
packaged, handled and stored. Consequently, it is not enough to simply
1 Environmental Reports, September 14, 1979.
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determine the toxicity of a substance in measuring risk; rather, the likeiihood
of its exposure must be considered. Two substances of equal toxicity which
differ only in that one is a raw material and the other a waste, may pose quite
different degrees of risk simply due to the different ways they are likely to be
handled. Toxic wastes, being by-products with no intended or actual value but
with a potentially high cost for proper disposal, carry a great disincentive to
be handled appropriately. As such they may pose the greatest potential
hazard. Raw materials, on the other hand, are economically and industrially
valuable and so carry a great incentive to "dispose of" into the manufacturing
process in a proper and predictable fashion. As a result their potential hazard
may be quite small.
It is, therefore, the predictability or unpredictability of the movement of
hazardous materials, determined by whether they are raw or wastes, that is as
much at issue as is their toxicity. This distinction is reflected in the different
regulatory approaches to chemicals, based on whether or not they are wastes.
Whereas toxic raw materials can be stored indefinitely at the site of a
generator, hazardous wastes from those same raw materials, of equal toxicity
and stored within equally safe containers, can only be stored for 90 days or
less. Longer storage imposes significantly more stringent regulations. The
implication is that a material being a waste must be regulated more carefully.
This characteristic is as important to its potential harm as is its toxicity.
Analogous to the distinction of risk between toxic raw materials and toxic
wastes is the distinction between hazardous wastes more likely to be handled
properly and hazardous wastes less likely to be handled properly—the segment
that ends up in uncontrolled sites and poses a real danger to human health.
Based on this distinction, the underlying regulatory challenge is not necessarily
to control the greatest volume of hazardous waste or even the more highly
toxic waste (which may in fact pose very little real danger), but rather to
regulate those wastes that are most likely to pose a threat to the population
due to circumstances surrounding their generation and handling. Thus, the
Committee's assessment of the regulatory agency's effectiveness in controlling
hazardous wastes was not based on how well the largest volumes have been
managed but how well the highest risk volumes have been managed.
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D. Identification and Definition of Hazardous Wastes
What constitutes a hazardous waste? The federal statutes define a
hazardous waste as a subset of solid wastes which alone or in combination with
other wastes, and because of the quantity, concentration, or physical,
chemical or infectious characteristics may:
1. cause, or significantly contribute to, an increase in mortality or
an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible
illness, or
2. pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or
the environment when improperly treated, stored, transported,
or disposed of, or otherwise managed.
The specific ways in which hazardous wastes are identified can be found
in Appendix B.
E. Number and Type of Generators of Hazardous Waste
Estimates of the number of generators of hazardous waste nationwide
range from 275,000 to 760,000. The most recent figures indicate an overall
generation of 264 million tons of hazardous waste each year, or more than one
ton for every man, woman, and child in the country. In Massachusetts,
2 3hazardous waste estimates range from 120,000 tons to 2,50,000 tons
produced by 1,700 to 12,000 generators. The disturbing variation in these
estimates is discussed in more detail in a later section.
Hazardous waste generators range from very large industrial plants to a
variety of small neighborhood businesses including dry cleaners, gas stations,
autobody repair and paint shops, printing shops, hospitals, and research
laboratories. A wide variety of businesses contribute to the overall hazardous
waste stream. Every town in Massachusetts has at least one generator of
2GCA, 1980.
3EPA
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hazardous wastes. According to the Generic Environmental Impact Report,
the five major hazardous waste generators in Massachusetts, ranked by order
of volume, are:
1. fabricated metal products except machinery;
2. measuring, analyzing, and controlling instruments;
3. chemicals and allied products;
**. electrical and electronic machinery, and
5. machinery except electrical.
This compares with nationwide production, which is somewhat different:
1. organic chemicals
2. primary metals
3. electroplating
k. inorganic chemicals
5. textiles, petroleum, refining rubber and plastics
There are a number of ways in which these and other industries generate
hazardous wastes:
Production residues: Toxic raw materials that are not used or
become contaminated and cannot be further used, become hazardous
wastes. Contamination can occur from the industrial process or
from accidental spillage.
Bad batches/off-specification products: Products that contain toxic
materials but must be discarded due to imperfection are treated as
hazardous wastes.
Equipment cleanup: Either routine cleaning of equipment or
cleaning between incompatible batches of production material can
generate hazardous wastes. These wastes may result from the
material that is cleaned out, such as a paint pigment or ink, or from
the cleaning substance, such as the various solvents.
Pollution control: Hazardous wastes can be generated from
pollution control equipment ranging from air pollution devices in
smokestacks that leave a fly ash to waste water treatment
equipment.
Table 1 lists common products and hazardous wastes that result from
their manufacture. Table 2 provides a comparison of the amounts of wastes
produced within general categories for the New England States.
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TABLE 1
PRODUCTS AND TYPICAL HAZARDOUS WASTES GENERATED
DURING THE MANUFACTURING PROCESS
Plastics
Pesticides
Medicines
Paints
Metal products
Leather
Organic compounds, chlorinated compounds,
organic sludges.
Organic compounds, chlorinated compounds,
organic phosphate compounds, organic sludges.
Organic solvents and residues, heavy metals (e.g.
mercury, nickel) in solution.
Heavy metal solutions, pigments, solvents,
organic solid or viscous residues.
Heavy metals, flourides, and cyanides in solution;
acid and alkaline solutions; solvents, pigments,
abrasives, oils, and phenols; aqueous
metal-containing sludges.
Solvents.
Textiles Heavy metal solutions, dyes, organic chlorine
compounds, solvents.
Source: 1982 Generic Environmental Impact Report.
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TABLE 2
CATEGORIES USED TO ESTIMATE
1981 MASSACHUSETTS HAZARDOUS WASTE GENERATION
Type 1 - Waste Oil
Includes: - Automotive
Industrial
- Hydraulic
- Waste Fuel Oil, Kerosene, Diesel Oil
- Oil Separation Bottoms
- Tank Bottoms
- Cutting Oils
- Lubricating Oils
Type 2 - Organic
Includes: - Halogenated Solvents
Nonhalogenated Solvents
- Alcohols, Ketones, Ethers
Type 3 - Inorganic
Includes: - Acids and Bases
Aqueous with Heavy Metals and Cyanides
Heavy Metal Sludges
- Plating Wastes
Type 4 - Special Hazard
Includes: - Pesticides
Explosives
Water Reactive
- Biological
- PCBs
Type 5 - Indeterminate
- Information not provided.
Source: 1982 Generic Environmental Impact Report.
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F. Handling of Hazardous Wastes
Nationwide, Massachusetts is not among the top ten hazardous
waste-producing states, which contribute 65% of all hazardous waste. These
states are:
1. Texas
2. Ohio
3. Pennsylvania
4. Louisiana
5. Michigan
6. Indiana
7. Illinois
8. Tennessee
9. West Virginia
10. California
Because the risks associated with hazardous waste are abased on the
likelihood of exposure which in turn is based on the way in which such wastes
are handled, the fact that Massachusetts is not among the ten largest
hazardous waste producers may be of much less significance than other
characteristics that may affect the handling of these wastes and their
exposure to the human population.
Generators of hazardous waste can handle their wastes in a number of
ways. A few of the major ways are:
1. Recycle - either reuse waste or send to another generator that
can use the products in their industrial process. An example in
the dry cleaning industry is the distillation and reuse of cleaning
solvents.
2. Treat or detoxify - a process that either reduces the quantity or
toxicity of wastes. This includes incineration of wastes.
3. Land dispose - in a secure landfill.
4. Incinerate.
Each of these options can take place at the site of generation or can
require transport of the wastes to another location.
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Illegal or improper waste disposal might include: 1) pouring wastes down
drains into the sewer system, 2) dumping wastes in a solid waste landfill or in
the woods or waterways, or 3) incinerating wastes without a permit.
Nationwide it is estimated that 96% of wastes are managed on the sites
where they are generated; the remaining <4% is managed offsite. On a volume
basis 80% of all managed waste is land disposed. Two major hazardous wastes
producing states, Texas and Louisiana, land-dispose 95% to 97% of their
hazardous wastes. In contrast, the profile in Massachusetts is very different.
Last among the 15 industrial states in disposal facilities and with no secure
landfills, 65% of all hazardous waste, or 83% if waste oils are excluded, is
if. 5
transported out of state. ' It is this significant out-of-state transport that
primarily defines the parameters of hazardous waste risk in Massachusetts.
The top five states, by volume, receiving Massachusetts waste are:
1. New Jersey
2. New York
3. Connecticut
4. Other New England States
5. Alabama
As the following chart shows, the cost per gallon mile of waste
transported increases dramatically from Waterbury, Connecticut (3 cents per
gallon) to Emelle, Alabama (54 cents per gallon). These transportation costs
are more dramatic for the smaller generator, which can ill afford them, since
the overall cost is divided among fewer units of transported wastes. For
example, if it costs $150 plus $50 per barrel to transport waste, it would cost
$200 to transport one barrel or $88 per barrel to transport 4 barrels, compared
with $51.50 per barrel to transport 100 barrels. The economics of scale are
considerable, with longer distances the disparity becomes greater. Many
smaller companies find it difficult to pay $100 to $200 to haul a few barrels of
hazardous waste. One generator indicated that his transport costs for a load
of hazardous wastes had increased from $400 to $4,000 since 1979.
^Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, 1983.
^Generic Environmental Impact Report, 1983.
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EXHIBIT I
EFFECT OF HAUL DISTANCE ON HAZARDOUS WASTE COSTS
FOR MASSACHUSETTS GENERATORS
(using Worcester as the point of generation, a price of
$.12 per ton mile, and ii,bQQ gallons per truck load)
Transportation
Cost
!*/gallon>
Worcester
100 200
Newark,
A *"
Waterbury,
cr
300 400 500
Niagara
falls, NY
600 700
A
Williamsburg,
OB
800 900 1000 1100 1200 Distance
| (miles)
Ernelie,
AL
Source: Generic Environmental Impact Report, 1982.
Whereas on-site disposal involves only the generator, off-site disposal
always involves more parties, i.e., transporters and disposal facilities, with an
attendant increase in the risk of contamination. If out-of-state transport is
used, as is the case in Massachusetts, the risk increases, since multiple
transporters and facilities may be involved. The simple fact that the waste
may travel 100 to 1,200 miles increases the potential for harm. Additionally,
interstate shipment involves multiple bureaucracies and a more complex
regulatory scheme. All of these factors increase disposal costs, particularly
the cost of transportation, and serve as a discentive for proper disposal
thereby increasing risk.
In Massachusetts, small generators contribute a significantly greater
fraction to the overall hazardous waste stream than do small firms nationally
(approximately 20% in Massachusetts versus 1% or less nationwide). Due to a
lack of economies of scale it is much more difficult for these smaller firms to
comply with regulations. And because they do not have environmental staffs
-24 -
or individuals who can devote much time to hazardous waste issues, they are
iess likely to know about or understand regulations. These circumstances,
combined with Massachusetts' dependence on transport of most hazardous
wastes, produce a potentially high risk situation. Taken together, these
circumstances may be of much greater significance than the overall quantities
produced, and may explain why Massachusetts has been rated among the ten
worst states in terms of health risks due to hazardous wastes, even though it is
not among the ten largest hazardous waste producing states.
G. Regulatory Response to the Hazardous Waste Problem
When Congress passed the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) in 1976, it gave to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency the responsibility of developing a comprehensive framework for a
hazardous waste management system. At the same time, it made clear that
the states were to be responsible partners in this endeavor. This partnership
was established with the following major elements:
a criteria for identifying the characteristics of hazardous waste
was developed,
lists of wastes or processes were developed,
standards for generators, transporters, and facilities that treat,
store or dispose (TSD) of hazardous waste were promulgated, and
- a permit system for the facilities that treat, store, or dispose of
hazardous waste was established.
Among the more important standards for generators, transporters, and
TSDs are those which mandate:
- use of a manifest system that tracks waste from "cradle"
(creation) to "grave" (final disposal),
- notification to EPA of the generation, transport, or treatment
hazardous waste, in order to receive an ID number,
- proper packaging and labeling of all hazardous wastes,
- restriction in the on-site accumulation of wastes 90 days or less
(or become a TSD),
- personnel training and preparedness, contingency planning and
emergency procedures,
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maintain recordkeeping, annual reporting and manifest exception
reporting (when complete manifests are not returned to
generator within 35 days of shipment).
RCRA also created a small generator exception threshold—any
company generating less than 1,000 kilograms (2,200 lbs.) of hazardous waste
per month, or storing less than that amount was exempted from the
regulations. This also meant that owners or operators of permitted, licensed,
or registered solid waste facilities could accept hazardous waste from small
generators since that waste was exempted from hazardous waste guidelines
(unless that conflicted with state or local regulations).
These federal regulations provide minimum performance standards that
must be met nationwide. Individual states were encouraged to develop their
own hazardous waste programs, and to ultimately assume full responsibility for
hazardous waste management, as long as the state program was "equivalent
to" and "consistent with" the federal guidelines. In the transition period from
federal to state control, an interim authorization would be granted to state
programs that were "substantially equivalent to" the federal guidelines.
H. Massachusetts' Response to Hazardous Waste Threat
The Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Management Act (Chapter 21C of
Mass. General Laws) was enacted on November 9, 1979. The act gives
regulatory authority to the Department of Environmental Quality Engineering
(DEQE) to establish a Division of Hazardous Waste (DHW) to be administered
by a director chosen by the Commissioner. The Department was empowered
to develop rules and regulations to implement Chapter 2 1C. An advisory
committee was established to assist in the development of the regulations.
Chapter 21 C set general guidelines that followed the above RCRA
guidelines to (1) track waste in authorized generators, transporters, and
facilities from generation to disposal; and (2) develop a system to license and
monitor treatment, storage, and disposal facilities.
&An exception which was modified when RCRA was reauthorized by the
Congress late in 1984.
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The state regulations to guide day-to-day operations were developed from
the above general framework. In most respects they were similar to RCRA
regulations with the following important distinction:
A load-by-load manifest system, in which a copy of each
manifest for each load is forwarded to DEQE by both the
generator and facilities. RCRA only requires that generators
and facilities hold copies and report discrepancies.
Transporters must submit monthly reports on amount and types
of waste transported, and must be specifically licensed, including
being bonded, having liability insurance of $1,000,000 and
providing special training.
Landfilling of hazardous waste is authorized only as a last resort
and is prohibited over "actual, planned or potential" underground
drinking water sources (100 gpm or greater).
Waste oils and PCBs were included in the list of hazardous waste.
More progressive reuse and recycling regulations were instituted.
Massachusetts regulations exceeded federal requirements in that all but
"insignificant" wastes are regulated. "Insignificant" is defined as the
generation of hazardous wastes in quantities of less than 20 k.g. (about five
gallons) per month. Acutely toxic wastes are not included in this definition
and, as with RCRA requirements, are regulated if generation exceeds 1 k.g.
per month. The practical result of this regulatory policy is that in
Massachusetts, the l t000 k.g. threshold exemption permitted by federal law
does not exist, and solid waste facilities cannot accept hazardous waste.
Those generating between 20-1,000 k.g. of hazardous waste, defined as "small
generators", must handle their waste properly and manifest it but are given
certain administrative relief—no annual reporting, no contingency plans, and
transporters can assist in the labeling and packaging of the hazardous wastes.
The implementation of the Massachusetts regulations was divided into two
phases:
Phase I - hazardous waste tracking system, including generator and
transporter notification, the manifest system, program
administration and recordkeeping, and interim authorization for
facilities.
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Phase II - specific technical, administrative and financial
requirements for treatment, storage and disposal facilites.
Phase I regulations became effective July 1, 1982. Mandatory compliance
started October 1, 1982. Phase II regulations were promulgated in October
1983. Under Phase I, which constitutes the overall day-to-day control of
hazardous waste movement, the DHW has basically four ways to ensure proper
disposal of hazardous waste:
manifest system - tracks all hazardous waste sent offsite (which
accounts for most hazardous waste in Massachusetts).
inspection of the regulated community.
enforcement activity - surveillance, investigation, and
administrative civil and criminal remedies.
outreach - educational programs.
The development of these regulations represent a major accomplishment.
Massachusetts received full authorization July 1984.
The purpose of this audit was to examine how well the Division of
Hazardous Waste (DHW), within the Department of Environmental Quality
Engineering (DEQE), implemented regulations which were, in many cases,
designed in reponse to the specific problems and special risks of hazardous
waste management in Massachusetts.
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II. STUDY DESIGN
The Senate Committee on Post Audit and Oversight identified eight areas
within the M.G.L. 21C Hazardous Waste Management Plan that it felt
warranted examination. The eight areas that constitute the scope of this audit
are:
1. Organizational and Management Capabilities
2. Generation Rates
3. Small Generator Issue
4. The Manifest System
5. Inspection/Enforcement/Compliance
6. Attitudes of Generators and Transporters
7. Outreach Programs
8. Administrative Fine
These areas encompass the day-to-day management of hazardous wastes.
Critical to the success of any program are the organizational and management
capabilities of the agency mandated to accomplish the legislative intent.
Regulatory success requires a complete knowledge of the universe to be
regulated, in this case, the overall volume of hazardous waste generated.
Because Massachusetts exceeded federal law by including the small quantity
generator within the regulated universe, the Committee felt the small
generator issue was worthy of special attention.
In Massachusetts, the key characteristic of the hazardous waste
management system is that virtually all waste must be transported off site.
This defines the orientation of regulatory controls and the nature and
likelihood of hazardous waste risk. Because most waste is transported, three
participants are involved—generators, transporters, and treatment facilities.
The manifest system and the inspection and enforcement unit are the two
primary regulatory tools employed to promote industry compliance and protect
against the risk of hazardous waste. As such they were examined in detail by
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the Committee. Because this program is relatively new, the Committee also
sought to examine its success and problems from the perspective of the
regulated community—its activities, attitudes, and suggestions. Outreach
programs were examined because they compliment the primary compliance
efforts and were recognized by DEQE as important to these efforts.
Finally, the Committee examined the issue of instituting an
administrative fine, since this is before the legislature and is directly
connected to issues of effective day-to-day management of hazardous waste.
Information was gathered on the eight study areas in three ways:
1. Review of background literature. This included federal and state
studies, including states other than Massachusetts where
relevant. Also reviewed were studies by policy groups and
scientific and private organizations. Documents from DEQE and
other related agencies were examined. This included in-house
studies, five year plans, transition reports, budget narratives,
and memos.
This process helped to identify and focus the eight issue areas
and to identify individuals to interview in more depth.
2. Interviews
a. In-depth interviews were conducted with key personnel within
DEQE to ascertain their performance and approaches to certain
program components. This also allowed an assessment of
attitudes, concerns, problems, critiques, and the consistency of
approach to particular problems from individual to individual.
Interviews with key personnel in related agencies or having
special concerns about the functioning of the program provided a
different perspective of the program.
Individuals interviewed included:
Undersecretary of Executive Office of Environmental Affairs
Policy Analyst, Office of Environmental Affairs
Deputy Commissioner of Department of Environmental Quality
Engineering (DEQE)
Director, Division of Hazardous Waste
Three Deputy Directors, Division of Hazardous Waste
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Eight mid-level personnel, Division of Hazardous Waste
Attorney, Department of Environmental Quality Engineering
Four Regional Engineers (DEQE)
Four Deputy Regional Engineers (DEQE)
Regional Inspectors
Three EPA officials
(three individuals from other states)
Two officials, Department of Environmental Management
Two officials, Department of Public Health
Attorney, Attorney General's Office
NRO officers
Two MDC officers
Ten individuals from citizen, environmental, trade, or
other organizations
Eighteen Community Hazardous Waste Coordinators or equivalent
Fifteen generators
Four transporters
Eight of the above individuals were interviewed at least twice, a total of
95 in-depth interviews.
b. Questionnaire interviews of 55 large and small generators. This
consisted of 10 questions (see Generator Attitudes Chapter)
asked in person or over the phone. Some of the generators
interviewed in-depth were also asked the questions from the
questionnaire.
3. Key processes of the program were directly audited or
examined. This included the manifest system and inspection and
enforcement activities. Files, data, and outcome from these
programs were examined.
In order to obtain appropriate representation, individuals and companies
were contacted in the four regions of the state—northeast, southeast, central,
and western; from large and small companies, from major cities and small
towns; and from different industrial SIC codes.
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III. ORGANIZATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT DIFFICULTIES
IN THE HAZARDOUS WASTE PROGRAM
The 1979 Hazardous Waste Management Act, c. 21c of the General Laws,
directed the Department of Environmental Quality Engineering to establish a
Division of Hazardous Waste to be administered by a director appointed by the
Commissioner and to serve at his pleasure. Aside from the brief directive, the
Division is not mentioned again in the act. The responsibility and authority to
establish the desired "cradle-to-grave" tracking and management system for
hazardous waste was assigned to the department. The Division of Hazardous
Waste (DHW), although created by statute, functions only with the duties
delegated to it by the Commissioner of the department, but has been assigned
the job of developing and managing the program.
Both the division and its parent department would seem to be in enviable
positions in that they have been recently created to establish rapidly
expanding new programs. This uniqueness carries with it many advantages and
disadvantages. The newness of the agencies and the importance of their
missions allows them to attract and hire enthusiastic, highly motivated
individuals to pursue innovative solutions, unencumbered by an already
entrenched bureaucracy. On the other hand, the wide range of programs that
must be developed rapidly can create enormous management pressures,
particularly when seeking to chart a course in the largely untested area of
hazardous waste regulation. These difficulties are compounded by the lengthy
process of hiring new staff and the series of internal job switches that occur in
response to this process.
The rapid growth of the program is reflected in the budget figures below
(Table 3). Prior to 1979 the hazardous waste regulatory program operated
within the Division of Water Pollution Control (DWPC). A staff of two persons
issued licenses to transporters and commercial hazardous waste TSDFs. Since
1979 DHW has grown from a staff of 18 (which included ten for solid waste
work) to a present staff of approximately 131; from a budget of less than
$400,000 to one over $3,000,000.
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As Exhibit 2 below shows, DEQE is one of five departments within the
Executive Office of Environmental Affairs. The Division of Hazardous Waste
is one of five divisions within DEQE (Exhibit 3). In each of the four regional
offices of DEQE, there is a regional engineer and two deputy regional
engineers, one responsible for the water programs and one for the air and
hazardous waste programs. Each deputy regional engineer has responsibilities
to two division directors, either for the two water programs or for the air and
hazardous waste programs.
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Even though each deputy regional engineer is supposed to receive
direction on program issues from the division chiefs, the four regions operate
with substantial autonomy. While it may be accurate to state that policy is
being developed by central office management personnel, it is equally clear
that the application of that policy is almost entirely the province of the
deputy regional engineers. Just how the field offices deal with central office
management personnel below the rank of division chief remains unclear.
Equally unclear is how the deputy regional engineers respond to the conflicting
and competing priorities of the division chiefs whose policies they must carry
out. We were unable to determine how and by whom such disputes are
decided. Evidently, such problems are solved at the field level on an ad hoc
basis.
The Commissioner's 1979-1982 Transition Report stated the problem this
way:
A problem growing out of our organization was the lack of a
centralized management structure at the Commissioner's level.
There was a noticeable deficiency of Department-wide goals and
objectives, no accountability system and no singular way to deal
with the public at large and with public interest groups.
For the most part these problems continue to this date.
The Department and its Division of Hazardous Waste have been quite
successful in staff development for specific job activities. Middle and senior
management are highly professional, well educated, motivated, and dedicated
to the goals of the Hazardous Waste Management Program. However,
discussions with many officials both inside and outside DEQE, and examination
of how certain crises or problems have been confronted, reveals a certain lack
of overall cohesiveness, long range planning, and clear delineation of
priorities. This distinction between individual effectiveness and organizational
shortcomings can best be demonstrated through examples of the four
organizational levels on which it occurs.
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A. Relationships Among Regional Offices and Between the Regional
and Central Office
The central office provides insufficient direction to regions on
regulations. As such, interpretation of regulations is left to individual regions
and varies from one region to another. In terms of compliance and
enforcement cases, the type and sequence of actions taken, and the
thoroughness of handling of cases varies from one region to another. Major
policy approaches are inconsistent from region to region. For instance, in
some regions virtually all inspections are done on an unannounced, surprise
basis so as to get the best picture of actual operating conditions, without the
opportunity to "put on a show." Yet, in another region virtually all inspections
are pre-scheduled for greater efficiency, the element of surprise apparently
not a priority.
These findings are due, at least in part, from the absence of adequate
time for deputy regional engineers to become more involved in policy, and
from an inadequate and ineffective meeting schedule between deputy regional
engineers and the central office (there was consensus on this last point).
Together these factors result in an insufficient two-way input on policy issues,
major problems, etc. Inspectors, who are the "eyes" and "ears" of the entire
division, and who are trained from direct experience and the expertise of other
inspectors, have little input to the central office and little interaction with
inspectors from other regions.
B. Functions Within the Central Office of the Division of Hazardous Waste
There has been an inability in many instances to resolve major problems
and to evaluate, in depth, the effectiveness of major programs. The computer
component of the manifest system, a cornerstone of the Hazardous Waste
Program, did not function properly for years. It has not been possible to
obtain or make use of various types of data from the system. The Division was
not able to respond for more than a year to the request by the Department of
Environmental Management, its sister agency, for manifest data crucial to its
- 37 -
operation and programs. As a senior official within DHW stated,
"We don't have the horsepower to deal with the confidentiality issue
to give DEM data. We have diverted people from other programs.
But there is much disagreement among staff as to the relevance of
data or what should be given."
This resultant paralysis, lasting for well over a year, left unused the great
wealth of manifest data and greatly hampered the efforts of DEM in its siting
and waste reduction program. DEM has since conducted its own state survey
of hazardous waste generation to obtain the necessary information.
The degree of compliance with the manifest, among different components
of the regulated community (generators, transporters, TSD facilities), among
different sizes of businesses (large and small generators) and types of
businesses (by SIC code), has not been evaluated. The types of violations,
problems, or discrepancies the manifest has uncovered, the follow-up on those
findings and the time sequence of the process has not been established.
The 1979-1982 Transition Report emphasized the importance of an
effective and consistent compliance/enforcement effort between all regions.
Implementing this goal was listed as one of the major accomplishments of the
Department. Nevertheless, as a 1984 memo documents, the establishment of
an organized enforcement program was not accomplished. The failure to have
such a program, in a critical component of the hazardous waste program, was
not formally acknowledged for almost three years. Even such elemental data
as the types of violations, according to the various groups within the regulated
community was not assembled. Nor was the simple task of following-up and
verifying of notices of violations completed.
C. Relationships Between the Central Office of DHW, DEQE, and EOEA
The autonomy of the professional staff of DHW, which seems to function
with minimal supervision, may well be suited to many of the different tasks
they must confront. However, that sense of independence, permeating the
upper levels of organization, can be detrimental to the resolution of major
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issues that require a more sophisticated level of cooperation. For instance,
DEQE and the Department of Environmental Management (DEM) both
members of the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs (EOEA), were
unable to resolve issues surrounding the transfer of manifest data from DEQE
to DEM. Because the Division of Hazardous Waste could not delete from its
data base certain submissions for which claims of confidentiality had been
made, DEQE would not permit the transfer of the information on the basis
that section 12 of C. 21 C prohibited such an exchange. Although the disputed
claims represented only a fraction of the collected data and DEM offered to
help DEQE with its computer software problem, the two sister agencies were
unable to reach an agreement and a stalemate persisted for more than a year.
Whatever the merits of the arguments of either agency, the issue became
stalemated and no one at a more senior level of the organization, namely the
Executive Office of Environmental Affairs interceded to resolve the
outstanding issues. As such the stalemate persisted and DEM was denied
access that it desperately needed for its programs. This interdepartmental
dispute over access to information is the very type of problem that the cabinet
form of executive governance was designed to solve and did not do so in this
and related instances.
D. Relationships Between DHW/DEQE and Outside Agencies
In certain instances DHW/DEQE has been unable to work effectively or
communicate its positions successfully to outside agencies. The above
described problems between DEQE and DEM is one example of this. Its efforts
to establish a workable relationship with Natural Resource Officers (NROs) in
a surveillance program, or to coordinate NRO resources with regional DHW
needs is another example. Comments from a number of past and present
community hazardous waste coordinators and other individuals trying to obtain
information from the Division also indicate that dealing with the agency is
often arduous and frustrating.
A number of factors outside the immediate control of the Division of
Hazardous Waste and its parent department have a direct effect on the ability
of the agency to properly plan, organize, implement and evaluate the services
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mandated in the Hazardous Waste Management Act. A major problem facing
the agency is that every mission given to it by the legislature is surrounded by
a high level of urgency and public expectation. The frequency of such urgent
delegations to a single agency make it unlikely that even a perfectly organized
agency could meet the expectations of the public. Moreover, the enormous
impact on agency performance posed by the legal and fiscal gyrations of the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency must also be accounted for when
assessing this agency. When EPA changes gears, the state agency has little
choice but to follow suit. But aside from these more global pressures, the
Division has had to deal with the following specific problems:
The Division is understaffed, with approximately half of the
staff needed to accomplish all program goals. Because each
individual has so many specific responsibilities, there is
insufficient time for individuals to devote time to overall
problems and objectives, on an ongoing basis.
Key positions have remained vacant. The deputy directorship for
policy, which is responsible for the manifest system, has been
vacant for well over a year. This has created a gap in a vital
function. Individuals temporarily covering this position have had
much to learn and are not sufficiently well-versed in all the
activities to adequately handle the position.
The budget approval and scheduling process is lengthy and
cumbersome. Positions approved are not actually filled nine to
twelve months later. Although this process may be satisfactory
for mature agencies with stable workforce levels in which
employee turnover is predictable and moderate, it is not
well-suited to an agency which requires rapid growth.
The newness of the agency and its promote-from-within policy
leads to three to six job changes for each vacancy that opens.
Training for these positions can require six to twelve months and
utilizes the time of existing staff. All in all, this causes great
disruptions in an agency already short of staff and overwhelmed
with work.
In many instances pay scales for critical jobs are completely
unrealistic relative to the general market. The pay scale for
computer programmer and analyst positions were substantially
less than other competitively advertised positions. As a result,
these positions were unfilled for years despite numerous
advertisements. This delay greatly impacted on the development
and management of the manifest system.
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The Division is responsible for such a wide range of programs,
each distinct from the other, that its capabilities are strained.
This in turn exacerbates the understaffing problem because the
limited staff cannot prioritize a single problem. As one senior
official in the Division stated, "trying to cover all programs at
once, rather than focusing one at a time and then building
gradually, has created chaos. The right-to-know legislation will
stop us dead in our tracks."
A frequent change in program priorities, often exerted by EPA,
adds to inefficiency, ineffectiveness and lack of cohesiveness.
Within the span of a few years, emphasis has changed from
enforcement to landfill permitting to incinerator permitting to
enforcement to right-to-know. Staff is constantly shifted around
and must quickly acquire different skills or knowledge; in some
instances skill requirements are more sophisticated than what
inspectors were trained for (such as incinerator inspection).
As one of the largest regulatory agencies in the state, with one of the
most important mandates to protect human health and the environment, the
lack of a computer system and Management Information System is quite
serious. The inability to easily move, retrieve, and analyze data and the lack
of hard data on employee activities—particularly in a new, understaffed
agency in which employee resources must be used most effectively—is a major
shortcoming of the Division of Hazardous Waste/Department of Environmental
Quality Engineering. Not only does this lack of modern management
capability preclude the quick observation or tracking of what is taking place,
it also interferes with attempts to evaluate the past and to plan the future.
The absence of any discernible demand for an automated data system within
the agency staff is quite disturbing, given the very high ratio of scientifically
trained professionals employed.
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IV. THE HAZARDOUS WASTE STREAM AND GENERATION RATES
Effective management of the hazardous waste stream requires a
knowledge of what that waste stream is—how much waste is generated and the
types and locations of generation, particulary as it relates to the high risk
areas of major groundwater sources. A recent report by the Office of
Technology Assessment (OTA) states the following:
Although EPA and the states are improving data collection, there
are major uncertainties on how much hazardous waste is
generated . . . Data inadequacies conceal the scope and complexity
of the nation's hazardous waste problems, and impede effective
control.
The intent of the federal RCRA regulations and the State Hazardous
Waste Management Act was to "manage all hazardous waste from 'cradle' to
'grave'." Without a basic understanding of the nature and degree of the
hazardous waste stream, it is difficult to ensure or assess the effectiveness of
the hazardous waste management program and to monitor its progress from
year to year.
A number of different studies have estimated hazardous waste volumes in
the state:
1. 1982 Statewide Generic Environmental Impact Report (GEIR)
(conducted by the Department of Environmental Management) -
off-site shipment was in the range of 250,000 to 390,000 tons.
2. 1983 EIR - off-site shipment was in the range of 190,000 to
240,000 tons.
3. 1980 Booz, Allen and Hamilton report estimated off-site
shipment of approximately 260,000 tons.
4. 1980 report by GCA, Inc., which updated a 1976 study, estimated
off-site shipment of hazardous waste at approximately 120,000
tons.
5. 1979 New England Regional Commission report, updated in 1982,
estimated between 170,000 to 230,000 tons of hazardous waste.
6. An EPA estimate of between 850,000 to 1,020,000 tons of
hazardous waste.
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As these show, there is much variability in the estimates, which raises
questions about the reliability of any single estimate. There may be a number
of reasons for this. Differences may result from the source of
data—manifests, annual reports, or EPA reports—or from the type of data
used—industry production levels, number of employees, or Massachusetts
waste as a fraction of New England waste. Whatever the reason, this
variability raises questions about the accuracy of any single estimate and
about the importance DEQE attaches to having such an estimate in carrying
out its hazardous waste management mandate.
This situation appears to have resulted from a vacuum created because
DEQE, as the primary regulatory agency, did not establish a single,
authoritative estimate of total volumes of hazardous waste. Because certain
segments may have been excluded, control of these segments becomes more
difficult. This in turn raises questions about the priority DEQE attaches to
controlling all_ segments of the hazardous waste stream. Reflecting this
problem, and perhaps as a partial cause of it, the Committee was concerned
about the ambiguous way in which overall generation volumes have been
defined. It examined the 1982 and 1983 GEIR reports in more detail because,
although these reports were produced by the Department of Environmental
Management, they are often cited by DEQE in their own estimates.
Both the 1982 and 1983 EIR reports refer to "hazardous waste generation
rates for Massachusetts." The Executive Summary of the 1982 EIR states a
primary function of the report is:
"to provide basic information about the quantities and types of
hazardous waste generated in the Commonwealth." (emphasis added)
The report goes on to state:
"At least 1,700 industries in Massachusetts collectively generate
approximately 190,000 tons of hazardous waste annually. This is the
first time that hard data was used to quantify the hazardous waste
generation rates in the Commonwealth." (emphasis added)
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At other points in the report, however, the estimates are referred to as
the amount of hazardous waste reported as transported off site—which is the
accurate description of what is being measured.
By using data of waste that is reported as transported off the site of
generation for overall generation amounts, an important distinction between
the two terms is lost even though they are very different. Without this
distinction—without first independently establishing overall generation
amounts and then comparing this to the amounts reported as transported off
site—it becomes difficult to ensure that all wastes have been accounted for.
By starting with the view that wastes reported as transported off the site of
generation are the entire universe of concern rather than only a subcategory, a
critical focus is lost from the issue of unaccounted for wastes—those which
may be disposed of improperly or illegally. This approach apparently arises
from the assumption that most wastes are accounted for and that, therefore,
the best use of resources is to carefully monitor those wastes rather than
attempt to track down unaccounted for wastes or to confirm the potential
degree of non-compliance. This assumption cannot be tested, however, if
wastes reported as transported off site are considered as the entire waste
stream.
This approach is reflected in a statement in the GEIR, cited by DEQE
officials, that "14 firms generate 50% of the waste in Massachusetts" and that
"the top 100 firms generate 90%." Clearly if this were true it would justify an
approach focusing resources on the few well known companies generating the
bulk of the waste, which they report. But is this the case? The Committee's
research indicates that if the top 14 companies generate 50% of reported
waste and the top 100 companies generate 90% of the waste, a large volume of
waste must not be reported. Small quantity generators alone generate
approximately 20%; 2,200 large quantity generators, who are not among the
top 100, must generate at least an equal amount. It is questionable, therefore,
that the top 100 companies generate 90% of the waste. That this discrepancy
did not prompt a review and an effort to establish more accurate total
generation rates, but rather was used to support an approach that views the
subcategory of reported wastes as the entire universe of concern, underscores
the problem.
_ w .
The practical implications of this approach on the day-to-day
management of hazardous wastes can be observed in a number of areas, and
are given much attention in this report:
the priority of focusing resources on wastes produced by large
quantity generators, which may be at much lower risk, than on
the wastes produced by small quantity generators which although
much less significant in terms of volume may be at much higher
risk;
the lack of adequate outreach programs to assess the status of
small generator compliance and understanding, and to provide
needed services;
the low priority that has been given to the non-notifier program
in the regions, despite the higher risk of these companies.
More specifically, the Committee has serious doubts about the
estimates—made by DEM and accepted by DEQE—of hazardous waste
requiring off site treatment. The 1982 EIR estimate was reduced from
240,000-390,000 tons to 190,000-240,000 tons. These figures consist of two
components—sludge estimates and non-sludge transported waste. The sludge
estimates were reduced from a range of 50,000-200,000 to 0-50,000 tons; the
non-sludge estimate remained the same—190,000 tons. It is this latter
estimate that raises questions. The EIR indicates it was not able to utilize
more recent manifest data to update year earlier estimates but goes on to
indicate it is satisfied with the estimate based on the sources it used.
Our research indicates that the 1982 190,000-ton estimate for off-site
generated hazardous wastes is too low and that it is unlikely that the amount
would have remained the same in 1983. These conclusions were reached for
the following reasons:
the estimate was partially based on monthly transporter reports
which have been shown to be incomplete and to underestimate
the amounts,
the estimate was partially based on annual reports even though
only 20% of generators filed annual reports and many of these
were inaccurate,
both the 1982 and the 1983 reports were based on 1,700
companies reporting, despite 4,000-5,000 companies manifesting
waste,
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the 1982 report was based on industry activity during the depths
of a severe recession whereas the 1983 report covered a period
of significantly increased industrial activity, and
using the 190,000 ton figure, EIR concludes that 50% of waste is
generated by fourteen firms and 90% is generated by top 100
firms. Since there are 2,200 large generators and 2,000-6,000
small generators, and small generators alone contribute
15%-25% to the waste stream, the 90% figure suggests that
much hazardous waste was not reported.
These points indicate an inaccurate data base from which to implement
and direct resources most effectively. It appears to reflect the lack of a real
effort to first establish clear cut, overall estimates of hazardous waste
volumes so that priorities are based on data rather than assumptions. The
Committee's analysis of this issue was designed not so much to reach
conclusions but to stimulate a study and discussion of overall generation
rates. Particularly in light of the agency's limited resources, such an effort is
necessary to effectively regulate the highest risk sectors of the hazardous
waste stream.
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V. GENERATION RATES AND THE SMALL GENERATOR ISSUE
When Congress passed RCRA in 1976 it exempted from regulation all
those generating less than 1,000 kg. (2,200 pounds) of hazardous waste
monthly, except for acutely hazardous waste which is regulated to 1 kg. per
month . Its reasons for this decision were as follows:
1. Ninety-five percent of the 750,000 generators nationwide
generate less than 5,000kg. per month but contribute only 2.3%
to the hazardous waste stream; 91% generate less than 1,000 kg.
per month and contribute less than 1% to the waste stream; and
74% generate less than 100 kg. per month and contribute only
0.23% of the total waste stream. The implication was that the
vast bulk of hazardous waste could be controlled by regulating a
relatively small fraction of the generators. Including smaller
generators would increase the regulatory burden tremendously
but only fractionally increase the amount of waste controlled.
2. Eighty-nine percent of those generating less than 1,000 kg. per
month are in the non-manufacturing sector, i.e., auto repair, dry
cleaning, electrical contractors. Because these are small and
often independently operated, the firms would not have the time,
expertise, or manpower to interpret and follow the regulations.
3. The hazardous waste generated by the small generators would
still have to go to approved landfills or disposal sites, so their
destination would be controlled. It was presumed that, mixed
with solid waste, these small amounts of hazardous wastes would
be well diluted and so pose little risk.
When Massachusetts passed its Hazardous Waste Management Act, it,
along with about 16 other states, chose to eliminate the 1,000 kg. exemption so
that all generators, except those generating less than 20 kg. per month would
be regulated. The reasons:
1. Whereas nationwide 91% of the generators generate less than
1,000 kg. monthly but contribute only about 1% to the hazardous
waste stream, in Massachusetts, 86% generate less than 1,000 kg.
per month but contribute approximately 20% to the waste
stream. Data compiled by this research indicates the amount
may be closer to 25%. Since half of these small generators
7The 1984 amendments to RCRA mandated the application of
RCRA to generators of 100-1,000 kilograms per month of waste. EPA is
also required to report to Congress on this group.
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produce less than 100 kg. per month and contribute only 3% to
the hazardous waste stream, the 43% that generate between
100-1,000 kg. contribute the bulk of the 20% produced by small
generators.
2. Thirty-five percent of the small generators are industrial in
Massachusetts, compared with 11% nationwide. Therefore, a
higher percentage of Massachusetts small generators are in the
industrial sector and due to that association might be in a
position to understand and comply with regulations.
3. Small firms in Massachusetts appear to be clustered in certain
high population areas, rather than evenly distributed throughout
the state. The assumed dilution of small quantities of hazardous
waste in solid waste landfills might not occur due to this
clustering effect and over-reliance on a few landfills.
The Committee agrees with the decision to eliminate the 1,000 k.g.
exemption level from Massachusetts regulations, but is concerned that the
importance given this problem in the legislative process has not been matched
in the regulatory sphere by the same degree of priority. It is understandable
that in the early stages of this new program the larger generators would
receive attention first. Most large generators, however, have been in the
system for quite some time, their numbers not changing much in the last few
years (see Manifest section). It is with the small generators that DHW has not
assessed the problem to determine what is needed, has no specific program in
progress, and has nothing planned.
The Committee's research on the small generator issue found the
following:
From 30%-60% of small quantity generators may not be
manifesting their waste, compared to a maximum of 5-8% of
large generators. (A more detailed examination of this finding
can be found in the Inspection and Enforcement chapter.)
Small quantity generators are least likely to know about or
understand regulations.
Small quantity generators were often uncertain as to the
hazardousness of certain wastes.
The required use of transporters was viewed as an unnecessary
and costly burden for small quantity generators.
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Limitations on the amount and length of time of hazardous waste
storage was viewed as a burden by small quantity generators.
The 1986 budget is the first to give attention to the small generator issue,
but despite the above mentioned problems only a few percent of agency
resources are devoted to this segment, approximately ten times less than the
proportionate contribution this segment makes to the hazardous waste
stream. Given that small generator waste may pose considerable risk that is
out of proportion to the volumes it produces, this commitment of resources is
even that much less adequate.
At the very least, DEQE should assess the seriousness of the problem and
then either develop policies consistent with the findings or, if not, justify any
other approach.
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VI. CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE OF THE MANIFEST SYSTEM
A cornerstone of the 1976 federal RCRA regulations was a hazardous
waste tracking system. A manifest system was conceived to provide a
mechanism to account for all hazardous waste shipped off site from the point
of generation to the point of final disposal—the so-called "cradle to grave"
system. Each participant in the system—generator, transporter and
treatment, storage, disposal (TSD) facility—was required to obtain an
Environmental Protection Agency I.D. number for use on the manifest.
Generators, haulers, and TSD's were required to transfer hazardous waste
to or receive it from only those with I.D. numbers. Manifests contained the
names and signatures of each handler of the hazardous waste, as well as the
type, quantity and date handled. Generators were required to report lost or
late shipments; TSDs were required to report discrepancies between shipments
and manifests. All were to maintain copies of the manifest for future tracking
purposes or for auditing. Improper or illegal disposal within this system would
require the deliberate participation of three separate parties and would,
therefore, be theoretically less likely to occur.
The Massachusetts manifest system, instituted under Chapter 2 1C, was
more comprehensive than the federal system. The state system was designed
to provide computerized, load-by-load tracking of hazardous waste shipments.
In addition to all the federal requirements that each handler sign and retain a
copy of the manifest, the state system required that the generator and facility
foward a copy of each manifest to DHW for computer entry. If between the
two end points (generator and facility) a discrepancy (late, lost or unmatched
hazardous waste) was discovered, the computer would quickly catch this and
trigger an investigation.
The Committee evaluated the performance of the manifest system in
general and the computerized, load-by-load system in particular, according to
the departmental standards, goals, and expectations and the time table set out
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to meet them. According to DEQE's five-year plan, transition reports and
internal memos:
The primary purpose of the manifest is as a "critical
enforcement tool" designed to insure wastes are not improperly
or illegally disposed. When asked whether "enforcement tool"
meant the actual identification of violations or the
documentation of cases developed in other ways, it was indicated
the manifest system was capable of both.
The computerized load-by-load tracking system, compared to the
federal system in which manifests are kept on file and are
available for audit, is necessary to maintain continuous
compliance by verifying each load at the time of shipment. This
would provide maximum protection to the public by allowing the
agency to rapidly respond to problems and contain them before
they intensify.
A readily accessible data base of hazardous waste would allow
for analysis and presentation of data in many forms and would
satisfy a number of needs: the obligation to provide every
community with a profile of its hazardous waste (M.G.L. Ch. 21c
Sec. 4); a statewide profile of hazardous waste to determine
disposal and/or treatment needs to assist in the siting of
facilities.
The timetable for the manifest system was as follows:
Make the computer system operational by the end of
1982 (the system was first developed during 1981).
Begin regular reporting for enforcement, licensing and
siting activities by the spring of 1983.
Publish the first annual report on hazardous waste
activities to cities and towns using manifest data by
spring of 1984.
Use manifest data to produce 1984 Generic
Environmental Impact Report (GEIR).
Evaluate program at the end of 1983 and beginning of 1984.
In explaining the purpose, both DEQE personnel and DEQE documents
describe the manifest system as a "cradle to grave" tracking system and as a
primary enforcement tool, these terms should be further clarified as part of
this evaluation.
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A. The Cradle to Grave System
The "cradle to grave" system implies an accountability or balance sheet
for waste shipped off site such that each ton of waste that leaves a generator
(cradle) can ultimately be matched to an equal amount in a facility (grave).
This cannot, in fact, be accomplished by the manifest system as a number of
transporters pointed out. The degree to which it can be accomplished is even
less so in Massachusetts because much of the waste is transported out of
state. A significant portion of that waste goes to one or more treatment
facilities (TSD's) prior to its shipment out of state. At these intermmediate
TSD's, waste is treated, reduced, batched with similar wastes from other
generators and then sent to different out-of-state destinations. The treatment
centers act as the final point (grave) for the first manifest but then, in turn,
become generators themselves—the starting point for a second manifest.
Because of changes in the hazardous waste, the possibility of batching, and the
added complication of out-of-state transport, wastes from the second
shipment cannot be specifically matched to the first shipment. In this
situation, initially manifested hazardous waste, although recorded as in its
"grave" and having satisfied all reporting requirements, may be many stages
from final disposal. Although the manifest serves a purpose as a double check
between sender and receiver, it cannot document specific final disposal of
initially shipped waste.
This limits the overall ability to account for, or provide a balance sheet
of, the fate of total hazardous waste shipped offsite. It also is difficult to
extrapolate from the total number of manifests the total number of shipments
of waste or the total amount of waste shipped offsite, due to double or triple
counting. At the time of this investigation, the Department did not have the
capability to somehow separate double or triple counting and so arrive at a
more accurate data base.
B. The Manifest System as an Enforcement Tool
The value of the manifest system as an enforcement tool is yet to be
demonstrated. Although it has been described as capable of detecting cases of
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improper and/or illegal disposal (as well as documenting cases developed in
other ways), our research showed no instances in which illegal or improper
disposal had been uncovered due to the manifest system. Similarly no
investigations were initiated or are presently being conducted as a result of
examination of manifest data.
Additionally, the DEQE view that the manifest, system was a critical
enforcement tool that could identify violations of regulations and so insure
against improper or illegal disposal, must be tempered by the realization that
it only encompasses those parties already operating within the system. Upon
discussion of these issues, department officials agreed that the manifest would
not offer indicators or documentation of illegal/improper activity for those
operating outside of the system. They agreed that the manifest is used in a
reactive mode to document cases of illegal/improper disposal that developed
in other ways.
Because the manifest only encompasses those operating within the
system, its effectiveness as an enforcement effort is dependent upon the
willingness of the regulated community to participate in the system, unlike the
usual concept of an enforcement system, which is one that attempts to track
those operating entirely outside of a regulatory system. Clearly the problem
with this concept of enforcement is that it is effective against those who
participate (are least likely to violate regulations) and it is least effective
against those who entirely evade the system (those most in need of
enforcement actions). Consequently, this leaves unanswered what the
enforcement tool is that insures that participation. It is imperative for the
regulating agency to have a sound strategy that insures maximum participation
in the system for all who generate hazardous waste if the manifest system is
to be defined as or have value as an enforcement tool.
In the case of Massachusetts, although use of the manifest system is
mandatory and most large and medium size companies are manifesting their
waste, the extent to which small generators are in the system is not
established, nor has it been established to what extent small and perhaps
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medium and even some large size generators manifest ali_ their waste.
Interviews with a variety of officials, generators, and transporters suggested
that many companies obtain an EPA I.D. number and enter into the manifest
system, protectively, but do not necessarily manifest or dispose all their
hazardous waste properly.
DEQE has not conducted an audit of compliance with the manifest, nor
does it plan one at this time, so it has no way of knowing the extent of the
problems. Nor does it presently have the computer capabilities (manpower or
software) to track manifested levels by company or cross-check within
industries (SIC) to locate discrepancies. Also, discussions with senior officials
and field personnel clearly established that inspectors have neither the time
nor the expertise to determine whether the amounts of hazardous waste
generated at the site are equivalent to what is reported on the manifest,
except by a wide range of variation. Large, medium, and small companies may
be quite likely to participate in the system, due to their public prominence,
fear, or sense of moral duty. However, participation in the system and the
extent or completeness of that participation among small and obscure firms,
the segment most likely to dispose hazardous waste improperly/illegally, is
essentially dependent upon their willingness to do so. The concept and
rationale of the manifest system as an enforcement tool is weakest among
that segment which requires the greatest degree of enforcement.
Because the importance of enforcement in any regulatory system,
particularly one as diverse and extensive as that encompassing hazardous
waste, is so great, the value and limitations of tools chosen should be clearly
defined and understood. Our research indicates that in terms of that segment
of the hazardous waste community presenting the greatest risk, the manifest
system as an enforcement tool (as opposed to a back-up document for cases
developed in other ways) has little value and should be defined as such. This
finding should prompt DEQE policymakers to either determine ways to
increase its value as a true enforcement tool (i.e. audit compliance levels) or
to emphasize other enforcement strategies.
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C. The Performance of the Manifest System
The value of the manifest system as a means of tracking the activities of
the very large numbers of persons and enterprises participating in the system
and its potential for being a pivotal instrument in statewide environmental
planning nominates its actual operation for review. With that in mind the
Committee sought information about volume, accuracy, completeness,
deadlines, problems meeting goals, and other indicia of performance in order
to evaluate the functioning of the system itself.
The agency now receives approximately 1,000 manifests weekly and
predicts eventually the number could approach 2,000 weekly.
The number of manifests filed has risen steadily, approximately doubling
from July-September 1982 to July-September 1984:
Total Number Monthly Average
July-September, 1982 8,366 2,800
October-December, 1982 11,1.58 3,700
January-March, 1983 10,630 3,600
April-June, 1983 13,227 4,400
July-September, 1983 12,744 4,300
October 1983 - March 1984 30,000 5,000
April-June, 1984 13,900 4,600
July-September, 1984 16,100 5,400
For each shipment of hazardous waste, at least two manifests are
forwarded to DEQE, one each from the generator and facility. Each manifest
must be checked for mistakes and entered into the computer. DEQE cannot
enter a manifest into the computer if: (l)an EPA identification number is
filled out incorrectly or not at all, (2) the number of the manifest, printed in
the upper righthand corner is missing (torn off), (3) the type of waste is.
improperly coded or not coded, or the quantity of waste is incorrectly listed or
is absent, or (4) the manifest is undated.
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The precent of manifests properly filled out has increased from a range of
50%-74% during 1982, to 91% during 1983-1984:
July 1983 -June 1984 % of Total
Total Manifests 56,701
//incompliance 51,849 91%
// not in compliance 4,852 9%
Although the compliance rate appears high, the actual number of
incorrect manifests is considerable, given the management desire to have a
workable, load-by-load computerized tracking system and usable data base.
The volume of incorrect manifests is more significant in that it takes much
more time to reconcile these than it does to enter the correct ones. The depth
of the problem becomes clearer with the discovery of a six-week lag in
entering correct manifests. Particularly if one remembers that the advantage
of a load-by-load computerized system was quick discovery and correction.
Supposedly unmatched shipments or other discrepancies were to be dealt with
within a 35-day time frame. As a matter of practice, this has not occurred.
Aside from its role in the regulatory and enforcement effort, the
computerized manifest system was expected to serve other entities. First, the
system was scheduled to provide hazardous waste data to the cities and towns
in the form of the first annual report in the spring of 1984. It was also to
provide data to the Department of Environmental Management (DEM) for the
1983 Generic Environmental Impact Report, which was published in 1984, and
for DEM's efforts in assessing statewide hazardous waste streams to develop
hazardous waste management strategies, including the siting of facilities.
None of these deadlines were met or have as yet been met. Not only does this
create serious problems for those programs needing and requesting the data,
but it reflects a number of problems with the computerized manifest system
and its management. The report to cities and towns is now tentatively
scheduled for late winter or early spring of 1985.
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The manifest computer system has been in operation since 1981-1982.
Anxious policymakers in other agencies have been awaiting data for over a
year and a half. But for a number of reasons there have been continual delays
as partially explained hereafter:
1. The computer software has contained "bugs" since its start and
these have not to the present time been worked out. There has
been difficulty pulling out some data and not others. More
recently there have been questions about whether total
hazardous waste tonnage is correct and correlates to the sum of
individual wastes. The computer may be leaving off a certain
number of decimal places.
2. Until very recently, the inability to hire and retain computer
specialists, specifically a systems analyst, has aggravated the
problem. Salary scales were significantly below the averages for
competitive positions, and months of advertisements in the
Boston Globe attracted no applicants. A systems analyst that
was hired left for another position after four months. A
computer programmer who was hired left after a few weeks
because the supervisor position was unfilled. Overall, the
department has been unable, in over two years, to correct the
problems in the computer software, to hire the necessary
personnel, or to bring in a consultant to correct the problem.
Because this part of the system is so central to the overall
program, this inability raises serious questions about
departmental priority or management of problems.
3. A number of companies claimed confidentiality of their
hazardous waste data in that release could affect the proprietary
nature of their products. The inability to resolve this over a long
period of time reflects two problems: a lack of coordination and
cooperation in the transfer of data between two sister
agencies—DEQE and DEM—that are both within the Executive
Office of Environmental Affairs; and the inability of the
computer system to retrieve large amounts of data while leaving
a few pieces of data—due to confidential requests—alone. This
again underlies problems in the computer system.
4. A major complication has been the entrance into the computer
of invalid or improper temporary I.D. numbers issued by the EPA
to those companies either changing status, just coming into the
system or planning to be in the system for only a single shipment
of hazardous waste or for a short time. There are approximately
1,300 improper I.D. numbers, the data associated with these
entries cannot be used by the computer. Since the total number
of companies in the system is approximately 5,200, this
represents 25% of the companies, a potentially very significant
amount.
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The following data gaps and lack of capabilities in the manifest system
were also discovered:
There is no data on the overall number of overdue shipments
flagged.
- Data on follow-up of overdue shipments is not kept.
- Only three exception reports (indicating overdue shipments) were
filed by generators since November, 1982 even though there
were many more overdue shipments detected. Notices of
violations sent to those generators who failed to file an
exception were not recorded or noted.
No data on the number of other discrepancies (unmatched
shipments, inconsistent shipments, lost shipments, etc.) found in
manifest was compiled. Likewise, no breakdown by category or
degree of follow-up or outcome in those cases was kept.
There is no data on the number of cases being investigated or
prosecuted, in which manifest data was utilized.
The ambitious goals of the manifest system combined with the limited
resources of DHW has diluted program capabilities. The results of this are
that although thousands of manifests are processed monthly and compliance
levels have improved, the three above-mentioned problems remain.
Organizations that need the data have not received it and data analysis
capabilities still do not exist, years after the computer system was first
instituted. The manifest system functions as an enforcement tool only in a
reactive mode, to support other enforcement activities, and hazardous waste
activity is assessed in the form of inspection audits rather than from
load-by-load tracking.
Given that DHW has grown rapidly in the last few years and its size
appears to have plateaued, with additional programs competing for relatively
fewer dollars, the possibilities for the manifest system may have to be
realistically assessed and prioritized. If all of its capabilities cannot be met,
then meeting some also means not meeting others, or meeting all partially
means the more important goals will suffer along with the lesser important
ones, which now seems the case. While it has been possible to greatly increase
manifest processing, bugs remain in the computer, data has not been released
for necessary facility planning and analysis of problem segments has not taken
place.
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The question to be asked is, for all the paperwork, administrative burden,
and resource use, what have been the benefits in terms of improved
compliance with regulations and a reduction of inappropriate disposal
practices? Is it really worthwhile to track each and every load of hazardous
waste, to process and correct each and every manifest from both generator
and facility, particularly if certain segments are in high compliance and are
inspected frequently (during which time manifests are audited)? Perhaps it
would be more worthwhile to first develop a state profile of hazardous
wastes—geographically and by industry, that would determine "hot
spots"—places or industries with more discrepancies, lost or late shipments, or
other problems. A more intense examination of these high risk segments could
then follow. These are policy decisions that DEQE should address.
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VII. COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT ISSUES
Compliance and enforcement are two crucial elements to the hazardous
waste control program, designed to ensure that future uncontrolled dump sites
do not occur. Although these two components are distinct, their activities
overlap somewhat, and thus it is appropriate to review them together.
The central activity that ensures compliance with the regulations is the
systematic inspection of the regulated community—all generators,
transporters, and treatment/storage/disposal facilities (TSDs). Inspections
accomplish a number of objectives:
Create a general regulatory visibility that will enhance the
incentive to comply for those not yet inspected.
Educate the regulated community on the regulations.
Gather firsthand information on how effective the regulations
are, evaluate the problems and suggestions of the regulated
community, and direct a two way line of communication.
Directly enforce regulations on those who are inspected and who
are out of compliance.
Clearly the inspection process provides a critical interface between the
regulated community and the regulatory agency. It also underlies the
effectiveness of the two other main components of the hazardous waste
control system—the manifest and the community outreach/education
program—by providing feedback on how well they function.
If an inspection reveals a violation of a regulation, a number of actions
can be taken. These would fall under the definition of enforcement actions
although most are carried out by the inspector within the scope of compliance
as an administrative activity. More serious actions that involve the Attorney
General's office fall within the narrower scope of enforcement activities. The
compliance activities, including inspections and initial responses to violations,
take place in the four regional offices. Once these cases reach a more
advanced level of action they are handled in the central Boston office.
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The actions available in response to a violation are as follows:
Notice of violation or warning letter - lists violation and
timetable for correction.
Administrative Order - more formal, departmental issuance.
- Civil Penalties -
- Criminal Penalties -
Other enforcement activities include surveillance by individuals working
directly with DEQE or by outside law agencies whose activities are
coordinated; and efforts by informants and community people to report
suspicious activities.
A. Size and Nature of the Regulated Community
The number of generators notifying DEQE has increased over the years,
with fluctuations due to change of status. Recently the total number of large
generators has decreased:
November 1982 2,342 large (over 1,000 kg/month)
431 small (20-1,000 kg/month)
November 1983 - EPA 3,571 large
1,258 small
November 1983 - DEQE 3,127 large
628 small
April 1984 3,700 large
1,500 small
July 1984 2,295 large
1,901 small
The number of large generators has fallen back to levels of 1982, whereas
the number of small generators has consistently increased. These different
trends are primarily accounted for by either change of status (large companies
that become small generators) or by companies that leave the system entirely
because they went out of business or were protective filers in the first place.
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Most new companies entering the system are small generators. This can be
seen in examining the list of new notifiers in the last four months of FY 1984.
Of 395 new notifiers, 383 (95%) were small quantity generators. Between
December 1983 and July 1984 the number of small quantity generators that
have notified DHW increased from 1,313 to 1,901, a 50% increase.
From an examination of SIC codes and records from other divisions, DHW
has estimated that there are approximately 850-900 potential non-notifier
generators. Based on recent notification rates and the number of small
generators that have not notified, many if not most are small quantity
generators. This is based on the fact that the large generator probably
appears to have plateaued in the 2,200-2,400 range (although no audit or
compliance check has been done), whereas many of small generators are not in
the system.
DEQE buget narratives, as well as other economic data, estimate as many
as 10,000 small quantity generators of hazardous waste; more conservative
estimates are 3,000 to 6,000. With approximately 1,900 small quantity
generators having notified, 30% to 60% of small quantity generators have not
notified. This compares to a maximum of perhaps 10% of large quantity
generators that have not notified. If, as estimated, small quantity generators
contribute approximately 22% to the overall hazardous waste stream in
Massachusetts and that a middle range estimate of the small generators that
have not notified is 45%, then as much as 10% of the hazardous waste stream
in Massachusetts may be unaccounted for from small quantity generators
alone. Based upon the EIR estimates (which are considered low) of 190,000 to
200,000 tons of hazardous waste, this means that 19,000 to 20,000 tons from
small generators is unaccounted for.
The category of large quantity generators is further broken down into
major and non-major categories for regulatory purposes. The major category
includes generators producing 5,000 gallons or more per month of hazardous
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waste, the large treatment, storage, disposal (TSD) facilities and the in-state
transporters. To summarize, the regulated community includes:
Non-major
large generators 2,295
Majors 115
Small generators 1,901
TSDs 83
Transporters 61
Activities broken down by region are as follows:
Western Central Northeast Southeast Total
Large Gen. 141 (6%) 257 (11%) 1,262 (55%) 635 (28%) 2,295
Major 36 (31) 24 (21) 27 (23) 28 (24) 115
Small Gen. 278 (15) 399 (21) 947 (50) 277 (15) 1,901
TSDs 21 (25) 10 (12) 34 (41) 18 (22) 83
Potential
Transporter 12 (19) 9 (14) 30 (48) 12 (19) 63
Potential
Non-notifier* 75 (9) 66 (8) 565 (67) 132 (16) 838
Numbers already identified by DHW but not yet verified; conservative
estimates are 3,000-6,000 additional non notifiers (proportionately distributed).
B. Regulatory Activities
1. Distribution of Resources
Each region consists of a regional engineer and two deputy regional
engineers (DRE), one a supervisor of the water programs and one the "dry"
programs—air quality, solid waste and hazardous waste. The hazardous/solid
waste division is divided into three parts: RCRA (hazardous waste inspections,
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licensing of facilities and closures), solid waste and emergency response. The
number of inspectors in the RCRA section, by region are:
Western Central Northeast Southeast Total
1981 1.6 (19 %) 1.6 (19 %) 2.8 (34 %) 2.25 (27 %) 8.25
1982 2.0 (20) 2.0 (20) 3.0 (30) 3.0 (30) 10.0
1983 2.0 (18) 2.0 (18) 4.0 (36) 3.0 (27) 11.0
1984 3.15 (22) 3.5 (25) 4.0 (28) 3.4 (24) 14.05
1985* 5.0 (24) 5.0 (24) 7.0 (33) 4.0 (19) 21.0
*requested
At last count the western region had four inspectors and the northeastern
region had three. Numbers falling short of slots available was due to as yet
unfilled positions.
A comparison of the two previous tables indicates a discrepancy between
the relative number of inspectors per region and the overall activity in each
region. Although there is a similar number of major generators/facilities in
each region and these should require more attention and longer inspection
time, their actual numbers are small enough that they do not begin to balance
out the disproportionate numbers in the other categories. The northeast
region has twice as many large generators as does the southeast region, five
times as many as the central region and almost ten times as many as the
western region. The northeast region also has three times as many small
generators as the other regions and from four to almost ten times as many
potential non-notifiers. These discrepancies may be even greater, given the
estimates of another 1,000-4,000 non-notifiers, many of whom are likely to be
small quantity generators.
In almost every category, 50% or more of the activity is in the northeast
region. And yet this region has only one to two more inspectors, or 30% of the
total inspector resources. Our research and discussion with officials on the
following matters suggests the problems may be even worse than is shown by a
simple comparison of these numbers.
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First, in other categories not mentioned but which may affect inspection
activity, the northeast region has much greater demands. For example, almost
50% of all spills (670) that have occurred in the state since January of 1983,
were in the northeast region (310). This averages to more than one spill per
working day. Because of the emergency nature of these spills, they have top
priority, often drawing individuals from other activities.
Second, the actual number of inspectors per region and the range of these
numbers from one region to another is small—from three or four inspectors in
one region to five or six in another. This compares to the actual number of
businesses and their range between regions—from 2,209 large and small
generators in the northeast region to 419 large and small generators in the
western region; from 565 non-notifiers in the northeast region to 66
non-notifiers in the central regions. Given such a small number of inspectors,
whether it is four in one region or five in another, there appears to be a
"critical mass" to the number of generators/transporters/TSDs that these
inspectors can control. Beyond that, an additional one inspector makes little
difference. In a region with 400 businesses it is much easier for proportionally
fewer inspectors to have an overall grasp of the situation and to create a
visible presence than it is in a region with over 2,000 businesses. An additional
one or two inspectors in the higher density regions is insufficient to overcome
the greater complexity, the lack of visibility or the compounded
administrative and organizational problems that arise.
2. Number of Inspections
The number of inspections per year since 1981 are:
July-December 1981 232
Fed. FY 1982 408
1983 634
1984 540
In FY 1984 there were 589 total inspections and 49 follow-up inspections.
As closely as can be determined, the 49 follow-ups are included in the 589,
meaning there were 540 initial establishment inspections. This figure is not
exact since some inspections may have been follow-ups from the previous
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year, and some follow-ups may not have been counted. In FY 1983, there were
634 inspections, but because there was no breakdown of the follow-ups, the
number of initial inspections may be lower and there may not be an actual
drop from FY 1983 to FY 1984 in the number of establishment inspections
conducted.
Four hundred and thirty-nine of the 540 inspections in FY 1984 were for
large and small generators, the other 101 were for majors. Virtually all of the
439 inspections were on non-major large quantity generators. Although a
breakdown of the numbers has not been established, our research indicates
that only 20 to 30 of the insepctions were on small quantity generators. These
numbers suggest that all large quantity generators could be inspected in about
five years if only a few small quantity generators were inspected. However,
this is not the case. First, of the 439 inspections per year, about 80 are TSD
facilities and as such would likely be inspected each year, reducing the number
of new inspections each year to about 350 (or 6.5 years to inspect all). Second,
as mentioned above, inspection resources are not proportionately distributed
throughout the state. In regions with fewer generators, each large generator
might be inspected yearly or every other year, whereas in the northeast
region, with half of the state's generators, it might take ten years or longer to
inspect large notifying generators (small and non-notifying generators not
included in numbers).
3. Outcome of Inspections
In examining the outcome of the inspections—the number of violations and
outcome of these violations—it is important to note that violations are
categorized as Class I, II, or lit
Class I - refers to a significant violation which possesses a short
term direct and immediate harm to the public health or the
environment, (ex. leaking storage container)
Class II - includes violations which are statutory in nature rather
than related to implementing regulations.
Class III - covers violations which are minor, including procedural or
reporting violations which, in themselves, do not pose direct,
short-term threats to public health or the environment, (ex. sign
not posted, contingency plan not filed).
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Class I and II are considered together as the more serious violations; Class
III is considered minor. A review of the 634 inspections conducted in FY 1983
shows that there were 400 notices of violation (NOV's), 10 to 15 administrative
orders and four cases were referred to the Attorney General's Office. The
inspections of the four cases that were subsequently turned over to the
Attorney General's Office, were not routine but were initiated by other
sources, such as citizen complaints. Of the last category, three of these cases
were resolved and one case resulted in a criminal conviction. Of the
administrative orders, approximately eight were resolved, two were
de-escalated to NOVs and the others appear to remain unresolved. Although
the NOVs were not broken down into classes, a senior official indicated that
approximately 20% involved potential health problems.
A closer review of the first quarter of federal fiscal year 1984 (October,
November, December) showed the following activities:
Category % In Complete Compliance
(no violations)
84 generators inspected 69 %
31 TSD facilities inspected 29%
7 Transporters inspected 100 %
The 26 generators and 22 TSD's not in compliance had a total of 83
violations for an average of 1.75 violations per business. The number of
violations for a single business ranged from one to eleven. In terms of
seriousness of violations there were:
13 Class I and II violations - serious (16%)
70 Class III violations - less serious (84%)
The timetable for correcting violations varied, usually from one to three
months, depending upon the severity and type of violation; obviously, the
absence of a notice on a door would take much less time to correct than
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developing a contingency plan or creating a separate storage area for certain
wastes. After three months, 30% of the Class I and II violations had been
completely corrected or followed up. The status of the remaining 70% could
not be completely verified. Some were in the process of correction but were
behind schedule (with no timetable established for completion). Others were
involved in some type of negotiation or were disputed.
During the first three quarters of federal fiscal year 1984 (October 1,
1983 to June 30, 1984) inspection activity and results were:
Major N<on-Major Total
Number of Inspections 80 371 451
Number of NOVs 9 70 49
Number of orders 3 3 6
Total Violations Cited 106 418 524
An analysis of the activities for these three quarters, compared to the
first quarter, discloses the following trends:
Of all businesses inspected, 81% were in compliance (no
violations); this compares to 69% compliance for generators and
29% compliance for TSD's in the first quarter. Clearly this
reflects an improvement but it also reflects the fact that many
more visits in the first quarter were first time inspections,
whereas a greater proportion in the latter quarters had already
had their first inspection and were receiving a follow-up
inspection. Those that had only minor violations during the first
inspection had corrected them for the follow-up so that they
were in complete compliance.
Although only 19% of the businesses were out of compliance in
the three quarters compared to 31% for the first quarter, the
behavior of those remaining out of compliance seemed to
deteriorate. Of the total 524 violations in the three quarters,
251 or 48% were serious Class I violations, in contrast to the
16% during the first quarter. Thus the proportion of businesses
in compliance increased, but the seriousness of the problems of
non-complying businesses also increased.
In cases of non-compliance, there was an average of six
violations per business during the three quarters, as compared to
1.75 during the first quarter. This meant that among those
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fewer number of businesses not in compiiance during the three
quarters, each committed more violations that were also more
serious.
In proportion to the number of inspections completed, there were
twice as many notices of violation among the non-majors as
compared to the majors (19% versus 11%). No data was
available on small generators, since the number inspected was so
small, but the trend suggests more violations for smaller
companies.
There was no collected data on violations corrected, but the best
estimates available indicate that substantially less than half,
perhaps as low as 30% were verified as being corrected.
In addition to the inspection/enforcement activities, the following major
enforcement actions were taken during 1983 and 1984:
In October 1983, two members of a North Brookfield family
were found guilty of 55 violations of the Hazardous Waste
Management Act, including illegal disposal of hazardous waste.
Both were sentenced to prison, one to five years at Walpoie
State Prison, the other to four years in Concord Reformatory.
In October 1983, DEQE obtained a temporary restraining order
and then a permanent injunction that prohibited the Charles
George Landfill Trust from continuing to operate a landfill in
Tyngsborough which contained hazardous waste.
In May 1983, after a lengthy adjudicatory process, the hazardous
waste license held by the Lewis Chemical Corporation, a
treatment and storage facility in Boston's Hyde Park
neighborhood, was revoked.
In April 1984, DEQE issued an order to revoke the license of
Geochem, Inc. of Lowell to transport, store, and treat hazardous
waste. The company was alleged to have accepted and stored
pesticides and PCBs illegally, and had a long history of other
violations. The company appealed the order and has been
allowed to stay open during the adjudicating process.
In August 1984, SCA Services, Inc. was fined $20,000 for failing
to report a spill of 200 gallons of oil contaminated with PCBs at
the firm's Braintree facility on June 25, 1984.
In September 1984, the Atlantic Corey Crane Service, Inc. was
fined $62,500 for illegally handling hazardous wastes after a
truck dropped a transformer and spilled 100-200 gallons of PCBs
and trich/orobezene onto Routes 213 and 495 in Methuen and
Haverhill.
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In April 1984, Monsanto Corporation entered into consent
agreements with DEQE and EPA which required the firms to
investigate its ground disposal areas at its Springfield property
and to identify and cleanup sources of contamination. These
studies will be undertaken at the companies expense and will
cost approximately $400,000.
It is important to note that none of the above cases was initiated as the
result of a routine inspection or data from the manifest system; rather they
arose from complaints, direct knowledge of an incident, or other sources of
information. One of the problems with these cases, and the reason there are
relatively few, is they consume a great deal of time, money, and manpower.
Due to the nature of the adjudicatory process and its inevitable delays, many
of the very serious cases continue for what seems to be an intolerably long
period of time. A good example of this phenomenon is the Lewis Chemical
Corporation case, a formal proceeding where numerous violations were alleged
to have continued, even after the company had been repeatedly cited and
actions against it had already been commenced. Geochem, Inc. of Lowell is a
recent example of this—it continues to operate following an order to revoke
its license after a long history of serious violations (including PCB
contamination) that threatens human health and the environment.
This has lead to a catch-22 situation. Because of the amount of resources
required for formal procedures, the Department has relied primarily on
cooperation with the regulated community, negotiating whenever possible so
as to avoid lengthy, expensive, resource-intensive legal or administrative
processes. DEQE officials in both the central and regional offices indicated a
preference for voluntary compliance based on cooperative efforts rather than
enforcement. They indicated this reflected an informal policy stance and also
the practical reality based on their resource and time constraints. In only the
most serious or prominent cases—including cases in which there has been
public outrage or media attention—has DEQE reacted with legal options. In
many other instances, so-called secondary cases, in which there have not only
been repeatable Class III violations but also serious Class I violations, the
approach has been to continue working with the offending party, encouraging
it to change its practices.
-70 -
Clearly there is a place and value for the regulatory agency establishing
cooperative working relationships with the regulated community. But it
appears that those that benefit most from that approach are those most likely
and willing to abide by regulations. The Committee's research has shown, in
fact, that this approach is not well-suited to those companies and patterns of
behavior to which cooperation has been specifically directed—the more minor
but serious offenders—those with less dramatic Class I violations, or a series
of Class III violations (an ongoing pattern of carelessness). This approach
offers delays and avoidance of correcting problems and reinforces the
perception among many in the regulated community, particularly those willing
to benignly neglect certain regulations, that the Department is, as one senior
official expressed it, "a toothless tiger."
DEQE officials indicated that one of the reasons for the few number of
cases adjudicated was the inability of the Environmental Section of the
Attorney General's Office to handle more cases. Indications are, as the
Attorney General's Office itself stated, that substantially more than the three
cases they received in the past year could be handled. Perhaps this was
partially due to an increase in their staff. This is discussed in more detail in a
later section.
C. Surveillance
An important element of the enforcement of the regulations is use of
surveillance, which in distinction to the manifest system and inspections, is
primarily designed to catch those operating outside of the system—those
intentionally dumping improperly or illegally, the so-called "midnight
dumpers." Midnight dumping has become much more sophisticated in recent
years. Gone is the open dumping of barrels on the side of the road or in the
woods. That behavior has been replaced by more furtive acts such as: pouring
wastes down sewers, using abandoned mine shafts, or under the cover of rain
storms, opening spigots on tanker trucks and releasing wastes on the road.
These more concealed actions require increased and more sophisticated
surveillance techniques.
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The importance of surveillance extends beyond the apprehension of
violators. When properly devised, surveillance also increases the visibility of
the enforcement effort and heightens public awareness of the importance of
these activities. This serves to decrease the level of illegal activities by
raising the risk or the perception of the risk of being caught. In addition to
the actual collection and proper handling of evidence, surveillance includes the
development of an information gathering network including the use of
informants.
To achieve a recognizable climate of deterrence, surveillance activities
require the use of individuals and agencies separate from the regulatory
agency, in this case DEQE/DHW. This creates a new organizational
dimension. Agencies involved in this effort may include the Attorney
General's Office and various law enforcement groups such as the state police,
local police, MDC police, and Natural Resource Officers (NROs). Law
enforcement officials may work directly for DEQE/DHW or the A.G., or work
within their own agency, in a coordinated fashion with those two groups.
Early in the development of the hazardous waste program, DEQE/DHW,
citing the above considerations, recognized the importance of a surveillance
component. It concluded that a well-publicized surveillance program could
greatly aid this new agency in most rapidly bringing under control what was
viewed as an extensive problem. Given that it might take at least a decade to
bring the regulated community under control and that the lesser known
businesses, which might be contributing the greatest risk, would probably not
be examined until the latter part of that decade, these efforts were viewed as
critical. It was the general consensus that regulatory efforts must include an
"unknown factor" that would act as a disincentive for those contemplating
operating outside the system.
As part of that effort, at the time Phase I regulations went into effect in
July, 1982, a pilot program was started with twelve Natural Resource Officers
(NROs). They were selected because their jurisdiction covered the entire
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state, because they were familiar with and frequently inspected deserted
wilderness areas—where dumping might take place—and because they had
developed many local contacts that could be used in the creation of an
intelligence gathering network.
Since the collection and handling of hazardous wastes is complex, the
officers were trained by the Attorney General's Office, DEQE, and the
Metropolitan District Commission in both legal and technical matters.
Following training, the NRO's conducted statewide investigative activities for
two weeks. Although no arrests occurred, the pilot program did turn up "a
number of suspicious activities that warranted continued investigation"
according to administrative officials. The program received widespread
publicity. Officials refused to tell how many officers were involved which left
the regulated community guessing as to the risk of their being caught.
Following this pilot program, 70 additional NROs were to be trained over the
next year. Finally, three of the original twelve officers would remain in the
Attorney General's Office to provide law enforcement capabilities to the
office for cases it was pursuing.
These programs eventually failed. The 70 NROs were not trained and the
three in the A.G.'s Office left. State police officers working in the A.G.'s
office for the hazardous waste program also left. Discussions with individuals
directly involved or knowledgeable of this program provided these explanations:
Agencies experienced difficulty in effectively coordinating the
activities of individuals employed by one agency while working
for another agency.
Low morale developed among those collecting information
because there was no feedback on the result of their
activities—the validity of their cases, the type of follow-up that
occurred, and corrective action that resulted. This lack of
infomation in turn affected informants who provided the officers
with information and who also wanted to know the outcome of
their efforts. In all, this situation affected the productivity and
validity of the intelligence gathering system.
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Overall, there was no central authority to coordinate all the elements, to
set up procedures, and to insure that each element was included in the
process- Nor did any of the agencies involved have or invest the resources
needed to coordinate activities. Discussion with regional DEQE officials
indicated that they did not have the resources to oversee the activities of the
NROs and they were concerned about NROs undertaking activities without
central, coordinated supervision, particularly where safety was involved. Most
believed that they would be overwhelmed with referrals and have to expend
much time and effort following up cases, which they feared would not bear
out. NROs, on the other hand, did not want to invest their time and resources
into cases that they would have little control over and that they could not see
through to completion.
The regretable outcome of this situation was that an agency which lacked
adequate resources and which could benefit greatly from outside assistance,
could not take advantage of a ready-made statewide surveillance system
because it did not have the resources to properly organize or supervise it.
The lack of any organized systematic surveillance has resulted in a
number of different agencies working in hazardous waste on their own. Most
of the time the Attorney General's Office, the county District Attorney, the
MDC, and the NROs work independently. For example, during a two-week
period in March of 1984, NROs drove 8,987 miles and spent 1,048 hours
inspecting potential hazardous waste dump sites across the state. A total of
451 inspections of sites were conducted resulting in the submittal of 31
hazardous waste reports which were referred to DEQE. Nineteen of these
were previously unreported to DEQE and are being investigated. This program
generated additional complaint actions from NRO officers and from the
public. Encouraged by these results, the Division of Fisheries and Wildlife
intends to continue the program and, importantly, to work with the MDC.
Clearly there is a value to this program as it has the potential of
supplementing and reinforcing the regulatory efforts of DEQE.
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D. Summary of Inspection/Enforcement Issues
The inspection/enforcement component of DHW has improved in the last
few years. More inspections are conducted, compliance rates have increased
and a number of significant cases have been adjudicated. Nevertheless,
deficiencies and serious questions persist. The Committee's main concerns
center on these issues: organization and personnel management, data
management, and policy development.
1. Organization and Personnel Management
A 1979-1982 transition report on DEQE prepared by agency staff stated
the following:
On December 1, 1981, DEQE established an Enforcement Review
Group. The responsibilities of this group, chaired by a Deputy
Commissioner and composed of seven representatives from most
DEQE divisions and the Office of the Attorney General, are (l)to
ensure that DEQE hazardous waste enforcement actions are carried
out in an effective, consistent, and timely matter, and (2) to develop
policies and procedure for future enforcement actions and cost
review actions. This group has been very effective in coordinating
complex cases involving several divisions (e.g., water supply, OIR,
and Hazardous Waste) and in guiding general hazardous waste
enforcement policies and cases (emphasis added).
In contrast to that optimistic assessment, a memorandum three years
later, dated March 23, 1984, entitled, "Improving DEQE Enforcement Efforts
and Coordination with the Attorney General" states:
"A meeting was held on March 15, 1984 to consider various aspects
of DEQE's enforcement efforts.... It was generally agreed that
DEQE's enforcement program is not as effective and consistent as it
might be. Referrals of cases to the Attorney General's Office vary
in completeness and quality of preparation. The magnitude of the
harm associated with the cases also varies, and there is currently no
mechanism for establishing priorities."
-75 -
The report goes on to list recommendations. What these two reports and the
time between them illustrate is an inability to develop or implement
procedures or, perhaps more importantly, to adequately monitor that
process—as the second memo indicates, the accomplishments outlined in the
first memo have in fact not occurred, even three years later.
An examination of enforcement/compliance procedures employed at the
four regions produced evidence of inconsistent practices.
The number of Notices of Violations for a particular violation
varied from region to region; this ranged from two to as many as
twenty for the same violation.
The time given to correct a violation, the time at which
violations were verified as being corrected, and the time at
which a follow up inspection was conducted varied greatly from
region to region.
When the regulatory response was escalated from Notice of
Violation to Administrative Order, the number of preceeding
NOVs necessary to trigger escalation and the time frame for
escalation varied greatly.
There were instances in which escalation from NOV to
Administrative Order was later followed by deescalation to NOV;
there was no consistent pattern to this.
In certain of the regions inspections were normally made on an
unannounced, surprise basis to provide the most accurate picture
of activities and procedures; the importance of this was
emphasized. In other regions inspections were usually scheduled
in advance with the regulated companies.
In discussions with a variety of officials and examination of records, a
number of reasons were advanced to explain these differences.
The regional offices operate relatively autonomously. In many
ways this is well-suited to the geographic distribution of the
offices and the professional level of the senior staff. However,
it has interferred with a centralized management. DREs are
responsible for at least two programs and so report to two
different program directors in the central office. The DRE
responsible for hazardous waste and the air programs is on the
same level in the management loop as the deputy director for
enforcement in the central office of DHW. As a result there is
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no single central figure that is in fact in charge on a day-to-day
basis insuring that consistent approaches are being followed in
the field.
As a result of absences in certain key positions, in many
instances interpretation of regulations was left to the regions
and as a result they were interpreted somewhat differently from
region to region.
There was a consensus among regional employees that monthly
meetings between the central and regional office are often
unfocused and unproductive. This appears to be a function of
time constraints. As these meetings are for deputy regional
engineers, inspectors have little input or the opportunity to
communicate with inspectors from other regions. On the few
occasions this has occurred informally it has been productive.
Although the regions are the "eyes" and "ears" of the department
and the DRE position was designated as an
administrative/policy-development position, the DREs are so
overwhelmed with work that they have little time for ongoing
systematic input to the central office.
There is no systematic tracking of employee time spent and
there is no formalized evaluation system. In two of the regions
no evaluation of employees has ever been done.
The absence of an effective central authority in the program has
manifested itself in a number of other ways at the regional level. For
example, EPA allowed the state to choose one of two ways of reporting data.
Three regions chose one way, the fourth another and no agreement could be
reached. The issue continued unresolved for quite a long time since no one
directly involved could make the decision. Had there been one central figure
to consider all possibilities and make a decision, the matter could have been
settled more quickly.
Another area where regional variability adversely affects performance is
in the handling of cases which may end up in formal litigation. The time and
intensity of investigation prior to referral to the central office follows no
established protocol. In some regions employees operate with the perception
that the Attorney General's Office is too busy and that the regions should work
with the cases as much as possible. There have been a number of instances,
however, in which holding on to the case too long has been detrimental to its
prosecution.
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There is also variability between regions in the training of inspectors
because it is mainly "on the job". Because this direct experience is the main
basis for developing a capable inspector, the high turnover rate of inspectors is
cause for serious concern. A number of generators, particularly larger ones,
have stated that in many instances inspections have been more of an
educational experience for the inspector than the company being inspected.
2. Data Management
Although the Division of Hazardous Waste administers one of the major
regulatory programs in the state, its inspection/enforcement section has no
computer capability nor is one planned in the near future. All inspection data
must be manually tabulated. The central office has no immediate access to
data from the four regions, either to monitor specific activities or analyze
data. And the regional offices have no effective, simple tracking system for
cases. One of the smaller regions is somewhat of an exception, having devised
a limited system of its own.
Although there are quarterly reports that provide the number of
inspections, initial compliance rates, follow-up inspections and Class I, II, and
III violations, there is no readily available access, particularly by senior
officials either at the regional or central office, to valuable data that would
provide a clear profile of priority targets within the regulated community or
enforcement effectivenss. The present system does not produce information
on the following variables necessary to good management:
- a breakdown of major types of Class I and Class III violations and
the number and time sequence of NOVs sent,
the time at which NOVs are escalated to Administrative Orders,
verification that violations are corrected and in what time span,
- a breakdown of specific types of violations by type of business,
i.e. TSD, major, large non-major, and small generators, and the
sequence of activities that follow (i.e. whether certain businesses
or certain violations are corrected faster, require more NOVs or
more time; whether certain businesses have multiple violations).
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- a simple crosschecking between programs (air, water, etc.)
In discussions with the regions, none couid provide updated answers to any
of the above points and all expressed frustration at the inability to have easy
access to such information. Beyond the general knowledge of how many
businesses were inspected and how many were initially in or out of compliance,
all indicated it would be necessary to manually go through hundreds of paper
files to monitor activity and data.
3. Policy
Given that the regulated community is quite large—majors, TSDs,
non-major large generators, small generators, transporters, known non-notifier
and many more potential non notifiers~and that the resources for the critical
inspection process is quite limited, it is necessary to prioritize activities.
Without the necessary data, particularly in a new agency working in
unchartered areas that are extensive and complex, this process becomes quite
difficult. As a result there is a temptation to do the obvious, focus on the
largest and most visible targets. However, the most obvious way to prioritize
may not be the best or most accurate. And that appears to be what has
occurred in this case study. The Division of Hazardous Waste, without clear
profiles of the hazardous waste universe, appears to have equated the degree
of risk with the amount of waste generated, assuming that if the greatest
quantities of waste are controlled so too will be most of the risk .
Unfortunately, there are no solid data to support this operating assumption.
Indeed, what data exists suggests that just the opposite may be true—that the
largest volume hazardous waste generators may be the safest, and the smallest
volume generator the riskiest.
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This priority of controlling the largest hazardous waste businesses is
reflected in the budget plans through 1985, as summarized in the section
dealing with inspection costs on a man-year basis.
Man-Years
Initial
Inspection Follow-up Total
Major facilities (115, inspected
4 times per yr. @ 5 days per
inspection) 10.18 16.50 26.68
Non-major TSDs (300, now reduced
to 83; 75-100 per year @ 5 days
per inspection) 1.64 2.72 4.36
Non-major generators/transporters
(2,200, inspected once per 15 years
@ 3 work days per inspection) 1.40 3.00 4.40
13.22 22.22 35.44
As can be seen, DHW has committed 75% of its inspection resources to
inspect 115 majors four times each year, compared to 12% of its resources to
inspect 2,200 non-major generators once every 15 years, and no resources to
inspect 3,000-6,000 or more small generators. Analysis of the data available
shows that majors have a violation rate half that of non-majors and that
compliance is lowest during the initial inspection and improves thereafter. A
general consensus among a variety of officials outside DEQE and members of
the regulated community is that (l)the hazardous waste risk is least among
the majors who, with the greatest visibility and with full time environmental
staffs, are most likely to comply with regulations, avoiding certainly the more
serious Class I type violations, and (2) the hazardous waste risk appears
greatest among the smaller generators that are less likely to notify or, if they
do, to fully comply. Until the necessary data is available to demonstrate who
does what, a more prudent policy would be to make some provision for the
likelihood that risk is not necessarily related to size. At the least, some effort
should be made to test the present operating hypothesis.
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Note: As this report was going to press, a draft of FY 1986 budget was
produced in which changes were made including more frequent inspections of
large non-major generators and some inspections of small generators. A
concern of this change at this time is that the Division has grown so rapidly in
the past few years—in response to the budget priorities during those
years—that further increases to meet these new demands are unlikely. This
has been acknowledged by senior officials who indicated that all the positions
from FY 1985 may not be funded.
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VIII. GENERATOR AND TRANSPORTER ATTITUDES
The Committee considered it important to obtain input from the
regulated community, particularly because the hazardous waste management
program is so new, because the effectiveness of many of its components have
not been evaluated, and because the success of the program depends to a
certain extent on the cooperation of the regulated community. This would
serve to complement the objective analysis of the program. The survey was
conducted to obtain attitudes and trends rather than statistically significant
differences. This was done either in person or by telephone.
Thirty-six small generators (generating less than 1,000 kg. hazardous
waste per month) were questioned. Eight (22%) were not aware of regulations
or were not participating in the hazardous waste management program. Of
the remaining 28, three at first responded that they were aware of and were
following regulations. However, upon further questioning, they did not have an
EPA I.D. number and were not familiar with the manifest system, leaving 25
out of the 36 who were actually in the system. It could not be established
whether those that stated they were unaware of regulations actually were not
or simply said so to protect their own neglect. Either way they were counted
as outside the system. Twenty-two large generators (generating more than
1,000 kg. hazardous waste per month) were surveyed; only one was not in the
system.
Ten questions were asked in three categories: knowledge of regulations,
attitudes about regulations and the regulatory process, and the nature of their
own activities. Based on the sample size, none of these results can be
considered statistically significant but can only be used to reflect certain
trends and to serve as a basis of comparison in future years.
1. Are you generally aware of the regulations?
Seventy percent of large generators said they were "very aware"; 25% said
"basically aware"; 5% were unable to measure their awareness.
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Fifty-nine percent of small generators were "very aware" of
regulations, 20% were "basically familiar", and 11% could not measure
familiarity.
One hundred percent of the larger companies that had staff assigned
to interpretation of regulations and other environmental matters were
"very aware" of regulations.
2. Do you understand the regulations, are they clear to you? For
example, do you know which wastes are hazardous and how they
should be handled and packaged, what the recordkeeping
requirements and the contingency plans are?
Sixty percent of large generators understood regulations "very clearly",
30% understood them "clearly" but had some questions, and 10% had many
questions or were confused.
Forty-eight percent of small generators understood the regulations "very
clearly", 25% understood regulations "clearly", but had some questions and
27% had many questions and were often confused.
Comparing responses to the above two questions, a certain percentage of
both large and small generators that were "very aware" of regulations
(Question 1) did not, upon closer questioning, have a detailed understanding of
the regulations (Question 2). For instance, they had a general understanding
that wastes must be hauled by licensed transporters to a licensed facility and
must be manifested. However, they were less aware about their particular
responsibilities and liabilities in the more technical areas of the regulations.
These findings reflect that small generators were much less aware of or
understanding of regulations than were large generators. This may understate
the problem. Large generators, particularly those with staff devoted to the
problem, appear, by their greater knowledge, to have higher standards by
which to judge themselves in this self-evaluation. What many smaller
generators consider a "very clear" understanding of regulations, may be viewed
as much less than that by large generator standards.
-83 -
3. How did you learn of regulations and how do you receive information
on an ongoing basis?
Both large and small generators received specific information on the
regulations and manifest from the EPA or DEQE, once they applied for an I.D.
number. How they knew to apply for an ID number and how they have
received information since that time differed between large and small
generators.
Large generators more actively sought out information from state and
federal officials, including use of the Federal Register. Large generators also
had a line of communication established with DEQE from other regulatory
programs such as air and water quality, by which they automatically heard of
developments and could ask questions. Other sources of information included
professional and trade associations, general publicity created by the
formulation of regulations, by surveillance and enforcement activities, and by
inspections.
Small generators obtained information from trade associations and from
the general press due to the publicity of activities. Major sources of ongoing
information were the transporters who haul their wastes and assist them in
packaging and labeling containers. Small generators indicated that their
interaction with DEQE or DHW—either the central or regional
offices—including inspections, was a minor source of information.
4. How much contact and what is the nature of that contact with
DEQE/DHW?
Approximately half of the large generators indicated somewhat regular
contact with DEQE/DHW, usually with the regional office. These contacts
were usually initiated by the generator which had a particular question.
Contact with or awareness of DHW was greatest in the southeastern and
western regions and lowest in the northeast region. The group of generators
reporting the highest number of contacts also indicated the highest familiarity
with regulations and understanding of them. A number of these generators
participated in local programs or chamber of commerce projects designed to
improve understanding and involved working with the regulatory agency.
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The other half of the large quantity generators reported infrequent
contact with DEQE/DHW. This group also contained greater proportions of
those unclear or unfamiliar with regulations. Interestingly, this group indicated
that contacts with DEQE were less worthwhile than did the other half which
had a clearer understanding of regulations to start with. This is somewhat
surprising since one might expect those most confused about regulations to
derive the most value from communication with the agency capable of
resolving questions. However, it appears that those initially more concerned
and responsive to regulations invested the time and effort to understand the
regulations, ask questions when necessary and so value the information when
received. Those with less contact and less understanding of the regulations
appear to view the whole process more negatively and so view contact with
the regulatory agency that way. This may suggest a subgroup of large
generators requiring more attention from DHW—those less knowledgeable of
regulations, less likely to interact with regulatory officials and perhaps with
less incentive to comply.
Approximately 25% of large generators interviewed had been inspected at
least once, a proportion that appears somewhat higher than DHW's statistical
rate. Almost two-thirds of large generators with some type of a full-time
environmental or regulatory staff had been inspected at least once; half of this
group had been inspected twice or more. This reflected the fact that the
larger the company—making possible and necessitating full-time
environmental staff—the more frequent the inspection. An often stated
comment of these generators was that some inspectors seemed inexperienced
and that the inspected company did more to inform those inspectors than did
those inspectors inform the company. The other comment mentioned many
times was that information and interpretations of regulations was variable
from one inspector or regional official to another.
Only a fifth of small generators indicated somewhat regular contact with
DEQE/DHW. These contacts were initiated by the generator to obtain
explanation of regulations or a listing of transporters. The remaining small
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generators had little or no contact with DEQE. Two of the 25 small
generators had been inspected. In general, small generators indicated little
enthusiasm about contacts, similar to the response of those larger generators
who had few contacts with the agency.
5. What concerns motivate you to comply with regulations?
Large quantity generators most frequently cited as their primary concern
bad publicity—the importance to project to the community the image of good
citizenship. ("We want to do the right thing; we don't want the public to think
we are unconcerned about their health and the environment.") They were
certainly concerned with the legal ramifications of non-compliance, but
seemed to feel those problems were more manageable and surmountable than a
tarnished public image.
Small quantity generators were primarily motivated out of fear of the
consequences to their business of "fines and jail." They also cited good
citizenship and "doing the right thing" but with much less intensity than their
concern about an administrative or judicial penalty. Lastly, small generators
were somewhat concerned about bad publicity.
6. How effective is DEQE/DHW in raising your concerns about
non-compliance?
Neither large or small quantity generators perceived a strong presence
from DEQE nor felt that if an action were taken it would be very strong.
Although small quantity generators were most concerned about the
consequences of legal actions, they seemed to think there was much less
likelihood that such actions would in fact be taken than did the larger quantity
generators. This may reflect the less frequent contact small generators have
had with the agency. Large quantity generators, although less concerned
about legal repercussions, see them as somewhat more likely. This may
reflect the greater knowledge of and contact with agency activities. The
reason they may be less concerned, however, is that they anticipate milder
legal actions such as negotiable settlements and relatively minor fines. This
may explain why large generators, although perceiving a greater likelihood of
legal actions than do small generators, are less concerned with the
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consequences. Small generators, on the other hand, see legal consequences in
terms of large fines and jail—actions which, although unlikely to happen, could
put them permanently out of business if they were to happen.
In summary, relative to the expectations of an efficient and strong
enforcement effort that were created by the initial publicity about the
hazardous waste program, generators perceive a rather weak and scarce
effort, a tiger "without much bite."
7. What major changes do you perceive from before the institution of
regulations to the present time? What role did DEQE/DHW play in
those changes?
A major change noted by many large quantity generators was the greater
awareness they had that their wastes were hauled by licensed transporters and
that the destination of those wastes was known. Among the small quantity
generators who answered this survey (and were therefore participating in the
hazardous waste management system) the major change they noted was their
entry into the system due to the promulgation of regulations and the publicity
surrounding that process.
Both large and small generators indicated their participation/involvement
in the management program was self-initiated and has, for all practical
purposes, been voluntary, due to their own concerns about
non-compliance—bad publicity or fear of legal consequences—rather than the
result of an active presence or prodding by DEQE/DHW. The agency's role was
primarily one of explaining certain regulations, providing informational
material, or creating the possibility of certain enforcement consequences,
which the generators themselves took actions to avoid.
8. What are your problems in complying with regulations?
Large generators cited an abundance of paperwork, some confusion over
contingency plans, and the restrictiveness of the 90-day storage rule.
Small generators cited financial costs of transporting waste, the need to
use licensed transporters, the complexity of the regulations including the
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manifest requirements, the confusions and costs of testing certain wastes, and
the difficulties of complying with the under 1,000 kg. storage rule.
9. What single most important improvement would help you?
Large generators - allowing longer storage of wastes.
Small generators - being able to transport wastes to a central location or
being allowed to store wastes for a longer period so that they could be
transported more economically.
10. Do you know generators of hazardous waste who have disposed of
their waste improperly?
To approximate the degree of improper disposal, we asked generators
about the practices of other generators, since they were unlikely to
incriminate themselves (all indicated they were handling their wastes
properly). This nominative approach has been used in surveying other types of
suspect behavior and was used successfully in a nationwide survey by the EPA
of illicit disposal practices.
In this approach, generators were asked about their direct knowledge of
other companies who fall under M.G.L. 21c regulations, that is, generate
hazardous wastes. Secondary sources of such information—from the media,
others outside the company, including transporters—was not included.
Approximately one in six generators knew of at least one company that
would fall within the hazardous waste regulations but was not handling the
waste properly. It appeared that about one in ten companies that fell within
the hazardous waste regulations was not handling their waste properly. This
was similar to nationwide findings. A much higher proportion of those
identified as mishandling wastes were smaller companies. However, since
companies were more familiar with and identified companies similar to
themselves, this may simply reflect the fact that small generators were more
likely (or willing) to identify other companies than were large generators.
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Transporters indicated that most large generators were in the system
although they periodically became aware of large, even major, generators, not
in the system. It was their impression that many small generators were not in
the system due to lack of knowledge or understanding of regulations.
The transporters themselves had brought many small generators into the
system by offering their services. In some instances transporters conducted
"milk runs" picking up small amounts of hazardous waste from a number of
small generators in close proximity to one another. The transporters
recognized the problem many small generators had with the financial costs of
transporting hazardous waste.
Transporters cited a number of instances of fraudulent use of their names
on manifests in areas of the state, or other states, where they did not conduct
business. In each instance these discoveries were made accidentally rather
than due to a systematic checking by government officials.
Transporters could be specially designated as "small quantity generator
transporters"—DHW maintains a list of such designated transporters. This
designation requires that the transporter be certified by DHW as having
sufficient knowledge on labeling, packaging, and, if necessary, testing wastes,
to assume those responsibilities for the small generator. Our review of 14
transporters designated as small quantity generator transporters indicated that
only four were aware of the special requirements attached to that
designation. All the others were either unaware they had been so designated
or were unaware that the designation meant anything more than that they had
checked a special box on a form, indicating they wanted to be included in a list
made available to small generators.
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IX. COMMUNITY OUTREACH/EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS
The Department of Environmental Quality Engineering recognized early
that a critical element to an effective and comprehensive hazardous waste
management program is the involvement and coordination of local officials.
Four factors prompted this awareness:
1. Hazardous waste activities, including generation, transport,
treatment/storage/disposal, and possibly illegal or improper
disposal, occurs in every one of the 351 communities in
Massachusetts, making this an extensive, decentralized, local
problem.
2. The tremendous concern and interest of the public in hazardous
waste issues, combined with the complexity and frequent
misunderstanding of the issues made it logical for the
department not only to tap this valuable resource but also to
ensure that sufficient information and expertise were provided
to the public.
3. The limited resources of the regulatory agency, in the face of a
very large universe to regulate, necessitated the use of local
resources and enthusiasms, particularly for those problems that
could best be managed locally.
4. The Department viewed these locally supported programs as the
most cost effective means of providing local communication and
education on hazardous waste regulations and issues. This was
viewed as a most appropriate way of dealing with a major barrier
to compliance—particularly among small quantity
generators—the simple lack of knowledge about regulations.
The importance of this was explicitly noted in DEQE's 1985 budget
narrative:
"A highly visible outreach effort to both community and industry
is needed. This effort will assist companies and communities by
making them more aware of the regulations and interpret
requirements as they apply to specific communities and
problems. Of particular emphasis will be community inventories
of hazardous waste generators and management practices (which
will also be used by the Compliance Unit's program to identify
companies which have not yet notified DEQE of waste
management activities) ..."
Two programs arose from these considerations: the Community
Hazardous Waste Coordinator Program (CHWCP) in 1980 and the Industry
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Assistance Program (IAP) in 1982. The CHWCP sought to establish a
hazardous waste coordinator in each of the 351 communities in the
Commonwealth. These officials would be chosen locally and work with
officials within both the central office and regions of the Department.
Meetings would be held to provide technical and organizational training.
The IAP was designed in response to industry needs concerning
understanding of the new regulations. A list of speakers was made available to
trade associations and other business groups to explain the regulations. Since
March of 1983 speakers have been provided to at least ten trade association
meetings (with a total attendance of 400) and booths have been set up at three
trade shows (total attendance of 8,000). This program has essentially
supplemented and given support to other programs started by different
business associations such as Associated Industries of Massachusetts (AIM),
Small Business Association of New England (SBANE) and New England
Fabricare, an association of dry cleaners.
Whereas IAP is an informal program that essentially responds to industry
requests for information, the CHWCP is a more formally structured program,
whose organization and activities were to be initiated, at least for the first
few years, by DEQE. Although neither of these programs are statutorily
mandated, the importance of community involvement is statutorily recognized
in the provision in M.G.L. Ch. 21C by the requirement that the Department
furnish reports of local hazardous waste activities to every community in
Massachusetts.
The CHWCP was designed to:
- locate abandoned hazardous waste sites,
assist in emergency response to local hazardous waste spills,
provide two-way communication between localities and the
regulatory agency to convey local concerns, questions and
complaints to the regulatory agency and to convey new
developments, technical expertise, education materials, and
organizing tools from the central agency to local officials, and
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to conduct local generator surveys, to locate non-notifiers, to develop
media attention about these activities, and to create an awareness in
the local community and any local industry.
Given the limited resources of the Department and the time required to
inspect all facilities and potential non-notifiers, this program could prove
invaluable. Its importance was recognized by a number of communities as well
as by DEQE. The Department's staff realized that in working toward the
resolution of the hazardous waste problem it must rely on the interest and
expertise of the people who are potentially affected, that is, all citizens of
Massachusetts. It was this recognition that led the Department to ask the
chief elected officials in Massachusetts 351 cities and towns to appoint
community hazardous waste coordinators.
A total of 311 out of the 351 communities appointed hazardous waste
coordinators. These individuals were appointed in one of three ways: they
were assigned the responsibility (usually a local government employee whose
other job responsibilities were in some way related); they were asked to take
the position and accepted; or they volunteered or actively sought the position.
Understandably, those who volunteered were the most active coordinators and
those assigned to fill the position were the least active.
Hazardous waste coordinators came from a number of backgrounds. The
five leading affiliations and the percent of the total are:
Affiliation Percent
Health; Sanitarians 31 %
Public (no municipal affiliation) 19
Chief elected Officials 1
1
(selectmen, managers, mayors)
Fire Department 10
Public Works
_9
(city engineers, building inspectors)
80 %
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The remaining 20% are drawn from the Conservation Commission, water
department, administrative assistants, clerks, civil defense, police, and
planning and finance committees. The activities of the different groups
generally matched their degree of representation. Individuals from the
health-realted field and from the public were most involved, those from the
last three groups were less involved and those from the remaining 20% were
least involved.
The Committee surveyed approximately 130 of the 311 hazardous waste
coordinators. Thirty-six of those returned their questionnaires (which took ten
minutes to complete).
The consensus among those who returned their questionnaires was:
There were many activities that could be accomplished by local
coordinators, including generation surveys and inventories;
hazardous waste collection days for homeowners with wastes;
educational efforts for industry to recycle or reduce wastes;
locating abandoned sites; creating public awareness concerning
improper/illegal or suspicious disposal practices.
They needed technical, organizational and some financial
assistance from experts which they felt would be minimal but
could produce significant results. They felt frustrated the
program was abandoned.
They reported strong support and enthusiasm from the local
community, a desire to become involved.
- They also indicated that both they and others had experienced
difficulty in obtaining information or having questions answered
by officals in either the central or regional offices.
There have been many efforts that show that local activities can work and
produce results:
An inventory of all the generators in Northampton by the
hazardous waste coordinator got a very strong response and
turned up many non-notifying companies. The issue was brought
to the foreground.
The Boston hazardous waste coordinator produced a list of many
non-notifying small generators.
- In the Cape Cod region, which has a fragile water supply system,
assistance and organization was provided for the transport of
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hazardous wastes for small quantity generators so as to greatly
reduce the financial and technical burdens of properly disposing
of their wastes (and so reduce the incentive for improper
disposal).
The New Bedford Chamber of Commerce and the Southeast
Massachusetts Task Force conducted generator surveys,
developed educational materials and programs for the regulated
community, and served as a spokesperson to the Department for
the concerns and questions of their own.
North Reading Hazardous Waste Committee, with the assistance
of the Metropolitan Area Planning Council (MAPC), has actively
identified small generators in its area and worked with trade
associations to educate the regulated community about the
regulations and identify special concerns that the Department
might need to address.
Each of these activities resulted because of local enthusiasm and
expertise. Had they not been initiated on the local level they would not have
occurred. They reflect a potential source of assistance for hazardous waste
control that remains largely untapped.
Although the Community Hazardous Waste Coordinator Program was
listed as a major accomplishment in the 1982 Transition report which
measured departmental activities during the 1979-1982 period, the program
has become inactive after providing four training sessions. Officials within
DEQE indicated that with the restrictive budget, the priority of the program
was such that they could not at present provide resources for the program and
showed little enthusiasm to resuscitate it. Therefore, there is a discrepancy
between the importance DEQE attaches to this program in written reports
such as the above cited Transition report and the budget narrative quoted
earlier, as well as public presentations, and in the actual support it gives to
the program. Given the enthusiasm among local communities and the types of
projects they have accomplished, DEQE should either support these programs
to the degree it claims they are important or else clearly state that these
programs are of little importance. The Community Hazardous Waste
Coordinator Program has received attention as an innovative program not only
within the state, but nationwide. It does not seem appropriate to give
attention to a program that, in practice, DEQE either cannot or will not
support.
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X. ADMINISTRATIVE FINES
During the course of this review, DEQE/DHW, the Attorney General's
Office, the Natural Resources Committee and a variety of other public
interest and environmental groups supported legislation conferring on DEQE
the power to levy an administrative fine on those violating laws administered
by DEQE. Proponents argued that they needed the enforcement tool to handle
"middle level" cases—ones which are not so major that they should require the
extensive administrative and legal resources for prosecution, but which
represent a high enough level of risk that they require more than a notice of
violation or administrative order, neither of which carries any actual
punishment.
Early opponents of the concept—primarily Associated Industries of
Massachusetts—argued that there are few enough cases that they can be
adequately handled by the court system, that it is inappropriate for DEQE to
have such power and to act as "judge, jury, and executioner" and that there is
likely to be widespread abuse of the administrative fine, especially if it is
touted as a revenue raising tool.
After committee hearings on proposed legislation empowering DEQE to
assess administrative fines, the parties produced a compromise bill and
Chapter 95 of the Acts of 1985 was enacted in June. This Committee
supported this legislation and sets forth here the reasons why it believes its
enactment is appropriate and useful.
While allowing a state administrative agency the power to impose
discretionary civil penalties seems to be a novel concept in Massachusetts,
there is ample precedent for such practices in other industrial states, such as
Illinois and Ohio. Additionally, the ability to assess administrative penalties is
found in the enabling statutes of many federal agencies. Officials of agencies
which already possess such power view that ability as an invaluable and
indispensable complement to their other enforcement alternatives. Such
endorsements suggests that Massachusetts should fully explore the desirability
of instituting that specific deterrence for use in the area of pollution control.
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At the threshold of the discussion, some will argue that the power to
enter judgements involving penalties is a judicial function which should never
be conferred on an administrative agency. In their opinion, administrative
fines violate the hallowed doctrine of "separation of powers" and legislation
permitting such error would be stricken down under the provision of Article 30
of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution. This
Committee, however, finds no Massachusetts precedents that militate against
the adoption of a statute that would allow DEQE to assess administrative
penalties, and does not agree with such arguments.
In jurisdictions where environmental agencies have had the ability to
assess monetary penalties, reviewing courts have validated such legislative
enactments on the basis that they are police measures having a general
purpose going to the conditions necessary to sustain life. Also found to be
compelling has been the recognition that the urgency of the pollution problem
and the legislative desire to centralize its control in a designated
environmental agency for consistent enforcement purposes made, in most
cases, direct judicial action impractical and inexpedient. In those cases, the
penal functions are deemed to be incidental to the duty of administering the
law, and, as such, are quasi-judicial powers which fall outside of the preserve
carved out for the judical branch. Lastly, and of significance, has been
judicial insistence that the statutes provide adequate judicial review and
establish protective guidelines that the agency must follow in imposing
penalties.
Most of the legislation proposing administrative fines for use by DEQE in
its enforcement efforts contained the elements which assured the successful
adoption of similar legislation in other states, except for one missing feature.
That ommission, the part that assures the separation of investigations and
prosecutorial functions from adjudicative responsibilities, is significant and
accounts for a considerable part of business opposition to the proposed
legislation. Although the Massachusetts Administrative Procedure Act,
M.G.L. c. 30A, does not require the separation of the functions, and the
Supreme Judicial Court in its decisions finds no denial of due process in the
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combination of the investigative and adjudicative functions in administrative
agencies, the Committee believes that the better practice, in this instance,
would be to provide some independence in the adjudicative process.
In this regard, the Committee points out that the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act 5 U.S.CS S. 554(d) requires that the person who presides at the
reception of evidence in a adjudicatory hearing and makes a recommended
decision must be insulated from the investigatory or prosecutorial functions.
The purpose of this provision is (1) to prevent the interpolation of facts by
adjudicators who had been exposed to them ex parte, and (2) to avoid partiality
of adjudicators involved too closely with one side of an issue. The federal act
does not, it should be noted, require a complete separation of functions in the
agency; only the hearing officer is sequestered. This arrangement may be
appropriate for Massachusetts in the context of a statute proposing
administrative fines for environmental law violations. As this concept was
incorporated into the enacted bill, the Committee believes that many of the
evils perceived by industry to be flowing from commingling the role of
accuser, judge, and jury have been ameliorated.
As to the substance of the proposed fine program, the Committee's review
of DEQE enforcement needs and the progress of programs in three other states
indicates that the program will be valuable and will be managed in a fair and
appropriate manner. At least 100 instances were found in which an
administrative fine could be used, including DEQE programs other than
hazardous waste. There have been many violations in the solid waste
program. In hazardous waste there were at least 20 cases that required
immediate action but did not warrant development of court actions. It would
be difficult for DEQE and the Attorney General's Office to handle this many
cases at one time through court action.
Staff review of administrative fine programs in three other states showed
very few cases were contested, and in every instance the courts supported the
original fines. In those states the number of notices of violations decreased
somewhat and compliance appeared to improve.
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For some time DEQE has had the power to revoke a license—a power
much greater than administrative fine. Every indication is that this power has
been used fairly and appropriately and every decision to revoke or suspend has
ultimately been upheld. DEQE/DHW has supported the use of an outside
hearing officer to make recommendations in contested cases. Although the
Commissioner will make the final decision, the independence of the
adjudicator will enhance the reality of procedural due process. The
Committee has no doubt that a fairly managed administrative penalty program
will make a significant contribution to achieving future voluntary compliance
to the states environmental laws.
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XL KEY ISSUES, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
At the outset of this report, the Committee noted that it identified eight
areas for closer review. It also emphasized that it is mindful of the many
external factors that bear on the performance of state agencies, particularly
one which must establish itself in an era when all government is under pressure
to contract rather than grow. Many of the current budgetary and personnel
strategies have been designed to retard and diminish governmental expansion.
As such they militate against the urgent growth expected from this agency.
Undoubtedly, these realities have made orderly growth and goal
accomplishment very difficult. Because of this, the Committee has sought to
be constructive in its observation and recommendations. The Committee
hopes that the Department will use its report as an opportunity to establish a
baseline of information from which further progress can be measured. Indeed,
many of the issues discussed hereafter have been framed for the sole purpose
of prompting agency staff to institute its own evaluative effort.
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Issue 1; Has the Division of Hazardous Waste developed an organizational
structure and management approach capable of effectively and efficiently
handling its rapid growth and the wide variety of programs for which it is
responsible under Chapter 21C?
Conclusion
Although DHW has a talented and capable staff it has had serious
problems adjusting to rapid growth and effectively managing a wide variety of
programs. The recent additions of the requirements of Chapter 21 E and the
"Right to Know" legislation, combined with a leveling out of further staff
expansion, are likely to exacerbate these problems.
The Division is understaffed relative to the number of programs that have
to receive top priority. This has diluted staff resources. The shifting of staff
activities and attention from one area to another without consistent policy
guidance has lessened their effectiveness and efficiency. The understaffing
problems relative to overall departmental objectives has been exacerbated by
a hiring process that is quite cumbersome. At the same time upper level
management capabilities have been strained by the speed with which the
Division has grown. This has resulted in upper level staff not being able to set
aside sufficient time, in a coordinated, organized way for overall management
problems and long range planning objectives.
The lack of a Management Information System makes it difficult to:
(1) array and analyze large amounts of data produced by the program and (2) to
manage and plan staff resources most effectively.
There is a lack of adequate communication or coordination between the
decentralized regional system and the central office. Input is lacking in both
directions and the implementation of policies is inconsistent from one office
to another.
Recommendation
Given the variety of programs the Department is responsible for, all of
which clamor for immediate attention and the inherent difficulties of
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satisfying all expectations, the Committee believes that the Department has
three realistic options:
1. Acknowledge limitations and establish priorities, explicitly
documenting the rationale for such choices;
2. Attempt to respond to all program assignments with the full
understanding that no particular program will likely receive
adequate attention.
3. Develop an acceptable plan that would justify substantial budget
and resource increases.
The Committee could support the third option but only if certain
measures are enacted. To start, a cohesive management structure should be
developed which includes at least:
1. a Management Information System that allows easy access to
data and personnel activities,
2. a division-wide Employee Evaluation Program,
3. a five-year plan that explicitly states specific program
objectives and a method by which progress can be measured,
4. a management committment to implement the stated goals and
objectives.
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Issue 2; Has the Division developed an adequate data base on overall
hazardous waste generation quantities and types so that it can determine, as
fractions of the total waste stream, the amount that is treated on site, shipped
off-site, or is unaccounted for (i.e. improperly or illegally disposed of)?
Conclusion
DHW/DEQE has relied, in an informal manner, on a variety of private
studies or on the findings and extrapolations made by the Department of
Environmental Management (DEM) in the annual Generic Environmental
Impact Report, the validity of which DEM itself has questioned. DEQE/DHW
has not attempted to resolve discrepancies between studies or to fill in the
gaps of individual studies. The DEM study, for instance, only focuses on waste
transported off-site . The use of these figures and their acceptance by DEQE
appears to reflect an official position that considers off-site transported waste
the entire universe with which to be concerned. As a result there is little
attention, as official policy focusing on unaccounted waste (i.e. improper or
illegal disposal). This finding is generally consistent with that found in a
nationwide study by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
which stated that "data inadequacies conceal the scope and complexity of the
nation's hazardous waste problems, and impede effective control."
With this operating assumption that waste transported off site is the
universe, the distinction between amounts generated and amounts reported as
disposed is lost. Consequently, it becomes much more difficult to critically
focus attention on the potential magnitude of improper or illegal disposal since
this problem occurs outside of what has come to be defined as the universe of
concern. DHW has had to make many management decisions as to how
resources will be targeted, what the high risk segments are. The above
attitudes may affect these decisions and so the orientation of the regulatory
program. For example, an inspection schedule that requires 10 to 15 years to
initially inspect all generators; a low priority for the systematic, organized
inspection of non-notifier companies; the low priority of inspecting small
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quantity generators; the lack of alternative approaches for small quantity
generators, including deemphasis on the Community Hazardous Waste Program
that could conduct local surveys of potential non-notifying small generators;
the use of the manifest system to primarily process tens of thousands of
manifests of those in the system, rather than developing profiles to flag those
segments not in the system; all of these decisions—without adequate data to
justify them—reflect an attitude of primary concern for the largest amounts
of waste that are in the system than for those high risk groups that may be
outside the system.
Recommendation
We recommend that DEQE make it a priority to conduct a statewide
survey or inventory to determine the total hazardous waste stream in
Massachusetts, and from that determine the fractions of that waste stream
that are treated on-site, shipped off-site or are unaccounted for. A breakdown
by industry size, location and SIC code should establish who is responsible for
what and to what segment additional resources should be focused. By
establishing these numbers the DHW will be able to officially estimate a range
of hazardous waste handled improperly or illegally—a primary concern of the
21C legislation—and to monitor year-by-year how this problem changes.
- 103 -
Issue 3: Does the DHW have adequate information to assess the nature
and magnitude of problems of small quantity generator hazardous waste
management vis-a-vis overall hazardous waste management? Has DHW
implemented or planned a program to adequately manage the small quantity
generator of hazardous waste?
Conclusion
The importance of the potential risk of small quantity generator
hazardous waste was clearly recognized by the inclusion of this segment in
Massachusetts regulations, in contrast to its exclusion from the federal
statutes. This has not been matched by an implemented program or by an
explicitly developed policy of DHW. This segment has received low priority
despite the fact that small quantity generators may contribute 15% to 25% to
the hazardous waste stream and that compared to other segments of the
hazardous waste stream a disproportionate amount of this waste may be
handled improperly. Even in the most recent budget, in which the importance
of the control of small quantity generators was explicitly recognized, only 1 %
of inspection resources were targeted to this segment. DHW has developed no
plans to approach this problem more aggressively or to consider innovative
solutions.
Recommendation
The Committee recommends that the legislative intent of regulating
small quantity generators be recognized explicitly by the DHW, by clearly
establishing the relative risk of small quantity generators (SQGs), by setting
priorities according to that risk, and by implementing actual programs to
ensure that the risk is dealt with appropriately. Establishing risk goes beyond
simply determining how much hazardous waste small quantity generators
produce but how well that waste is handled . Preliminary evidence suggests
that small generators have less awareness or understanding of the regulations
than large quantity generators and that due to the lack of economies of scale
have more financial barriers to appropriate disposal. In some instances DHW
will have to use innovative approaches to existing programs (see following
sections on inspection and outreach) to most effectively make small
generators aware of regulations and to understand them. In other instances,
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such as economic barriers, DHW wili have to develop programs or perhaps ask
for legislative changes to assist small generators. Certain exceptions to
existing transporter requirements could be allowed to enable some small
generators, who have been properly trained, to transport specific wastes to a
central location. This would greatly lower transportation costs and encourage
more participation in the system.
The regulations governing the accumulation of hazardous wastes on site
by small quantity generators should be changed. As the regulations
(30CMR351) now stand, small quantity generators can produce and
accumulate on site up to 1,000 k.g. per month. As long as storage does not
exceed 1,000 k.g. it can be stored indefinitely. If they exceed that amount,
they become large quantity generators and can store for only 90 days. This
means that an SQG that generates 800 k.g. of hazardous waste (3-4 barrels)
one time can store it indefinitely, whereas an SQG that generates 800 k.g.
each month, must ship it each month or else by the second month it would
exceed 1,000 k.g. and become a large quantity generator.
The Committee considers that if hazardous wastes are stored
properly—which is the assumption in allowing certain qauntities to be stored
indefinitely—it is the handling of the wastes that poses the greatest danger
rather than the actual storage of the waste. It follows that if a small quantity
of hazardous waste can be stored indefinitely, then storing two or three times
that quantity for 90 days should pose no greater qualitative problems. We
recommend that as long as SQGs generate less than 1,000 k.g. hazardous waste
per month and thereby retain small generator status, they should be allowed to
store that month's waste for up to 90 days. Rather than transporting 800 k.g.
of hazardous waste each month a generator could store up to 2,400 k.g. and
ship that once every 90 days, much more economically. The maximum a small
quantity generator could accumulate within 90 days would be 3,000 k.g. (up to
1,000 per month for three months). There is no basis to conclude that 90 day
storage of these amounts is riskier than indefinite storage of slightly smaller
amounts. The financial incentive of this more economical approach would
likely enhance the incentive to properly dispose of wastes.
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In making this recommendation this Committee is fully aware that
current EPA regulations would need revision but believe that the suggestion
has sufficient merit to be presented to federal authorities who are now
developing standards for those who generate more than 100 k.g. but less than
1,000 k.g. monthly.
Small generators could be required to file a storage/shipping plan with
DHW which could be programmed into the computerized manifest system and
tracked. This change would be consistent with the set of specific SQG
regulations that were designed to reduce, rather than exacerbate, the burdens
on SQGs to manage their wastes properly.
We also recommend that certification of transporters to assist SQGs and
haul their wastes involve some type of training program and periodic checking
to insure the level of knowledge is maintained. Such a program would require
a very short period of time to implement.
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Issue 4; How effective has the computerized load-by-load manifest
system been in accomplishing its two goals of augmenting enforcement and
providing data?
Conclusion
To date the manifest system appears to have increased or insured
compliance among those likely to comply, i.e. those that would not
intentionally circumvent regulations. The manifest has not initiated
enforcement cases or caught illegal disposal, nor has it triggered
investigations by regional inspectors. The load-by-load system has not
initiated an action or caught a violator in many cases of overdue shipments or
other discrepancies. There is no overall data on the types of problems picked
up by the manifest or on the follow-up or outcome of those problems. The
manifest has been used in the regions primarily as a cross-check or audit
during inspections, and as a backup documentation during enforcement cases.
There was not much enthusiasm in the regions to use the manifest as a basis
for tracking down problems or violations. Inventories of hazardous waste to
the cities have not yet been produced and the information requested over a
year ago by the Department of Environmental Management which is necessary
to its program has not been made available. Other more complex types of
data analysis such as violations or expected waste production by SIC code or
size of generator have not been conducted.
Recommendation
We recommend that the smooth functioning of the computerized manifest
system be given top priority. This includes providing the necessary software
and personnel, either as full-time staff or as consultants, if that expedites the
process. The result of this should be data availability to DEM and
Massachusetts communities, and easy accessibility for DEQE to data for
analysis of activities, compliance, and problems of different segments of the
regulated communities.
The Committee also recommends that the value of the load-by-load
manifest system be carefully weighed against its labor and resource
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intensiveness. We question whether the processing and correcting of tens of
thousands of manifests represents the most efficient and effective use of
resources when only 2>% of the manifests are out of compliance. This is a
particular concern if this "covering all bases" necessarily diverts resources
from intense monitoring of high risk sectors. Specifically, does the
outcome—the actual number of overdue shipments or other
discrepancies—warrant such intensive monitoring?
Since enforcement cases have not been initiated by the manifest and since
inspection and enforcement activities use the manifest in a follow-up, reactive
mode, it may be more realistic in terms of resources to use the manifest as an
auditing tool. It might be more effective to model the system after that used
by the IRS, requiring companies to keep manifest records, to randomly audit
records, prosecute violators, and to highly publicize results. Analysis of
segments more likely out of compliance would allow for a more focused
processing of manifests and constant surveillance of those groups. This might
then free up resources that could be used to pursue those not in the system or
those not manifesting all of their waste.
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Issue 5; Has the inspection/enforcement component effectively insured
compliance and prevented or curtailed improper/illegal disposal of hazardous
waste?
Conclusion
The inspection/enforcement component has improved in the last few
years, increasing inspection and compliance rates and completing a number of
major enforcement actions. In many of its basic programs, however, the
Division has failed to utilize its limited resources most effectively or
efficiently and has allowed certain programs to cease functioning due to
neglect rather than to clear-cut decisions.
Enforcement activities or policies have not been sufficiently organized
within the central office or between the regional offices. In addition, the lack
of a clear cut line of authority and communication between regions, or
between the central office and the regions has resulted in inconsistent
activities, policies and training from one region to another.
The lack of adequate data management has impaired the ability of the
Department to track cases or to analyze the outcome of cases so as to
pinpoint major trouble areas, effectively target limited resources, and
evaluate the program. As a result of these circumstances the allocation of
inspection resources and priorities must be questioned.
The present Division policy, which requires an average of three days for
each inspection, means that it will take 10 to 15 years to inspect all large
quantity generators with no resources allocated specifically for smaller
quantity generator inspection. The value and impact of a program with this
timetable raises serious doubts, particularly since 80% of all generators are in
compliance and this present program has produced no major enforcement
actions. The Division must decide whether its priority is to accumulate
statistical "bean counts" that satisfy goals set by EPA and DEQE, or whether
it is to make its presence known, survey the regulated community, and locate
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the most serious violators as quickly as possible. The policy as it now stands
does not only mean that the inspection process of the target group—large
quantity generators—is greatly drawn out, but that other segments of the
regulated community, namely small quantity generators and non-notifiers are
almost completely excluded from any formal, organized inspection schedule.
These may be the very groups most likely to violate regulations, intentionally
or not, and therefore most in need of inspections and contact with the
regulatory agency.
The Division and the regions frequently favor negotiations to the almost
total exclusion of automatic enforcement actions, particularly in second tier
cases. The failure to bring a sufficient number of enforcement cases, along
with the loss of opportunity to strongly publicize such activity, diminishes the
climate of general deterrence sought by the proponents of the statute.
The Division has abandoned another means of publicizing and emphasizing
its efforts to control improper/illegal waste disposal—the use of other
agencies and resources for a formal, well-organized surveillance effort. In
these two instances the Division has lost an opportunity to magnify its
resources and its "reach" as an incentive to bring the regulated community
into compliance.
Recommendation
The Division should establish a structured monthly meeting for the regions
that specifically addresses the day-to-day needs and problems of the Deputy
Regional Engineers and provides a structural mechanism for input to the
central office concerning policy and regulatory development. There should be
a reporting mechanism for these meetings.
There should also be a more standardized training format for inspectors,
including some degree of criminal investigation techniques, due to the number
and turnover of inspectors, and the importance of their training. This would
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best be accomplished by having a designated training officer. This person
could also provide on-going training, including timely communication of new
regulations and policy directives, as well as evaluate inspector activities on an
agency-wide basis. There should also be periodic meetings between all
inspectors whereby they can share experiences and suggestions and have the
opportunity for input into the central office.
The Division should include within its management system the ability to
track and analyze enforcement data and insure that this can be easily accessed
by both the regional and central offices. This should include data that would
answer the following questions: What type and size businesses commit what
type(s) of violations and how many? What are the categories of violations,
within the general Class I and Class III types? How quickly are these different
violations corrected?
By developing the above profile the Division could ascertain how well
targeted its resources are, i.e. the cost/benefit of its resource allocation. Do
larger businesses, which commit fewer violations, also commit less serious
ones and correct them more promptly (thereby using even less follow-up
resources)? Is it therefore worth targeting resources to such businesses, based
on the small increase in risk protection this approach affords?
The Committee recommends that the Division immediately institute
guidelines on how all violations will be handled—the timing and sequence of
actions and a single individual in the central office who will be responsible for
insuring the regional consistency of actions. Based upon the total number of
violations and categories, the central office should also decide on how many of
a variety of types of violations will be prosecuted and the priority. In order to
enhance its enforcement efforts, the Division should set as policy a certain
number or percent of second tier cases that it will prosecute and publicize.
The Division should consider alternatives to its present inspection policy
which requires three days per inspection resulting in a 10 to 15 year period to
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inspect all generators. Because this is a new program it is important for the
Division to make its presence known throughout the regulated community and
to ascertain the overall status of that community as quickly as possible. As
80% of generators are in complete compliance, with relatively few generators
committing the majority of violations, less time should be spent on the
average inspection. In this way more inspections could be completed in the
same time so that those committing the most serious violations would be
located at the earliest possible date. Once this process was completed, DHW
could then target inspection resources to the highest risk segments for more
exhaustive inspections.
The smaller businesses should receive a degree of inspection resources
approximately proportionate to their contribution to the hazardous waste
stream and ideally proportionate to the increased risk associated with their
handling of that waste. Despite the fact that small generators contribute as
much as 25% to the hazardous waste stream, no inspection resources were
allocated through FY 1985. In FY 1986 about 1% will be allocated.
The Committee appreciates that it is not practicable for DHW to inspect
all 3,000, 6,000, or 10,000 small quantity generators. However, a
representative sample should be inspected to determine what is taking place
among this high risk segment. And some type of alternative approach needs to
be developed to create more direct contact between DHW and greater
numbers of small generators. These generators must be made more aware of
DHW's presence, its "muscle", and the possibility of an audit. Without this
contact, their behavior appears unlikely to be changed. Although as an
administrative relief small generators are not required to file an annual
report, they could be sent a short, simple questionnaire, that outlines
regulations and asks such basic information as how much waste they generate
monthly, how often it is manifested and shipped, and the hauler names. This
could include a notice that the business and these records might be audited
during the following year. This would be comparable to the simpler tax form
that the average smaller tax payer fills out.
- 112 -
In connection to the above, the Committee considers the inspection or
systematic follow up of all potential non-notifiers to be a top central office
priority rather than, as now, a secondary priority of the regions. The central
office of DHW should develop a policy and timetable for examining all
non-notifiers, rather than leaving this to the sole discretion of each region to
examine them as they see fit. This program could be developed with input
from the regions.
The Division should develop a surveillance plan, in conjunction with the
Attorney General's Office, utilizing and organizing appropriate law
enforcement agencies, such as the MDC, state police, and NROs. This effort
should include training by the Northeast Regional Strike Force and should be
well-publicized.
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Issue 6: In implementing this new set oi regulations, does DHW/DEQE
know how the regulated community has responded to the regulations,
understands the regulations or whether there are certain segments that have
more difficulty with the regulations than other segments?
Conclusion
Given that this program is relatively new (1982), that the regulated
universe is quite large and the resources of DHW quite limited, the overall
success of the hazardous waste management program depends to a significant
extent on the voluntary compliance of the regulated community. This in turn
depends on the awareness, acceptance, and understanding of the regulations by
the regulated community. It is important, therefore, for the regulatory
agency to have an overall sense of the regulated community's reaction to and
understanding of the regulations as a general indicator of likely compliance
levels and as a means of input for specific need changes. At the present time
this type of information or input exists only anecdotally, there being no
organized way of obtaining this data.
Recommendation
The Committee recommends that DHW conduct an annual survey of
generator/transporter/TSD attitudes, knowledge of regulations, and activities.
This survey would be inexpensive and would pinpoint problems and deficiencies
such as special segments of the regulated community that require more
attention. It would tap the vast resource of the regulated community and
would serve to monitor the realitve status of a variety of parameters from
year to year.
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Issue 7; Would it be appropriate to provide the Division with the power to
assess administrative fines and would this capability greatly improve
enforcement efforts?
Conclusion
Administrative agencies, such as DEQE, are created to control certain
complex and significant problems that are unlikely to otherwise be controlled.
Such agencies are expected to gather to themselves sufficient expertise and
resources to tackle apparently intractable problems. Having sufficient powers
to efficiently and effectively accomplish their mandates is crucial to such
agencies. The very fact that the agencies are so empowered carries with it
the assumption that these powers will be carried out in a reasonable and fair
manner.
In this review the Committee has been impressed with the rule-making
and licensing expertise of the DEQE professional staff. It believes that the
agency has an experienced nucleus of administrative law professionals who will
be sensitive to the due process requirements of the law. This impression is
butressed by the fact that there is no evidence that the Commissioner's power
to revoke licenses has been unfairly or arbitrarily exercised.
An administrative fine should fill a gap between, on the one hand,
enforcement actions that carry no weight (warning letters, notices of violation
and administrative orders) and on the other hand actions that are major and
require much time and resources. There are a sufficient number of cases, the
risk of which requires prompt, decisive action but which are not major cases,
for which an administrative fine would be appropriate.
Although there were a number of objections to granting administrative
fine power to DEQE, most were adequately addressed during legislative
deliberations. Any business dissatisfied with an administrative ruling has been
guaranteed the right of judicial review. All those in favor of giving this type
of power indicated a willingness to allow an independent hearing officer to
preside over an evidentiary hearing and tp prepare a recommended decision for
final decision by the Commissioner of DEQE.
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Moreover, records in other states that have administrative fines indicate
that agency decisions are rareiy appealed or, when they are, overturned. The
Committee has no doubt that such a system of deterrence can be made to
function in a fair and reasonable manner.
Recommendation
As the Massachusetts Legislature has recently acted with reference to
this issue by enacting Ch. 95 of the Acts of 1985, further recommendations on
it are unnecessary.
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Issue 8: Is an outreach/education program necessary and has DHW
provided an adequate program?
Conclusion
Based on interviews with officials from the community, DEQE and other
agencies, and based on statements in the Five Year Plans and budget
narratives, outreach and education programs are quite important to the
success of the hazardous waste management program, particularly since (l)it
is a new program, in which one of the major problems within the regulated
community is lack of knowledge or understanding of regulations; (2) the
resources of the agency are quite limited; (3) the problems of hazardous waste
management are extensive, reaching into every community in Massachusetts;
(4) there is an extensive resource among the general population which is willing
and enthusiastic to participate; and (5) the program can be very cost effective.
Outreach programs, particularly the Community Hazardous Waste
Coordinator Program, have deteriorated into inactivity due to the priorities of
other programs. DHW has cited funding problems. However, the minimal
temporary resources needed, combined with its far reaching value, do not
justify this approach. Preventing a single significant spill, or locating an
uncontrolled dump site capable of contaminating the environment, which could
cost the taxpayers a million dollars or more in clean-up costs, would pay for
the entire program many times over.
Recommendation
The Committee recommends that the Division more actively support the
Industry Assistance Program by providing a more on-going consistent
organizational format. At present DHW has augmented efforts of trade groups
and others by providing speakers when requested. We recommend that DHW
take the initiative with a variety of groups, encouraging meetings and
presentations, and periodically providing literature explaining regulations. A
primary effort should be targeted at small generators.
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The Division should also insure that the Update, the Newsletter intended
for the regulated community be produced on a regular, monthly basis.
The Community Hazardous Waste Coordinator Program (a voluntary
program) should be activated with sufficient financial and organizational
assistance from DHW. The Division could use the resources of a number of
different public or private organizations that are well positioned to provide
the necessary expertise and to establish a statewide network that could work
with each community. We estimate that expending $150,000-200,000 during a
two to three year period would be sufficient to develop a self-sustaining
program with the aid of three full-time staff persons: one from DEQE to
provide regulatory input, one from Department of Environmental Management
to provide information on environmental status, and one from an outside public
or private organization to provide direct programmatic input and to establish a
statewide network. Local coordinators would be trained to conduct generator
surveys, indentify abandoned, uncontrolled dump sites, improve public
awareness of the programs, educate small businesses and individuals, and serve
as a conduit for public input to the regulatory agency. The importance of
hazardous waste issues on the local level and the interest and enthusiasm of
private citizens indicates that these programs would be widely supported.
It should be noted that the Community Hazardous Waste Coordinator
Program is distinct from the Municipal Coordinator Program of the
"Right-to-Know" legislation. These programs neither conflict with each other,
nor are they redundant. Whereas the program discussed herein is voluntary
and involves community concerns, the Municipal Coordinator of the
"Right-to-Know", is statutorily mandated and involves technical information
of concern primarily to employees of particular industries.
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APPENDIX A
Two ways of identifying such wastes were established to define those
wastes that may cause such effects and would therefore be deemed hazardous:
a criteria method which describes characteristics and a listing of substances or
processes that are toxic.
The criteria approach lists four characteristics:
1. Ignitability - A waste is an ignitable waste if it is a liquid and
has a flash point of less than 60°C (140°F), is not a liquid
and is capable under standard temperatures of catching fire
through friction, absorption of moisture or spontaneous chemical
changes and burns so vigorously as to constitute a hazard; is a
compressed gas and ignitable or is an oxidizer.
2. Corrosivity - It is aqueous and has a pH of less than or equal to 2
(acidic); or greater than or equal to 12.5 (basic), or corrodes steel
at a rate greater than 6.35mm per year at 55°C.
3. Reactivity - Normally unstable and readily undergoes violent
changes, reacts violently with water, is explosive with water or
generates toxic gases, vapors or fumes when mixed with water;
or contains cyanide or sulfide and when exposed to mid range pH
can generate toxic gases, vapors, or fumes.
4. Extraction Procedure (EP) toxicity - A representative sample
that releases specified amounts of eight toxic metals or six
pesticides.
There are four lists that identify hazardous wastes. The first lists
non-specific sources encompassing waste streams from many industries. The
second lists specific sources by a particular industrial processes. An example
of a non-specific source would be a degreasing process that might use a
variety of solvents. An example of a specific source would be waste water
treatment sludge from the production of paint pigments, such as iron blue.
The third and fourth lists contain specific names of toxic chemicals, one list
for acutely toxic chemcials, the other for less toxic chemicals. The accutely
toxic chemicals are regulated more stringently.
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APPENDIX B
Route of Exposure
The significance of inappropriately dumped hazardous waste can be more
fully appreciated if the public understands how hazardous wastes, or more
specifically the chemicals in the hazardous wastes, pose a threat to human
health. The three main modes for exposure are air, soil, and water. Vapors
arising from dumpsites can be quite strong, and in many instances are the
reason such dumps are identified—noxious odors call attention to something
that might otherwise go unnoticed. These vapors can be quite dangerous but
because of wind factors and surrounding fresh air this usually only causes a
problem within very close proximity to the source.
Soil and water can be contaminated at greater distances from the source
due to the movement of wastes through the ground. Contaminants in the soil,
such as heavy metals can be picked up by vegetation. This can affect the
vegetation, or it can affect livestock or humans if it is consumed by them.
Certain toxics such as the chlorinated hydrocarbons—DDT for
example—accumulte in the fat of animals, and as they move up the food chain
become increasingly more concentrated.
The primary vehicle of exposure to toxic wastes is through contamination
of the underground water supply (aquifer). This source is more vulnerable to
contamination than surface water (resevoirs, etc.) for a number of reasons:
1. Water lying well beneath the surface is a more likely target for
chemicals leaching downward.
2. Because groundwater is "unseen", improper or illegal dumpers as
well as many legitimate dumpers may dispose of their wastes in
areas in close proximity to groundwater without knowing it. The
ability of chemicals to move great distances through the soil
expands this problem.
3. Relative to the population served, the potential area of exposure
of surface water sources is smaller than that of groundwater
sources, i.e., a single groundwater source, such as the Quabbin
Reservoir may serve large numbers of people, whereas
groundwater well sources are more decentralized, each well
having a large area of exposure.
The consequences of groundwater contamination are also usually more
severe than those of surface waters. Surface waters have much more rapid
turnover of the water, are exposed to the sun which can assist in the
detoxification of some chemicals, and enjoy the presence of a variety of
organisms capable of detoxifying or metabolizing chemicals. Furthermore,
there is better access for treatment techniques. The cool, dark, abiotic nature
of groundwater, in which the turnover of water can be very slow, allows
contaminates to be stored undisturbed for hundreds or thousands of years.
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APPENDIX B (cont'd)
Although there have been cleanup efforts of some underground
sources—usually through pumping out all the (contaminated) water—this can be
extremely expensive and only applied in certain circumstances—where the
contamination source is close by and well defined and the contaminated
groundwater is isolated from other groundwater sources.
Landfills (solid waste as well as hazardous waste) and particularly
impoundments—natural or artificial depressions in the ground that create
ponds, pits and lagoons—are serious threats to groundwater. If groundwater
exists below these sites, the porosity of the soil responsible for the aquifer's
formation, allows leachate to move easily through the soil to the
groundwater. The saturation of the soil by impoundments exacerbates the
problem. Also the temporary expansion upwards of the groundwater table due
to heavy rains can "capture" chemicals lying on the surface or moving slowly
downward.
The ability of chemicals to move through the soil, the consequences of
such movements, and the relative permanence of these consequences was
clearly recognized in studies by the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
and the National Academy of Sciences (NAS). Both suggested that the EPA
standard for a secure landfill—that it be able to contain chemicals for 30
years—was grossly inefficient and should be replaced by a 500-year standard.
Because it would be difficult to test that 500-year standard, the reports were
in effect suggesting that landfills, even if "secure", were unacceptable forms
of storage. The recent findings of leaks in many of the nation's "secure"
landfills, some of which ironically are receiving hazardous waste cleaned up
from Superfund sites, only underscores the problem. The seriousness of the
problem is mutiplied manyfold for unsecured landfills and illegal dump sites
whose location or proximity to groundwater is unknown.
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Commissioner
June 20, 1985
Richard X. Connors, Esq.
Legal Counsel
Senate Post Audit
and Oversight Bureau
Room 314, State House
Boston, MA 02133
Dear Attorney Connors:
The Department of Environmental Quality Engineering has received a copy of
the draft report, "Regulating Hazardous Waste Generation in Massachusetts," pre-
pared by the staff of the Senate Post Audit and Oversight Bureau. Thank you for
the opportunity to review and comment on this draft report.
As the text indicates, the Bureau sought to be constructive in its obser-
vations and recommendations, and I believe that you have been. Overall, there
is much in this report that we agree with and I am pleased to say that some of
the more significant issues identified in the report have been or are being
addressed by Department. Other points, however, merit further discussion.
Rather than comment in this letter on all the points raised by the Bureau, I
would like to address briefly some of the report's key issues, conclusions, and
recommendations. More detailed comments will follow.
Issue 1: Organizational Structure and Management Approach
As the report suggests, the rapid and substantial growth of the Division of
Solid and Hazardous Waste has occurred in response to its increased respon-
sibilities and the high public expectations of its performance. In essence, the
report asks whether the Division has developed an organizational structure and
management approach capable of effectively and efficiently handling this growth
and the wide variety of programs for which it is responsible. Recognizing some
of the practical realities which make orderly growth and goal accomplishment
difficult, the report goes on to make certain constructive recommendations on
how the Division's organization and management could be improved.
Richard X. Connors, Esq.
June 19, 1985
Page Two
Although we believe that much more discussion is needed on the suggestion
that the current decentralized structure should be changed, we agree with most
of the issues the report raises and have taken the following steps to address
them:
° A management information system, which the report calls for,
was developed and in place by January 1985. Using a set of
Management Information Forms (MIF), the system provides
quarterly reports of program status and the work accomplished
towards meeting the objectives of the Division's program plan.
Currently, this is a manual information management system, but
the forms have been designed to permit automation when equip-
ment becomes available.
The Department has made progress in obtaining computer resources
and the appropriate support personnel, despite the cumbersome
state process for acquiring both items. Our first Automated
Data Processing Plan was developed and on file by December 1983;
a revised plan has been finalized and we are awaiting receipt
of four new microcomputers for the Division of Solid and
Hazardous Waste. The ability to attract and retain data
processing personnel improved following the passage of
Chapter 717 of the Acts of 1984 which establishes a more competitive
pay scale for those professionals. The core staff of a supervisor,
programmer, and the three data entry operators have been hired.
Now that we have resolved many of the data management problems
with the manifest system, we plan to use our data management
resources increasingly in the personnel, budgetary enforcement
and program management information areas.
° Hiring new staff has been a high priority over the last two fiscal
years and program managers have had to commit significant amounts of
time to this activity. The Division's staff has increased from 18 in
1980 to 146 currently. Progress has been made to obtain and fill
positions to the extent that we anticipate that the Division should
reach its authorized staffing level by the middle of fiscal year
1986. At that time, program managers will be able to focus increased
effort on the planning and management tasks such as the report recom-
mends.
Issue 2: Total Volumes of Hazardous Wastes Generated in Massachusetts
We agree that developing hard data on the total Massachusetts waste stream
could, as the report suggests, provide a useful yard stick to measure the
progress of the hazardous waste regulatory program. However, we believe that it
is important to determine who is generating hazardous wastes as well as how much
Richard X. Connors, Esq.
June 19, 1985
Page Three
is being generated. Our knowledge and understanding of the regulated community
is increasing and the Division is developing a more complete information base.
Since the enactment of MGL Chapter 21C, the Division has:
° Implemented a computerized manifest tracking system which is capable of
producing profiles and compilations on specific companies, identifying
patterns of hazardous waste management, and developing summary sta-
tistics.
° Prepared the Commonwealth's biennial report to the U.S. EPA summarizing
waste generation data from information provided by the manifest system,
annual reports from large quantity generators, and monthly operating
reports.
° Developed a non-notifier program which identifies potential generators
that should be verified for inclusion within the hazardous waste
regulatory program.
Issue 3: Regulatory Program for Small Quantity Generators
The report calls on the Division to make an increasing resource commitment
to regulating small quantity generators. As the hazardous waste regulatory
program was being developed, a priority was placed on regulating the firms which
generate larger quantities of hazardous waste. Now that we are beginning to see
greater compliance from that segment of the regulated community, we agree that
it is appropriate to focus more resources on small quantity generators.
However, the report's suggestions for regulatory changes to provide small quan-
tity generators with relief from some of the requirements of the hazardous waste
regulations could not be implemented without a corresponding change in the
federal program. We agree, nonetheless, that the program should be reviewed.
Issue 4: Effectiveness of the Load-by-Load Manifest Tracking System
The Department has been committed to the concept of a load-by-load tracking
system for hazardous wastes and has reached a major milestone recently in
staffing this program component and correcting the initial data management
problems identified in the report. We note that the resources needed to operate
the manifest system are not as great as the report suggests and that, as our
procedures become more streamlined, we plan to use these staff resources for
additional data management tasks. We agree, however, that it is important to
reevaluate whether our goals for the manifest system are achievable as origi-
nally envisioned.
At the same time, however, we are concerned that the suggestion that we
abandon load-by-load tracking might indicate to the regulated community that the
Commonwealth is backing off from its commitment to proper hazardous waste
management. The selective auditing of manifest data, which the report recom-
Richard X. Connors, Esq.
June 19, 1985
Page Four
mends, as an alternative approach, may diminish the deterrence value of the
program. This issue should be reviewed by the Advisory Committee.
Issue 5: Prevention of Illegal Hazardous Waste Disposal Via Inspections and
Enforcement
We appreciate the report's concern for the effectiveness of our compliance
and enforcement programs in reducing the illegal disposal of hazardous waste.
While we have not yet met all of our goals and objectives, we believe that we
have made significant progress in this area during and since the period of your
review. In fact, the last two reviews of this component of the Division's
program, conducted by U.S. EPA Region I staff, noted major improvements in both
the quality of inspections and in the provision of data that allow these efforts
to be tracked.
Improving the effectiveness of this program component has been one of the
Division's major priorities. In the last year, we have addressed many of the
problems perceived by the Committee's report, largely by implementing measures
similar to your recommendations:
° In February 1985, I issued a Department-wide Enforcement Policy that
provides clearcut guidelines for handling all types of violations, sets
priorities for prosecuting each type, and is designed to improve both
the quality and the consistency of our enforcement activities.
° The Division has held monthly meetings with regional and Boston office
staff to discuss and resolve technical issues that arise in compliance
and enforcement. These meetings have provided a forum for discussing
consistency issues as well as for reporting on the status of tasks
related to specific objectives in conjunction with the Management
Information Form system.
The Division has appointed a Regional Operating Coordinator who is now
working with regional and Boston office staff on issues of consistent
policy and on training. Recently, we have also designated a Training
Coordinator in the Boston Office with specific responsibilities for
maximizing the effectiveness of our training budget. Of course, we
appreciate the Legislature's support for increases in our training
budget that would allow us to provide more training opportunities in
specific areas such as criminal investigation techniques.
° We are continually reevaluating the inspection goals that the Committee
found in our budget documents. It should be noted that these goals were
stated to support requests for resources, and have had to be adjusted to
fit not only the resources that we have ultimately been given but also
inspection and enforcement goals set for us by the U.S. EPA. We feel
that, after five years, we are finally seeing most of the large quantity
generators come into compliance, and are now able to focus more resour-
ces on small quantity generators and non-notif iers to whom the report
suggests we should assign a higher priority.
Richard X. Connors, Esq.
June 19, 1985
Page Five
Issue 6: Survey of the Regulated Community to Determine Comprehension of
Regulations
We agree that, with the limited resources available to us, voluntary
compliance should be encouraged wherever possible. We also agree that this
effort would be greatly assisted by a comprehensive evaluation of the degree to
which specific requirements are understood by the regulated community. The sur-
vey that you propose would be accomplished by an Industry Assistance Program in
conjunction with the compliance unit. I am requesting that the Division examine
the feasibility of resuming its original plans in this important area.
Issue 7: Administrative Penalties
Legislation providing the Department with authority to levy administrative
penalties has been passed in the Senate and the House. We look forward to
enactment of this legislation since we have long understood our need for the
authority which it will provide.
Issue 8: Community Outreach/Education
We appreciate the report's concern for our public outreach program which
was designed to establish a network of regulated firms and community officials
for sharing information about the regulatory program and requirements. Current
plans are to resume many of these activities as program resources become
available.
Overall, we believe that your report is useful in providing an independent
assessment of the effectiveness of the hazardous waste regulatory program.
Again, we appreciate the constructive approach of this report. As you can see
from our comments we agree with your assessment of the major problems and have
taken steps to correct many of them. Some of the issues you have raised require
additional discussion. I believe it would be helpful to request a review of
your report by the Hazardous Waste Advisory Committee (established by MGL
Chapter 21C to provide public input to our hazardous waste regulatory program).
We would appreciate the participation of you and your staff in discussions about
some of the issues you have raised.
\Jery truly yours,
, S'. Russell Sylva
Commissioner
cc: Thomas F. McLoughlin, Deputy Commissioner
Kenneth A. Hagg, Acting Deputy Commissioner
Pat King, Legislative Liaison
William F. Cass, Director, Division of Solid and Hazardous Waste
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August 2, 1985
Richard X. Connors, Esq.
Legal Counsel
Senate Post Audit and Oversight Bureau
Room 31 4, State House
Boston, Massachusetts 02133
Dear Attorney Connors:
Enclosed are the Department of Environmental Quality Engineering's detailed
comments on the Bureau's draft report, "Regulating Hazardous Waste Generation
in Massachusetts."
In an earlier correspondence containing our major observations, we stated
our view that many of the key issues raised in the report either have been
or are being addressed by the Department. Consequently, we would hope that
the time period of the audit would be clearly stated in the final draft of
the report so that the Bureau's findings could be placed in context.
In addition, please note that although the Department chose not to comment
on the findings concerning the attitudes of the regulated community, that
information was reviewed with interest and will be considered further as
we continue our program development activities.
Finally, we would like to reiterate that we believe that this report is
constructive and useful as an independent assessment of the effectiveness
of the Hazardous Waste Management Program. Thank you again for the opportunity
to review and comment on the study.
/
\lery %ruAy yours,
cc:
J&. Russ\ell Sylva
Commissioner
Thomas F. McLoughlin, Deputy Commissioner
Kenneth A. Hagg, Acting Deputy Commissioner
Patricia King, Legislative Liaison
William F. Cass, Director, Division of Solid and Hazardous Waste
DEQE DETAILED COMMENTS ON "REGULATING HAZARDOUS WASTE GENERATION IN MASSACHUSETTS"
ORGANIZATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT DIFFICULTIES
Background
In response to its growing responsibilities and acute pressure by all sec-
tors to establish an effective hazardous waste management program, the Division
of Solid and Hazardous Waste has undergone tremendous growth since its inception
in 1979. The staff has grown from 18 to over 145; and the budget from less than
$400,000 to well over $3,000,000. The growth has forced the normal -systems of
state government to their limits and presented those management pressures which
are associated with charting a course of immediate action in largely untested
waters. In fact, the history and evaluation of the Division could well serve as
a case study to guide other public agencies in meeting comparable mandates. The
Committee's report correctly identifies the numerous pressures that have
resulted from the high level of public expectation for DSHW performance, and
describes problems that existed during the time period studied. However, the
Division has made significant progress toward correcting many of these problems.
Each issue is discussed below.
Issue: Management Information System
The report cites the absence of management tools, including management
information systems and personnel evaluation mechanisms. In the last year, the
Division implemented the first phase of a management information system via a
set of Management Information Forms (MIF). These forms have been designed to
provide quarterly reports on program status to support the Division's annual
program planning and budgeting needs; they contain information about the status
of each activity conducted to meet an objective described in the DSHW program
plan.
° Currently, this is a manual information management system. However, the
forms have been designed to allow automation when equipment is available.
° Even the first phase of this system has resulted in a significant expan-
sion of program information available to managers (although some program
information has always been collected about RCRA-related activities as a
condition of our grant from EPA and annual updates of the status of
active hazardous waste sites have been compiled.)
The results and analyses of their implications are presented quarterly at
meetings between Deputy Regional Engineers and program managers; expec-
tations about next quarter outputs are also discussed then.
Issue: Staffing
As the report points out, the system for acquiring positions and hiring
staff is more suitable for mature programs than for rapidly growing ones. The
example of a Deputy Director position which remained vacant for more than a year
(page 46) is a good indicator of the systemic problems that a growing program
faces. This position was approved as part of the fiscal year 1982 budget but
was not released on a schedule of positions for over a year after approval of
that budget. Nevertheless, progress has been made.
° Exhibit 1 summarizes the progress that has been made to obtain and fill
positions, as a result of giving the hiring of new staff the highest
priority for the last two fiscal years. Program managers have had to
commit significant amounts of time to this activity and by the middle of
FY 1986, Division staffing should reach the level authorized by the
legislature. At that time, Program Managers will be able to focus more
energy toward other aspects of the program.
° The ability to attract and retain data processing professionals has
improved significantly following the passage of Chapter 717 -of the Acts
of 1983 which .establ ishes more competitive pay scales for. .these pro-
fessionals. The Division is optimistic about realizing plans to fully
develop the manifest system as part of a more comprehensive information
system with the recently acquired staff. However, there are other com-
parable problem areas in state government, including the pay scales and
career ladders (or lack thereof) for administrative, fiscal and personnel
management, and clerical personnel.
° The Division has recently appointed a program manager to oversee the
Compliance Section after a long delay in gaining this position. This
section is responsible for the Non-Notifier Program. The staffing of
this and the Manifest. System Section will enable the Division to evaluate
management of the overall universe of regulated industries.
The lengthy delay in providing information from the manifest system to
the Department of Environmental Management is discussed in the section on
the Manifest System. However, it should be noted here that the availabi-
lity of DSHW resources to focus on this issue coupled with the legal
issues associated with confidentiality of the data were part of the
delay; the resource issue has been resolved.
Issue: Automation
The report incorrectly notes, an absence of discernible demand for automa-
tion. In fact, the Division staff is clamoring for automated data processing
and computerization.
In Spring 1984, a Data Management Task Force was established to update a
plan for acquiring the appropriate equipment (in addition to the Manifest
System, which had begun implementation in 1982). The Task Force's work
resulted in the Division's current ADP Plan. Now, steps toward acquiring
additional equipment within this Division are well underway. Four micro-
computers are presently being purchased.
It is ironic, in a state whose economy relies as heavily upon high tech-
nology industries as does Massachusetts that the process for obtaining
data processing equipment for information management is as cumbersome and
time consuming as it is. This sense of irony is shared by the Hazardous
Waste Advisory Committee, which constantly encourages the Division to
increase its level of automation.
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Issue: Regional Consistency
The report correctly identifies some of the problems that arise from a
decentralized organization structure. While it is true that regional offices
have interpreted policies and operating procedures inconsistently, OSHW mana-
gement has focussed on this issue over the last two years and several measures
have been implemented to begin to address the problem.
° A Regional Operations Coordinator (ROC) has been assigned to. address
inconsistencies in policies and procedures among regional offices. The
ROC has initiated monthly Technical Sessions held with staff from Boston
and regional office staff to discuss and clarify policies and procedures.
The input of regional staff for completing quarterly Management
Information Forms by each of the Division's program managers and the sub-
sequent discussions of quarterly program status at regularly-scheduled
meetings between Deputy Regional Environmental Engineers and Boston
program managers have provided another avenue for resolving inconsisten-
cies. The Management Information Forms have provided the Division with
a clear structure of reporting information from regional offices to
program managers to the Division Director.
During EPA's most recent midyear review of the DSHW hazardous waste regu-
latory program, federal staff commented that, from their perspective, the
Division has made significant strides in establishing consistency between
offices and in providing timely program information as required by our
RCRA grant.
Finally, it should be noted that the decentralized regional structure has
resulted in a program that reflects the geographical and economic diver-
sity of the Commonwealth, since the regional office has always had oppor-
tunities to comment from their area's perspective on program elements as
they are being developed. The regulated community as well as the public
at large are thought to benefit significantly from having a regional
staff which can settle most issues without the delays attendant in
checking with a central office. However, as the report correctly points
out, this organizational structure requires special management attention
to having policies and procedures carefully documented and to having
management systems which ensure consistency on important policy issues.
More attention has been and will be focused on this agreed-upon priority.
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GENERATION RATES
Issue: How Essential Are Estimates of Total Volumes of Hazardous Waste
Generation to the Department's Program.
The report finds that there is considerable variability in early
studies/estimates of total hazardous waste generation and that using reports
prepared by DEM in 1982 and 1983, there is no accurate data base which can be
analyzed to determine effective resources allocation. (See page 53-.) The issue
is raised to stimulate study and discussion of overall generation rates.
° The Division agrees that it is the Commonwealth's responsibility
to study the question of overall generation rates of hazardous
wastes. Reviewing the 1982 and 1983 GEIRs prepared by DEM, it is
understandable, given the paucity of hard data in the early years of
this program, that estimates of total generation rates have varied.
Since the enactment of MGL c21C, the Division has:
- Implemented load-by-load computerized manifest tracking
which has provided complete data on manifested shipments of
hazardous wastes back to October, 1982, when the Phase I
regulations took effect;
- Prepared the Commonwealth's biennial report to the EPA
summarizing waste generation data from information provided
by the manifest system, annual reporting by large quantity
generators, and monthly operating reports.
- Developed a non-notifier program which identifies potential
generators that should be verified for inclusion within the
hazardous waste regulatory program. EPA has recognized
Massachusetts for our non-notifier program.
° As a result of these initiatives, the Division is gaining considerable
knowledge of the regulated community and developing a more complete
information base. However, it is agreed that further analysis of total
waste generation needs to occur covering areas which go beyond the
scope of our present information base.
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SMALL QUANTITY GENERATORS
Issue: Level of Attention Given to Small Quantity Generators
The report finds: "Given that small quantity generator waste may pose con-
siderable risk that is out of proportion to the volumes it produces, this com-
mitment of resources is even that much less than adequate." (page 56)
° Small quantity generators may pose a considerable risk because they
may not, generally speaking, have the level of regulatory, expertise and
technical skill that large generators possess. A shift of existing and
new staff resources toward a small quantity generator program is a logi-
cal progression in program implementation, but should not be done at the
expense of ensuring compliance by large generators.
° Regulating large generators is a priority in part because the federal
program has made resources available to focus specifically on large
quantity generators and has ignored small generators as an issue.
° Massachusetts has worked closely with the NGA and ASTSWMO to influence
EPA to establish small quantity generation as a national issue to which
federal resources should be applied. Congress has recently responded
through RCRA amendments to address the problem of small quantity genera-
tors.
EPA has recognized Massachusetts as a leader in identifying potential
small generator non-notif iers for inclusion within the regulatory
system. The Division has worked closely with trade associations such
as the dry cleaning industry to educate and assist these groups in
complying with Hazardous Waste regulations. The FY86 budget, as a
planning document, begins to outline the resources needed to expand
this present effort with small quantity generators.
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AUTOMATED DATA MANAGEMENT - MANIFEST TRACKING SYSTEM
Background
The computerized Manifest Tracking System has been in operation since 1982
on a voluntary basis and became mandatory in late 1982, early 1983. It was
designed as a method of tracking waste from cradle-to-grave and to match up
shipping documents that accompany shipments off-site from a generator to a faci-
lity. It provides a means of capturing data about waste shipped off-site; who
generated, transported, and received those wastes; handling methods used; and
verification that shipped wastes arrived at the intended destination. The
system vs_ capable of producing profiles and compilations of selected companies
and summary statistics, and identifying patterns of incorrect use and misuse.
The fact that the system accumulates data on an on-going basis, is com-
puterized, and is constantly being improved in terms of data capture and analy-
sis is thought to increase its value as a deterrent. By identifying those
companies operating within the system, resources can be devoted to locating the
non-notif iers. The data is used after the fact in building enforcement cases,
and when staffing plans for the section are fully implemented, there will be the
capability to initiate enforcement actions based on on-going data analyses.
It should be noted that the Massachusetts manifest tracking system is one of
the few in the country that is computerized. Until recently, the only full-time
resources devoted to the system were two data entry operators. The absence of a
data processing coordinator and programmer caused many of the initial data base
and analysis problems identified in the report. Now that these positions are
filled, the problems are being dealt with aggressively and the system is
beginning to realize its full potential. The staff will process over 100,000
documents by this year's end. Given this volume, the continuous, systemized
entry and analysis of data is preferable to the random or spot checking of mani-
fest documents, a practice often employed in low volume states. It is our
belief that most industrialized states are moving toward our manifest approach
rather than toward a spot audit program.
Issue: Manifest Correction
The report states that the correction process associated with the non-
compliance rate of manifests is a lengthly, resource-intensive process, (page 9)
° Over the past year, this process has been expedited by routine telephone
calls with immediate resolution of most problems.
° Complicated problems are referred to the Compliance Section which con-
tacts the party and, depending on the severity the problem, initiates
enforcment action.
Issue: Quantity of Wastes Manifested by Company
The report cites an inability of the system to provide data on or track
wastes manifested by a particular company (page 9).
° A series of computer programs now exist which can provide historical sta-
tistics on a particular company.
Upon request, data analyses of a particular company over time can also be
done.
The imminent installation of a data base query language at the EOEA Data
Center will greatly enhance the Division's ability to service routine and
ad hoc queries and to manipulate the data base.
Issue: Relationship to Other DEQE Data Bases
Concerns are raised about the ability to make comparisons with and use of
other DEQE data bases (DAQC, DWPC, DWS) in relation to the Manifest data base
(page 9).
The differences in funding sources, reporting requirements, program
needs, and program age have in the past worked against establishing com-
mon key identifiers in DEQE ' s different data bases. Further, what is
important to one program is not necessarily important for another.
° Actions are being initiated now to build this cross-checking capability
into new and existing systems. Examples include:
- A rewrite of the Hazardous Waste Facility File to provide more
descriptive information, including longitude/latitude location
of facilities.
Development of the solid waste landfill inventory relying on ID
numbers from DWS and DAQC inventories.
Issue: DEM-DEQE Information Sharing/Confidentiality
The report cites the long delay in the transfer of manifest data to DEM and
the inability of the agencies to resolve the confidentiality issue (pages 45-46).
Data in a "sanitized" state has been given to DEM on three occasions,
after the complex issue of confidentiality was addressed. The data
transmittals included detailed explanations of its limitations and
problems.
The Enforcement Section is allowed daily access to Monthly Operating
reports. Copies of the Biennial Report have been provided to DEM.
Thus, a number of avenues for receipt of data were and remain open to
DEM.
The issues of confidentiality and release of information under the Freedom
of Information and Privacy Acts are more significant and difficult
than the report suggests. Resolution of these issues was complicated by
ambiguities in the state legislation and a Superior Court decision that
ruled against the Department. Division staff were advised in fact that
they could be held personally liable for placing certain information
beyond their immediate control.
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° The premature release of information and/or mishandling of confidential
data without a thorough legal review could have resulted in more law
suits and public embarassment to the Commonwealth as a whole. This
concern should be considered in light of the limited scope and utility of
the data in question at the time.
Issue: Assignment of EPA ID Numbers
The report raises the issue of inaccuracies in the assignment of EPA 10
Numbers (page 64).
° As a result of a continuing evolution in federal and state, roles, the
Division will shortly be given the responsibility for assigning temporary
ID numbers, thus providing better state control over the process.
° The continuous update of facility file information, more timely federal-
state exchange of data, development of a computer program to do electron-
ic cross checks of facilities, and the initiation of a program of data
exchange among Northeast states are all part of a concerted effort to
address this issue and that of non-notifier identification.
Issue: Identification of Non-Notif iers
The report cites repeatedly the short-comings of the manifest system and the
Division in identifying non-notif iers
.
o
o
The manifest system data base provides the Division with information on a
growing universe of those companies operating within the system; without
this knowledge, a systematic program for non-notif iers is difficult.
Cross-referencing of EPA and Northeast states' data bases will increase
the capability of the system to identify additional non-notif iers.
The imminent release of the Community Report will cause a substantial
increase in the reporting of possible non-notif iers as the communities
become more aware of the identity of companies within the system.
Issue: SIC Identification
The report states that the manifest system does not lend itself to analysis
of waste generation by SIC code (page 61).
The update and the future use of SIC codes are being considered as part
of the enhancement of the Hazardous Waste Facility File.
° The Division recognizes the importance of analyzing waste generation,
particularly since after September, 1985, waste minimization rules will
go into effect.
° SIC codes had been included in the system's original design and in the
permanent EPA number assignment. They were not , however, part of the
data log that EPA captured wnen it assigned temporary ID numbers, and
thus f el 1 into disuse.
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Issue: Acquisition of Automated Data Processing Equipment
The report cites the serious problems associated with the lack of computer
resources and appropriate support personnel not only for the manifest system but
for other Division management and programmatic activities. It wrongly states
that there is an absence of a discernible demand for such capabilities by the
professional staff (pages 47-48).
The degree to which the Department and the Division have been able to
acquire state-of-the art hardware and software is severely limited not
just by resources, but also by the state's process for acquiring such
items.
° As a result of complying with the state AF-29 process, computer-related
purchases take at least one year, if not longer. In some cases, even
after that period of time, the agency has yet to receive the equipment
and is forced to reinitiate the process.
° The lack of results causes many staff to do without. In some cases,
staff have resorted to using in the office their own personnally
purchased equipment.
° The Division has nonetneless made progress in implementing portions of
its ADP plan and is currently awaiting receipt of 4 micro-computers to
be deployed in each of the Division's operating units. This supply,
however, falls significantly short of meeting pent-up demand.
Issue: Outside Influences on the Manifest System's Operation
The report cites numerous problems associated with the system's use versus
its potential and the Division's ability to meet deadlines associated with
reaching this full potential. It does not mention actions initiated by other
agencies, in particular EPA, that adversely affect the Division's ability to
meet its stated manifest system objectives. An example is the manifest form
itself.
° New England states, until September 1984, used a comprehensive manifest
document they had developed in absence of federal action.
In September 1984, EPA required use of the National Manifest document.
This form differed from the previous New England form in its numbering
sequence rules, content, number of copies, etc. This necessitated data
base adjustments and a re-education of notifying facilities, thus
distracting the limited staff resources from their primary tasks.
The national form is again undergoing revision in order to accommodate
the certification statement by large quantity generators on waste mini-
mization which is mandatory as of September 1, 1985. This change will
again create an upheaval in the smooth functioning of the system but, we
nonetheless continue to support a national lead in this area.
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COMPLIANCE and ENFORCEMENT
Issue: Distribution of Resource and Workloads Amongst Regional Offices
The report finds that the Northeast Region has a disproportionately high
number of facilities and hazardous waste generators to be inspected, as well as
high levels of other program activity such as emergency responses. The report
then concludes that in comparison to the staffing and levels of activities found
in the three other regions, the number of staff in the Northeast Region is not
adequate. (See pages 70-72.)
° The Division agrees with this finding.
° For the specific purpose of evaluating the distribution of regional
staff, the Division prepared region-by-region analyses of program
activities. This information has already been and will continue to be
used to allocate staff among our offices and programs.
Issue: Complexity of Implementing an Enforcement Program
The report has identified the difficulties of implementing an enforce-
ment program that covers all of the Department's mandates in a comprehensive,
systematic manner. The findings are: too long a timespan for accomplishing the
goals of the Department's Enforcement Review Group, and an inability to
establish and monitor enforcement procedures resulting in regional autonomy
and an apparent lack of centralized control. (See pages 82-85.)
As part of the development of an enforcement program that sets
priorities, and ensures consistent and smooth operation, the
Division established an Enforcement Review Group in 1982 to
begin to address these broad concerns as well as to attend
to current, high priority enforcement cases. By December 1984,
the Division had adopted its own set of Enforcement Guidelines.
EPA, which performs quarterly file reviews of all regional files,
and mid-year and annual program reviews, has found in its most recent
mid-year review that the Division has made substantial progress in
improving its enforcement activities. In addition to recognizing
Division efforts to upgrade its enforcement program, EPA recognized the
Division for its initiative in developing a pilot non-notifier program.
The Division has appointed a Regional Operations Coordinator who
focuses on improving the consistency of compliance and enforcement
activities and coordinates monthly Technical Sessions held with
regional staff to improve their proficiency in these areas.
Issue: The Existence of Plans for Data Management in the Compliance and
Enforcement Programs
The report states that our "inspection/enforcement section has no
computer capability nor is one planned in the future." All inspection activi-
ties must be tabulated manually. Further, there is no immediate access to data
by the regions in order to monitor activities or analyze data. The regions have
no effective, simple tracking systems for cases. (See page 35.)
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The Division agrees with the underlying premise that the Department
must automate its data bases and develop a communications network be-
tween offices in order to have complete and timely information on
compliance and enforcement activities. An electronic communications
network between all offices is part of the Department's ADP Plan which
is being implemented as quickly as the state's hardware/software acqui-
sition process allows.
Presently, the Division has a manual reporting system (MIF-Management
Information Form) in effect that provides much of this data to the
Boston Office for quarterly summarization. A microcomputer is on
order to aid the Boston Office with tabulation of this data. The
regional offices which provide Boston with this data do have manual
tracking systems for enforcement cases.
Issue: Setting Enforcement/Compliance Priorities
The report cites the need to prioritize activities because resources are
very limited, but acknowledges that establishing priorities is difficult because
of limited data and the fact that the agency is working on uncharted, complex
issues. (See page 86.
)
° Setting priorities, while a difficult task, needs to be done because
resources are limited. The Division's practice is to select priorities
and program initiatives in conjunction with the broad-based Hazardous
Waste Advisory Committee established by MGL c. 21C. Through a series of
progam effectiveness reviews and planning sessions, the Division rou-
tinely reviews its goals and priorities, which may in practice shift in
response to emergency issues.
° This process of periodic evaluation has led to Division involvement in
a number of areas not previously recognized as priorities within the
framework of the federal program. For example, the Division has:
- developed a pilot non-notifier program focusing on small quantity
generators;
- vigorously enforced the financial responsibility requirements
for treatment, storage and disposal facilities.
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COMMUNITY OUTREACH/EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS
Background
The Division's public outreach activities have been designed to meet two
purposes: first, to obtain significant public input to the process of deve-
loping the hazardous waste regulatory program, and second, to provide infor-
mation about regulatory requirements to both industry and communities. During
the period studied, the Division concentrated on meeting the first public
outreach objective, largely through organizing and providing staff support for
the Hazardous Waste Advisory Committee and the regulatory hearing -process. The
Division then proposed the Industry Assistance and Community Hazardous Waste
Coordinator Programs as vehicles for meeting the second of its outreach objec-
tives.
Issue: The Committee states that the "minimal temporary resources needed,
combined with its far-reaching value, do not justify" the inactivity of
"outreach programs, particularly the Community Hazardous Waste Coordinator
Program. . ."(page 121).
The Division's early experience with the Community Hazardous Waste
Coordinator Program (CHWCP) pointed out some of the problems which can
occur when agency resource shortfalls are coupled with unbridled local
enthusiasm for addressing hazardous waste issues. The uncertainty and
wide variability of volunteer participation and the inadvisabil ity of
encouraging possible contact with hazardous waste sites are factors which
have constrained DEQE's reliance on the CHWCP.
In evaluating both the CHWCP and the Industrial Assistance Program (IAP),
it is clear that these activities require more than "minimal temporary
resources." Sufficient staff must be available to deal with the programs
themselves and with the ancillary activities thereby generated. This
latter group of activities range from the CHWC-initiated hazardous waste
site efforts to reports of non-notif iers and other types of non-
compl iance.
° Recently the Division has obtained the additional staff in the Compliance
and Enforcement Sections that are needed to help make a locally-based
network truly effective. The Division's continuing plan is to resume
many of its former outreach activities as the resources become available.
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EXHIBIT 1
Division of Solid and Hazardous Waste
Staffing Level By Program Over Time
Program
Hazardous Waste
Regulatory Program (1)
(1)Massachusetts Superfund
Solid Waste Management
Major Enforcement
Cases
Management/Legal
Total
Authorized
Staffing
Levels
FY 1984
Filled
Positions
7/84
Authorized
Staffing
Level
s
FY 1986
Filled
Positions
5/85
59 38.5 81 51
59 39.5 102 72
2 2 28 12
2 1 5 3
b
_5 8 8
128 86 224 146(2)
(1)
Includes administration and clerical staffing levels within the Division of Solid
and Hazardous Waste
(2) Additional personnel actions since May 1985 have increased the total staffing
level to 164.



